Philosophy Of Science

Deutsch’s Epistemic Theory Applied to His ‘Many-Worlds’ Interpretation of Quantum Physics: A Case of Epistemic Inconsistency

by Ravi Shukla

Science & Anarchism

by Karl Rogers

Amazon Digital Services

The Woes of Scientific Realism

by Jonathan Okeke

Kanu Anthony Ikechukwu, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Published in
AFRREV STECH
An International Journal of Science and Technology
Bahir Dar, Ethiopia
Vol.1 (1) April-July, 2012:32-44

This paper investigated the disagreement between Realists and Anti-realists on the observable and unobservable... more
This paper investigated the disagreement between Realists and Anti-realists on the observable and unobservable distinction in scientific practice. While the realists maintain that machines and gadgets can simulate the human act of perception there-by making all realities under the screen of science observable, the anti-realists or the instrumentalists insist that what cannot be observed with the human senses even if detected with gadgets are not observable. This paper contended against the realist position which says that machines can simulate the human activity of perception. Hence the distinction between what is observable and unobservable is shown to be indisputable.

Can we dispense with the structural explanation of social facts?

by Jeroen Van Bouwel

In: Economics and philosophy 18 (2002): 259-275.

Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best... more Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level.

The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism.

This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.

A PRAGMATIST DEFENSE OF NON‐RELATIVISTIC EXPLANATORY PLURALISM IN HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

by Jeroen Van Bouwel

History and Theory 47(2): 168-182 (2008).

Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example,... more Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with “anything goes”: we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown.

The utility of mathematical constructs in building archaeological theory

by Dwight Read

A Formal Explanation of Formal Explanation

by Dwight Read

Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences: Vol. 3: No. 2, Article 4. http://repositories.cdlib.org/imbs/socdyn/sdeas/vol3/iss2/art4

Two kinds of formal models need to be distinguished: data models derived from patterned observations and theory models... more Two kinds of formal models need to be distinguished: data models derived from patterned observations and theory models derived from theories about processes that produce the patterned observations. These correspond to the difference between the phenomenal domain of observations and the ideational domain of theories. Explanation can be characterized by isomorphism between data models and theory models. The physical, biological and cultural domains differ by what constitute the relevant structuring processes for each of these domains. The cultural domain associated with human societies is far more complex than the other two because the domain of observation must include cultural idea systems. One of the primary roles of formal models for cultural idea systems is to determine the necessary consequences (through mathematical reasoning) of processes hypothesized to provide their internal coherency.

Do we need to invoke multiple levels of selection to explain the evolution of altruism?

by Martin Huncovsky

Written as a part of course assignment.

The Uses of a Good Theory

by Steve Bearman

Co-authored with Faye Crosby

How does one diminish discrimination? Many members of SPSSI, including the present authors, have tried to reduce... more How does one diminish discrimination? Many members of SPSSI, including the present authors, have tried to reduce discrimination through the application of good theories. We outline three theoretical approaches that Crosby, like many other psychologists, has taken as she has struggled with discrimination. Sometimes missing in Crosby's approach, and often missing in the approach of others, is a frank avowal of values. We argue that the attempt to divorce science from values renders theories less effective than they need be and even allows unexamined values to contaminate good research.

Concepts in Complexity II: Emergence and the Difference Between Order and Organization

by Jon Lawhead

Still very much a draft. 

This paper would not have been possible without the help of Daniel Estrada and Tim Ignaffo.

There are a number of contemporary scientific problems that can benefit from good metaphysical analysis and... more There are a number of contemporary scientific problems that can benefit from good metaphysical analysis and philosophical clarification.  This paper examines one of these problems—explaining the nature of self-organized emergent behavior in dynamical physical systems.  While discussions of emergence have long been the province of metaphysicians, recent advances in network theory and complex systems theory have begun to suggest that there is both philosophical and metaphysical work to be done here, and that a rigorous, mathematically-grounded account of emergence might serve as the foundation upon which we can construct a tremendous number of other novel contributions to our understanding of the world. 

This paper explores the conceptual connection between this mathematically rigorous account of “strong emergence” (developed primarily by Yaneer Bar-Yam) and the still somewhat murky notion of self-organized systems.  I argue that a clear scientific understanding of emergence leads to a natural way of understanding the metaphysics of self-organization and (more generally) the difference between order and organization.  All three of these notions are central to the nascent field of complex systems theory, and getting a strong grasp on their conceptual relationships would represent not only a significant step toward developing a cohesive metaphysics of complex systems, but would also provide the theoretical tools necessary for continued philosophical and scientific work in that area. 

Given the sheer number (and diversity) of fields that stand to benefit from complexity-theoretic insights, this is work that urgently needs to be done.

"The Loneliest Desert": Science and the Ascetic Ideal in Nietzsche's Genealogy

by Nicholas Smyth

Draft, all comments welcome!

This paper is my attempt to make sense of Nietzsche's claim, made in the final few sections of the Genealogy of... more This paper is my attempt to make sense of Nietzsche's claim, made in the final few sections of the Genealogy of Morals, that scientific practise and the Christian 'ascetic ideal' share the same foundation. This is a puzzling and counterintuitive claim, yet, I shall attempt to elucidate and defend Nietzsche on this score, arguing that the scientist's attempt to eliminate pretense-like mental states from inquiry is a paradigm case of ascetic activity. Nietzsche's fundamental insight is that science, qua ascetic practise, cannot stand as the required counter-ideal that might banish the ascetic ideal from human life.

Ferit Uslu, BİLİMSELLİĞİN KRİTERİ VE SINIRLARI PROBLEMİ: BİLİM, BİLİM OLMAYAN VE SAHTE BİLİM

by Ferit Uslu

Telif makaledir.

ÖZET:
Bu makale, bilim felsefesi edebiyatında “bilimin sınırları problemi” denen sorunu ele almaktadır. Bu... more ÖZET:
Bu makale, bilim felsefesi edebiyatında “bilimin sınırları problemi” denen sorunu ele almaktadır. Bu çerçevede şu sorulara cevap aranmaktadır: bir metni, bir teoriyi, bir araştırmayı bilimsel yapan şey nedir? Bilimi ve bilimsel olanı metafizik öğretilerden, ideolojilerden, sahte-bilimden ve komploteorilerden nasıl ayırt edebiliriz? Makalede bu soruların cevabı incelenirken mantıkçı pozitivistlerin tümevarımcı bilim yöntemleri, Popper’ın tümdengelimci bilim yöntemi, T. Kuhn’un boz-yap çözebilme yeteneği olarak bilim anlayışı, I. Lakatos’un bir araştırma programı olarak bilim anlayışı öncelikle ele alınmıştır. Ardından bu konudaki yeni gelişmeler ele alınmış ve çoklu bilimsellik kriterleri incelenmiştir. Son olarak makale, bir şeyi sahte-bilim yapan nitelikler üzerinde durmaktadır.

ABSTRACT:
The article deals with the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science. In this context, it looks for answers to the following questions: What makes a text, a theory or a research scientific? How can we demarcate science and scientific from metaphysical thoughts, ideologies, pseudo-sciences and conspiracy theories? Those questions are discussed around the views of some modern philosophers. In this context, first of all the article deals with logical positivists and induction as their scientific method, Popper and deduction as his scientific method, T. Kuhn and his view of science as puzzle-solving skill, I. Lakatos and his view of science as research programmes. Then the article examines recent views on demarcation problem and evaluates multi criterion views about what makes something scientific. Finally the article seeks to give answer to the question what makes something pseudo-scientific.
Key words: Scientific, demarcation problem, pseudo-scienc

Rethinking Human Nature and the Place of (Wo)Man in the world: Anthropology between Philosophy and Science. A Manifesto

by Giacomo Pezzano

We are knowing more and more about (Wo)Man, but the determination of her/his nature is still problematic: asking «What... more We are knowing more and more about (Wo)Man, but the determination of her/his nature is still problematic: asking «What is (Wo)Man?» is paradoxically possible only in the space left open by (wo)man’s erasure. Whatever human nature is, (wo)man wants to know her/himself, because if (s)he does not know who (s)he is, (s)he can not know where to go: moving from hominitas to humanitas requires a definition of (wo)man’s nature, of her/his «place» in the world, in view of describing ex-istence as a modulation of the «World Openness» and an attempt to find a way of articulate the possibilities, as intrinsically «medial» and «modal» since it is founded on «referral» and «relationship with the outside»

Misyurov D.A. Dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas // Credo New. 2012. №2

by Dmitry Misyurov

The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with... more The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with dominant and the non-dominant elements; universal formula; formula with symbolic weight of elements; tautological formula. For example, it suggests an opportunity to use the dialectical formulas for modeling and artificial intelligence creation, etc.

Engineering love

by Brian Earp

Savulescu, J. and Sandberg, A. (2012). Love machine: Engineering lifelong romance. New Scientist, 2864, 28-29.

Essay partially adapted from Earp, B. D., Sandberg, A., and Savulescu, J. (2012). Natural selection, childrearing, and the ethics of marriage (and divorce): Building a case for the neuroenhancement of human relationships. Philosophy & Technology, forthcoming [see "profile" box in article].

Available at the New Scientist website: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21428646.200-love-machine-engineering-lifelong-romance.html

New Scientist BIG IDEA section, May 2012.

With break-up and divorce a major part of modern life, it looks... more New Scientist BIG IDEA section, May 2012.

With break-up and divorce a major part of modern life, it looks like we may be outliving our inborn capacity to love. But there could be a way to outwit evolution and make love last.

Also available at New Scientist: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21428646.200-love-machine-engineering-lifelong-romance.html.

Selectionist Approaches in Evolutionary Linguistics: an epistemological analysis

by Nathalie Gontier

Applied Evolutionary Epistemology: A new method to enhance interdisciplinary research between the life and human sciences.

by Nathalie Gontier

pdf download here: http://kairos.fc.ul.pt/nr%204/Applied%20Evolutionary%20Epistemology.pdf

Cézanne's Vision: Confront the Sciences With the Nature From Which They Came

by Hans H. Diebner

Studia UBB. Philosophia LVII, 33-57 (1/2012)

Science and Transcendence: Westphal, Derrida, and Responsibility

by Nathan Kowalsky

published in 'Zygon:  Journal of Religion and Science', March 2012.

A full copy of the paper is available from the author upon request.

On the naive reading, “radical social constructivism” would be the result of “deconstructing” science. Science would... more On the naive reading, “radical social constructivism” would be the result of “deconstructing” science. Science would simply be a contingent construction in accordance with social determinants. However, postmodernism does not necessarily abandon fidelity to the objects of thought. Merold Westphal's Derridean philosophy of religion emphasizes that even theology need not eliminate the transcendence of the divine other. By drawing an analogy between natural and supernatural transcendence, I argue that science is similarly called to responsibility in the encounter with that which lies outside its horizon of expectation. Science's rational autonomy is overcome by the heteronomy of realities that precede it. Understanding species as homeostatic property clusters is an example of nonessentialist, postmodern, and scientific realism. Science is still a vehicle for encountering natural alterity, thus decentering the relativism thought to characterize postmodernism. However, natural science must not attempt to place the whole of being at human disposal if it is to fulfill the potential of Westphal's philosophy of religion.

Book Review of Sandra Mitchell (2009) Unsimple Truths. Science, Complexity, and Policy.

by Jeroen Van Bouwel

In: Science & Education (forthcoming).