Philosophy Of Psychology

THE SELF

by stanley wilkin

This work and others can be found on: www.greenwich-academy-books.com

The nature of the integrated Self. The nature of the integrated Self.

Arbitrating between Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory: Evidence from a Think-aloud Study of Counterfactual Reasoning

by Meredith Wilkinson

Co-authored with Linden J. Ball and Rachel Cooper

Wilkinson, M. R., Ball, L. J., & Cooper, R. (2010).  Arbitrating between theory-theory and simulation theory:  Evidence from a think-aloud study of counterfactual reasoning. Chapter in S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.) Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. (pp. 1008-1013) Austin, Texas: Cognitive Science Society     

Phenomenological Psychological Research as Science

by Marc Applebaum

Published in the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 2012 (43)

Husserl framed his phenomenological inquiries as a response to the historical moment in which he found himself—a... more Husserl framed his phenomenological inquiries as a response to the historical moment in which he found himself—a period of crisis in which, he argued, a pervasive attitude of skepticism threatened to undermine peoples’ trust in their capacity to discover meaning in individual and communal life through reasoned inquiry. Today, a range of naïve assumptions regarding the meaning of science present challenges to conveying a Husserlian approach to psychological research. This paper is intended to address a variety of assumptions which can be encountered when introducing students to Giorgi’s phenomenological psychological research method. These assumptions are: 1) That the meaning of “science” is exhausted by empirical science, and therefore qualitative research, even if termed “human science,” is more akin to literature or art than methodical, scientific inquiry; 2) That as a primarily aesthetic, poetic enterprise human scientific psychology need not attempt to achieve a degree of rigor and epistemological clarity analogous (while not equivalent) to that pursued by natural scientists; 3) That “objectivity” is a concept belonging to natural science, and therefore human science ought not to strive for objectivity because this would require “objectivizing” the human being; 4) That qualitative research must always adopt an “interpretive” approach, description being seen as merely a mode of interpretation. These assumptions are responded to from a perspective drawing primarily upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but also upon Eagleton’s analysis of aestheticism.

The Ethics of Cognitive Extension

by Joe Dewhurst

First published in Aporia (Issue 9, May 2012: 22-28). Draft version attached. The author can be contacted at 0819473.sms.ed.ac.uk

This paper explores some of the ethical implications of hypothesis of extended cognition. It discusses the possibility... more This paper explores some of the ethical implications of hypothesis of extended cognition. It discusses the possibility of the manipulation of external memory stores qualifying as literally tampering with somebody's memories, as well as the implications of social extension for moral responsibility and agency. It concludes that if the hypothesis of extended cognition gains widespread public acceptance, it will change the shape and texture of moral discourse.

Sobre los usos de situaciones imaginarias en filosofía política

by Ernesto Riffo Elgueta

Hermeneutics and psychology: A review and dialectical model

by Kevin Reimer

How far have we come since the Age of Enlightenment?

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2008). How far have we come since the Age of Enlightenment? [Review of the book Brain, mind and medicine: Essays in Eighteenth-century neuroscience]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 53 (26).

Philosophy and psychology: Need there be estrangement?

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2010). Philosophy and psychology: need there be estrangement? [Review of the motion picture Examined Life ]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 55 (29).

Explanation in personality psychology: ‘verbal magic' & the Five-Factor Model

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2011). Explanation in personality psychology: ‘verbal magic' & the Five-Factor Model. Philosophical Psychology, 24 (2), 223-243.

Scientific psychology involves both identifying and classifying phenomena of interest (description) and revealing the... more Scientific psychology involves both identifying and classifying phenomena of interest (description) and revealing the causes and mechanisms that contribute towards these phenomena arising (explanation). Within personality psychology, some propose that aspects of behaviour and cognition can be explained with reference to personality traits. However, certain conceptual and logical issues cast doubt upon the satisfactoriness of traits as coherent explanatory constructs. This paper discusses ‘explanation' in psychology and the problems of circularity and reification. An analysis of relations and intrinsic properties is then developed to address the logical requirements necessary for circumventing these problems. An examination of McCrae and Costa's defense of traits as explanatory constructs, in terms of ‘tendencies' and ‘dispositions', highlights logical issues that prevent traits, so defined, from explaining trait-like behaviours and cognitions. The logical requirements for a coherent trait explanatory account are outlined and possible explanatory directions in trait-approaches are discussed. The ongoing tendency towards fallacious reasoning in psychology and suggestions for preventing this are further examined.

Addressing Mental Plurality: Justification, Objections and Logical Requirements of Strongly Partitive Accounts of Mind

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2005). Addressing mental plurality: Justification, objections & logical requirements of strongly partitive accounts of mind. Theory & Psychology, 15 (6), 747-767.

Strongly partitive accounts deviate radically from the common view of a single, unified knower or self within each... more Strongly partitive accounts deviate radically from the common view of a single, unified knower or self within each ‘person’, proposing instead an account of multiple knowers. This view is justified by consideration of mental conflict, and objections, including the view that conflict does not require strong partitioning, that there exists a tension between ‘persons’ and ‘parts’, and the problem of homunculi, are found not to hold. However, the problems of proposing partitioning ad hoc and ad libitum are genuine concerns that any account of mental plurality must address. The realist account of cognition, proposing that cognition is a relation between subject and object terms existing independently of the cognitive relation, provides a conceptual basis for evaluating strongly partitive accounts. On this view, any account of knowers, either singular or plural, must be capable of specifying their intrinsic qualities. Pears’s account is found to be problematic here since it fails to meet this logical requirement. Maze’s account is found to satisfy this requirement, providing in-principle means of characterizing the multiple knowers.

Ethicists' Courtesy at Philosophy Conferences

by Linus (Ta-Lun) Huang

Mary Jane, don’t deflate your Perception! Burge’s Perceptual Representationalism and Vision Science.

by Carlos M. Muñoz-Suárez

I argue that the version of Perceptual Representationalism extensively endorsed by Tyler Burge in his Origins of... more I argue that the version of Perceptual Representationalism extensively endorsed by Tyler Burge in his Origins of Objectivity (2010) captures an incomplete theory of perception. Although Burge offers compelling solutions to some core problems shaping perceptual psychology (i.e. the underdetermination problems), it neglects a third problem which has been of capital relevance in perceptual psychology and vision science: the problem of explaining the neurobiological correlates of the outcomes of perceptual systems. This indifference seems to elicit what I will call the explanatory ascent shaping Burge’s theory.

On Erich Fromm: why he left the Frankfurt school

by Caroline Kamau

Kamau, C. (2012).

Chapter synopsis: 'On Erich Fromm: Why he left the Frankfurt School':

-Biography: Erich Fromm
-Erich... more Chapter synopsis: 'On Erich Fromm: Why he left the Frankfurt School':

-Biography: Erich Fromm
-Erich Fromm was very critical of Freudian psychoanalysis. The Frankfurt School disapproved of that.
-Tension arose between Fromm and Horkheimer/Adorno/Marcuse and other pro-Freudian contemporaries
-Erich Fromm had reservations about the Frankfurt School's desire to merge psychoanalysis with Marxist theory
-Controversy arose over the Frankfurt School's decision not to publish a manuscript that Fromm wrote, with Weiss. This was a report of their landmark authoritarian personality study of 1931. The topic and methodology shaped the Frankfurt School's later research into authoritarianism (e.g. Adorno et al.'s famous studies).

This chapter also discusses Erich Fromm's work post-Frankfurt School:
--Fromm on social neurosis
--Fromm on thoughts as a form of self-presentation or impression management
--Fromm's theoretical focus on self identity, rather than instincts
--Fromm's theory about personality traits
--Fromm on empiricism and psychology versus psychoanalysis

I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2012). I can’t get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, in press.

Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness”... more Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness” worth solving in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I defend Chalmers against Dennett on this point: I argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, that it is distinct in kind from the so-called easy problems, and that it is vital for the sake of honest and productive research in the cognitive sciences to be clear about the difference. But I have my own rebuke for Chalmers on the point of explanation. Chalmers (1995, 1996) proposes to “solve” the hard problem of consciousness by positing qualia as fundamental features of the universe, alongside such ontological basics as mass and space-time. But this is an inadequate solution: to posit, I will urge, is not to explain. To bolster this view, I borrow from an account of explanation by which it must provide “epistemic satisfaction” to be considered successful (Rowlands, 2001; Campbell, 2009), and show that Chalmers’ proposal fails on this account. I conclude that research in the science of consciousness cannot move forward without greater conceptual clarity in the field.

The Ultimate Reality and Meaning of Samkhya

by Shiv Talwar

Published in the Journal of Ultimate Reality and Meaning, Vol. 24, No.1, March 2001.
Print a copy by visiting spiritualeducation.org.

It is in the nature of thinking and feeling minds to attempt to explain the totality of human experience. In the... more It is in the nature of thinking and feeling minds to attempt to explain the totality of human experience. In the absence of a plausible explanation, humanity attempts to improve its understanding until a reasonably satisfactory explanation is found that satisfies both the human head and the heart. Sages around the world have always searched for such explanations. In India, a school of thought known as the Samkhya philosophy is an outstanding example of this universal search for global truth.

Samkhya seems to understand the universe of sense perception as resulting from an unseen ultimate reality. Although this reality is totally imperceptible in itself, it is capable of being felt by the human heart and it underlies the entirety of perceptible universe.

Samkhya thinking regards the perceptible as a manifestation of the imperceptible underlying reality through some process of successive discretization. It enumerates the sequentially concrete and ephemeral principles emerging from the infinitely subtle and eternal ultimate reality. These principles together culminate in the universe of sense perception.

Yoga: Attainment of Ultimate Reality and Meaning

by Shiv Talwar

Piublished in the Journal of Ultimate Reality and Meaning, Vol. 27, No.1, March 2004.
Print a copy by visiting spiritualeducation.org.

Yoga is a serious system of contemplation with an integrated approach towards both the objective and transcendental... more Yoga is a serious system of contemplation with an integrated approach towards both the objective and transcendental knowledge. Yoga is a Sanskrit word, which is derived from the root yuj, meaning ‘to join’. Its purpose is first to unite the contemplative with the objective reality of the object of contemplation and then to enable unity with the realm transcending objectivity.

Yogic process begins with consciously stilling the mind to free it of its usual disturbances and fleetingness in order to develop an incisive focus of intellect to enable uninterrupted contemplation of one object. Eventually, even this one object fades and disappears from consciousness, which is left completely free of ordinary activity. The contemplative must want passionately to know the object of contemplation, or the effort needed for the contemplative union will not be possible. Any object of contemplation can enable the transcendence of objectivity, if the contemplative effort is uninterrupted.

Reflections on the possibilities and challenges of scientific production in psychology.

by Joao Batista Martins

with PALMIERI, Marilícia Witzler Antunes Ribeiro  - Psicologia em Estudo, vol.13, n.4, pp. 743-752, 2008

Psychology scientific production indicates the existence of methodological and epistemological controversies. The... more Psychology scientific production indicates the existence of methodological and epistemological controversies. The emergency of new epistemological perspectives requires a discussion on the possibilities and the challenges of the knowledge construction process. Discussion ranges from the acknowledgement of subjectivity in the process of scientific investigation, which, in fact, underpins the overcoming of dichotomical trends in the understanding of Psi phenomena, and subverts the positivist organization of thought. Since new ways for knowledge building are suggested, new concepts are provided as subjectivity factors. The researcher's labor becomes closer to that of the bricoleur's. Implications in knowledge production are acknowledged and tension fields are created that facilitate a new understanding of the world. The process of knowledge construction organizes and assures a more complex glance on Psi phenomena.

A Metacognitive Model of the Sense of Agency over Thoughts

by Glenn Carruthers

in press, in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

Introduction: The sense of agency over thoughts is the experience of oneself qua agent of mental action. Those... more Introduction: The sense of agency over thoughts is the experience of oneself qua agent of mental action. Those suffering certain psychotic symptoms are thought to have a deficient sense of agency. Here I seek to explain this sense of agency in terms of metacognition.
Method: I start with the proposal that the sense of agency is elicited by metacognitive monitoring representations that are used in the intentional inhibition of thoughts. I apply this model to verbal hallucinations and the like and examine the plausibility of this model explaining deficits associated with these symptoms.
Results: By tying the sense of agency to metacognitive inhibition I propose that the loss of a sense of agency in certain psychotic symptoms is accompanied by a particular deficit in the patient’s ability to control their own thinking. This is consistent with the experiences of those at high risk of developing hallucinations, who report more intrusive thoughts than controls. The model I present is able to explain why those at risk of developing verbal hallucinations and those suffering from verbal hallucinations have deficits in the intentional inhibition of thought. I defend this account from a possible objection by distinguishing the form of the intentional inhibition deficit displayed by those suffering verbal hallucination from that displayed by those suffering from orbital-frontal cortex lesions and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Conclusion: A plausible hypothesis is that the sense of agency over thoughts is elicited by the metacognitive monitoring representation used to intentionally inhibit thoughts. The deficit in the sense of agency over thoughts associated with certain psychotic symptoms could be explained by a failure to properly metacognitively monitor certain thought processes.

Toward a Cognitive Model of the Sense of Embodiment in a (Rubber) Hand

by Glenn Carruthers

in press in the Journal of Consciousness Studies

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the experience of an artificial body part as being a real body part and the... more The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the experience of an artificial body part as being a real body part and the experience of touch coming from that artificial body part. An explanation of this illusion would take significant steps towards explaining the experience of embodiment in one’s own body. I present a new cognitive model to explain the RHI. I argue that the sense of embodiment arises when an on-line representation of the candidate body part is represented as matching an off-line prototype representation of what one’s body is usually like. The cause of the sense of embodiment in the model body part only partially overlaps with the causes of proprioceptive drift, which commonly accompanies the RHI, and so is compatible with observed dissociations between the illusion and proprioceptive drift. The distinguishing features of this model are the off-line body representation, and the process of matching an on-line model to an off-line model, both of which are to be understood in terms of a conceptual space.

Key Words: Rubber Hand Illusion; RHI; Sense of Embodiment; Self Consciousness; Body Experience

Neurosciences et droit pénal : le déterminisme peut-il sauver la conception utilitariste de la peine ?

by Florian Cova

Published in Klesis, issue 21, 2011, pp.33-77.

Greene et Cohen (2004) ont défendu la thèse selon laquelle le développement des neurosciences, en favorisant une... more Greene et Cohen (2004) ont défendu la thèse selon laquelle le développement des neurosciences, en favorisant une vision déterministe de l'action humaine, finira par bouleverser notre conception de la peine et favorisera une conception utilitariste de celle-ci. De façon similaire, Xavier Bébin (2006) a défendu que les découvertes des neurosciences devraient nous conduire à adopter une conception utilitariste de la peine. Dans ce papier, je discute et rejette ces deux arguments, en utilisant des outils tirés de la philosophie, de la philosophie expérimentale, et de la psychologie.