A GEOGRAPHY OF THE LIFEWORLD in Retrospect: A Response to Shaun Moores
by David Seamon
originally published in the on-line journal PARTICIP@TIONS, vol. 3, November 2006
This essay is a response to Shaun Moores’ commentary on the author’s A GEOGRAPHY OF THE LIFEWORLD, a book that ... more
This essay is a response to Shaun Moores’ commentary on the author’s A GEOGRAPHY OF THE LIFEWORLD, a book that examines the significance of the everyday spaces, places, and environment in peoples’ daily lives (Seamon 1979). The author discusses a number of Moores’ concerns, including the role of media in supporting or undermining physical places; the value of phenomenological method for media and communication studies; and the charge that phenomenology is hindered by an essentialist approach that presupposes the presence and significance of invariant existential structures.
Keywords: architecture; digital media; everyday life; experience; media use; phenomenology; physical environment; place; space; placelessness; Merleau-Ponty
10 views
Being-in-the-Technologically-Mediated-World: The Existential Phenomenology of Marshall McLuhan
(2004, January). Unpublished paper. Two papers on McLuhan and phenomenology co-authored with Laureano Ralon (http://figureground.ca/author/lralon/) will be published in 2012. These new papers are inspired by the ideas originally pursued in this 2004 paper.
In this paper I make connections between McLuhan’s “general media theory” (his historical-analogical-perceptual model... more In this paper I make connections between McLuhan’s “general media theory” (his historical-analogical-perceptual model of communication running throughout his media writings) and a few key areas in existential and hermeneutic phenomenology such as the intentionality of human experience, Being-in-the-world, meaning and worldly encounter, Verstehen, and, via the work of Don Ihde, technologically-mediated existence. First, I sketch out a few key comparisons between McLuhan’s ontology (his “general media theory”) and Heideggerian-inspired philosophies of experience and interpretation. Second, I link McLuhan’s epistemology (his tetradic “laws of media”) to Ihde’s “phenomenology of media,” showing how the phenomenological McLuhan is most evident in his proposal for the tetrad by exploring the strong complementarities between McLuhan’s “method” and Ihde’s four-part model of “human-technology relations.” Third, I attempt to provide context and a corrective to some of McLuhan’s problematic critiques of phenomenology and make the claim that McLuhan would have found much common ground and intellectual fodder for his media theories in the works of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and Ricoeur. Ultimately, in the process of gradually unravelling an existentially phenomenological McLuhan, I make the claim that there is a latent but palpable communicational intentionality at the heart of McLuhan’s communication theory: For McLuhan, in our increasingly complex and technologically-mediated encounters with others and the greater world, the medium of communication (as the message) interplays with and influences, in varying degrees, how the world is encountered, projected onto, and reflected upon, simultaneously shaping our world as technology is in turn shaped by it. Finally, I conclude the paper with a speculative question: What if McLuhan had looked at phenomenology and Heideggerian-inspired philosophies of technology and human experience more closely? I believe it is fruitful to attempt to answer this question. The search for its answer, I claim, holds much promise for communication theory, technology assessment, and philosophy of technology research. With more explicitly phenomenological McLuhan, perhaps the “medium is the message” could have transformed into “Being-in-the-technologically-mediated-world is the message.”
Interactions Through the Screen: The Interactional Self as a Theory for Internet-Mediated Communication
(2004). Master of Arts Thesis, School of Communication, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby/Vancouver, BC, Canada.
This thesis presents an emerging concept called the interactional self to illustrate how, contrary to theories of... more
This thesis presents an emerging concept called the interactional self to illustrate how, contrary to theories of “cyberspace” and “cyberselves,” there tend not to be sharp socio-phenomenological distinctions between “virtual” and offline sociability within one’s life-world. As such, using aspects of the philosophies of experience of Heidegger, Mead, Schutz, and Husserl as foundations, this thesis argues that social interactions online, for most, are extensions of and not apart from their everyday, situated life-worlds.
After briefly introducing the path towards our contemporary “will-to-virtuality” and various utopian and dystopian visions of “cyberspace,” an alternative conceptual picture of the interactional self is gradually revealed using the metaphor of a portrait painted on a “social-world canvas.” In this painting, the ontology of Heidegger’s Dasein supplies the first brushes for outlining the early sketches of the interactional self, showing that online, as in offline settings, we encounter the world and others from the position of beings deeply engaged in practical daily acts and “interpretative understandings.” These brushes are then dipped into Mead’s intertactionist colours and Schutz’s socio-phenomenological textures, eventually filling in the portrait. Illustrated via a case study of blogging practices, Mead’s theory of the “generalized other” highlights the notion that the interactional self does not concretely distinguish between offline and online social settings but instead, as in more traditional “off the network” situations, uses Internet-mediated communication for performative practices that afford self-expression and maintain social cohesion. Schutz’s phenomenology of the life-world gives further perspective to the interactional self, showing that online sociability should not be viewed as being apart from the “intersubjective” intersection of life-worlds rooted in everyday life. With some help from Husserl’s phenomenology, Schutz is subsequently relied on for understanding online textual embodiment, spatial extensions, community, role-playing, and fantasy, adding yet more socio-historical shadings to interactions online.
Ultimately, the picture that emerges is framed within the following four concluding hypotheses: 1) The interactional self encounters social acts, online and off, as part of its greater life-world, practicing performative and group-enforcing self-management through 2) varying and interlinked dimensions of sociability and 3) pragmatic yet meaningful uses of the communicational tools at hand in 4) contextually relevant degrees of self-disclosure.
85 views
Seen by: and 16 moreRethinking Life Online: The Interactional Self as a Theory for Internet-Mediated Communication
(2005, Spring/Fall). Iowa Journal of Communication, 37 (1), pp. 27-57.
Grounded in the philosophies of experience of Martin Heidegger, George Herbert Mead, and Alfred Schutz, this paper... more Grounded in the philosophies of experience of Martin Heidegger, George Herbert Mead, and Alfred Schutz, this paper presents and emerging concept called the interactional self to illustrate how there are no clear phenomenological distinctions between the so-called “virtual world” and the dichotomously positioned “real world.” Instead, after presenting the two most predominant narrative trajectories that looked at Internet-mediated communication from this real/virtual split, the paper then explores how social interactional and phenomenological approaches can help the Internet researcher come to understand that a more nuanced reality is present in online social settings. Ultimately, the paper shows how the philosophies of experience of Heidegger, Mead, and Schutz can help the Internet researcher better conceptualize the tight intermingling of the online with the offline in Internet-mediated social settings. Such philosophies allow the communication researcher to delve more deeply into users’ phenomenologically-rooted use-contexts, performative practices, and intersubjective life-world experiences in Internet-mediated sociability.

