Philosophical Scepticism

Skepticism and information

by Eric T. Kerr

Co-authored with Duncan Pritchard. Forthcoming. In In H. Demir (eds), Luciano Floridi’s Philosophy of Technology: Critical Reflections. Springer.

Philosophers of information, according to Luciano Floridi (2010, 32), study how information should be “adequately... more Philosophers of information, according to Luciano Floridi (2010, 32), study how information should be “adequately created, processed, managed, and used.” A small number of epistemologists have employed the concept of information as a cornerstone of their theoretical framework. How this concept can be used to make sense of seemingly intractable epistemological problems, however, has not been widely explored. This paper examines Fred Dretske’s information-based epistemology, in particular his response to radical epistemological skepticism. We discuss the relationship between information, evidence and knowledge in relation to the problem of skepticism and the options available to an information-based epistemology for dealing with it.

Craigian Contextualism and Radical Scepticism

by Robin McKenna

Draft only.

Musings on Hume's Treatise

by Kile Jones

Blindness and Enlightenment: An Essay: With a New Translation of Diderot's' Letter on the Blind'and La Mothe Le Vayer's' Of a Man Born Blind'

by Kate Tunstall

A Puzzle about Natural Laws and the Existence of God

by Danny Frederick

Forthcoming, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, DOI: 10.1007/s11153-012-9343-8.
The final publication is available, online before print, at:
http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/s11153-012-9343-8

The existence of natural laws, whether deterministic or indeterministic, and whether exceptionless or ceteris paribus,... more The existence of natural laws, whether deterministic or indeterministic, and whether exceptionless or ceteris paribus, seems puzzling because it implies that mindless bits of matter behave in a consistent and co-ordinated way. I explain this puzzle by showing that a number of attempted solutions fail. The puzzle could be resolved if it were assumed that natural laws are a manifestation of God’s activity. This argument from natural law to God’s existence differs from its traditional counterparts in that, whereas the latter seek to explain the fact of natural laws, the former seeks to explain their possibility. The customary objections to the traditional arguments cannot be successfully adapted to counter this new argument, with one exception which has only limited effect. I rebut four claims that the theistic solution to the puzzle about natural laws is paradoxical, though I concede that one of these claims has merit. I consider four objections to the new argument but find three of them more or less unsatisfactory. The fourth, if successful, would undermine our claims to know the truth about the world.

Ségismond et le malin génie: Labyrinthes franco-ibériques de la rise sceptique

by antonio dominguez leiva

Homoerotik und Jenseitssymbolik - das selbstfressende Selbst als megalomanes Verfallsaxiom mehrfach kategorisierter Spezialhermeneutik

by Martin Jacob Schaunpeter

1990

Review of the Routledge Companion to Epistemology

by Aidan McGlynn

Draft only - final version to appear in the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.

Strangling philosophy

by Tawadeen Bankole

The friction in philosophy

by Tawadeen Bankole

Diseased Philosophy

by Tawadeen Bankole

http://rebelreasoner.blogspot.com/ http://rebelreasoner.blogspot.com/

Carneades' Art of Living

by Mike Bennett

Draft only. Do not cite without permission.

The lie that is philosophy

by Tawadeen Bankole

Categorías y supuestos del escepticismo pirrónico

by Ignacio Pajón Leyra

En el presente trabajo hemos tratado de exponer una visión unitaria de la génesis del pensamiento escéptico en su... more En el presente trabajo hemos tratado de exponer una visión unitaria de la génesis del pensamiento escéptico en su doble vertiente histórica y temática. Por ello, la estructuración interna evita el mero orden cronológico intentando, por el contrario, agrupar las corrientes objeto de estudio en función de la proximidad de sus contenidos doctrinales y también del modo de comprensión de estos contenidos por parte de la propia tradición escéptica. Así, la aproximación a la filosofía escéptica que aquí se ofrece pretende especialmente clarificar el decurso de la línea filosófica que, según el propio escepticismo, se inicia en los albores de la tradición griega y que termina dando lugar al corpus ideológico de la escuela pirrónica a partir de Enesidemo. La comprensión de este decurso filosófico se muestra como requisito previo imprescindible para cualquier investigación que pretenda poner en claro los presupuestos y categorías subyacentes a la filosofía escéptica. Por ello, hemos tratado de analizar y discutir con detenimiento las nociones fundamentales que funcionan como marco de referencia del pensamiento pirrónico, así como el papel que cada una de ellas desempeña en la concepción filosófica escéptica en su conjunto. Nuestra intención fundamental ha sido la de trazarnos como línea de investigación uno de los aspectos a nuestro entender más interesantes de la concepción filosófica que caracteriza a la corriente escéptica: el alcance teórico y las características específicas de su posición, determinadas por el tipo de supuestos con los que el filósofo escéptico cuenta a la base de su actividad.

Hume on historical knowledge and the problem of scepticism about testimony

by Péter Hartl

Draft

Recently Hume's account of testimonial knowledge has been reconsidered and defended against its critics. These... more Recently Hume's account of testimonial knowledge has been reconsidered and defended against its critics. These interpretations challenge the reductionist account and place Hume's statements into a broader context. My discussion focuses on Hume's critique of miraculous testimony. Of Miracles is one of the most widely disputed of his texts. What I would like to examine, though, is whether Hume was in fact sceptical about testimonial knowledge, and whether we can interprete his theory in a Cartesian framework. I will investigate Coady's interpretation and his general objection against Hume's theory of testimony. I will also examine Hume's views on historical knowledge: since it is well known that he wrote thick volumes about the history of England, he could not have been completely sceptical about historical knowledge. I will also present Anscombe's classical interpretation of Hume's views on historical knowledge, and summarize Traiger's criticism. I will argue that Traiger's interpretation has some valuable points, even though he fails to show that Anscombe's interpretation is not valid. Nevertheless, Hume himself has not made a clear distinction between the “psychology” and “epistemology” of testimony, while he was aware of the importance of testimony as well as the essential social aspects of belief-forming.

Failures of philosophy

by Tawadeen Bankole

Redefining of values or the root of perspectives and actions

by Tawadeen Bankole

What happened to philosophy? (The collective consciousness)

by Tawadeen Bankole

Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science

by Danny Frederick

Forthcoming, THEORIA

Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which... more Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which people exhibit instrumental rationality. Popper points out that people also exhibit critical rationality, the tendency to stand back from, and to question or criticise, their views. I explain how our critical rationality impugns the explanatory value of the rationality principle and thereby threatens the very possibility of social science. I discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality with the possibility of social science if we invoke Popper’s conception of limited rationality and his indeterminism.

Philosophy and Disagreement

by Brian Ribeiro

Crítica 43 (2011): 3-25

Disagreement as we find it in both the history and the contemporary practice of philosophy is an inadequately... more Disagreement as we find it in both the history and the contemporary practice of philosophy is an inadequately understood phenomenon. In this paper I outline and motivate the problem of disagreement, arguing that "hard cases" of disagreement confront us with an unresolved, and seemingly unresolvable, challenge to the rationality of philosophical discourse, thereby raising the specter of a worrisome form of metaphilosophical skepticism. A variety of responses and attempted evasions are considered, though none are found to be particularly satisfying: Thus, the specter remains unexorcised.