Cuerpo, sujeto, persona: Rodeo etnológico a la ética y la política de las tecnologías reproductivas
by Daniel Alberto Alegrett Salazar
Nociones de cuerpo, sujeto y persona fundamentarían debates éticos-políticos sobre lastecnologías de reproducción... more Nociones de cuerpo, sujeto y persona fundamentarían debates éticos-políticos sobre lastecnologías de reproducción asistida (ART). Éstas encarnarían promesas y amenazas para la“vida humana”. El desarrollo de las ART resolvería la infertilidad, superaría obstáculos a la procreación y satisfacería el deseo de familia. En un contexto tecno-científico, tienen una posición en el mercado y los regímenes de poder. Participarían problemáticamente en procesos de producción de individuos y relaciones. Reemplazarían al parentesco, unaimaginación moral para la que la persona es una especificación. Tal impacto sugeriría undesvío etnológico en la discusión. El registro etnográfico contextualizaría y recontextualizaríalas nociones de cuerpo, sujeto y persona. Recupero la etnología clásica del parentesco como principio de organización y recojo las intenciones de los llamados “nuevos estudios de parentesco” de ir más allá de supuestos naturalistas acerca de las relaciones. Trato de problematizar los usos discursivos de lo humano, natural, biológico, psicológico, social ycultural, incorporados en los debates sobre la intervención tecno-científica en la creación delhijo deseado.
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Seen by:Agency and personhood at the onset of the Mycenaean period.
(2010) Voutsaki, S., Agency and personhood at the onset of the Mycenaean period. Archaeological Dialogues 17:1, 65-92.
This paper offers a critical evaluation of the debate on agency and personhood in archaeology. Despite some very... more
This paper offers a critical evaluation of the debate on agency and personhood in archaeology. Despite some very interesting and sharp discussions, the debate has suffered from the projection of anachronistic definitions of the person and an over reliance on specific ethnographic readings. In addition, little attempt is made to bridge the abstract theoretical discussions with close analyses of empirical data. I would like to suggest that this should be our priority: to integrate theoretical discussions with careful contextual analysis of different types of evidence.
In the second part of the paper, an attempt will be made to apply these ideas, and to examine notions of personhood and agency held by the inhabitants of the southern Greek mainland between ca. 1800 and 1600 BC. The analysis will be based on the mortuary practices and imagery of the period.
Keywords
Personhood; agency; relationality; Mycenaean; burial practices; imagery
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Seen by: and 36 moreEssere una persona e avere diritto alla vita: analisi di alcuni argomenti in bioetica
Published in "Bioetica e società", II (2004), 2, pp. 17-27. In Italian.
I briefly sketch out two widely known theories of human persoonhood in bioethics: the "functionalist" one... more I briefly sketch out two widely known theories of human persoonhood in bioethics: the "functionalist" one and the "ontological" one. Their theroetical potentialities and limits will be assessed, as well as their practical implications regarding the attribution of the right to live. The last part of the paper is devoted to argue that the concept of person itself should be abandoned by bioethical debate.
Experiencia de la muerte y la representación de las personas en las prácticas funerarias del valle Calchaquí Norte
by Felix Acuto
Resumen: En este trabajo se sostiene que debemos ser cuidadosos y reflexivos con las herramientas teóricas y... more
Resumen: En este trabajo se sostiene que debemos ser cuidadosos y reflexivos con las herramientas teóricas y conceptualizaciones que utilizamos para interpretar el pasado. No deberíamos asumir que la naturaleza de las categorías, interacciones, instituciones y esferas sociales y de experiencia de las sociedades pasadas fue similar a la que tiene lugar en el contexto de la modernidad (y modernidad tardía) y el capitalismo. Teniendo en cuenta los modos variables en que el mundo es clasificado y ordenado, y la subjetividad constituida, y en base al conocimiento generado por la etnografía andina, este trabajo investiga la trama material de las prácticas funerarias en el valle Calchaquí, en los Andes del Sur, durante el Período Tardío (1000 – 1450 d.C.), a fin de explorar: 1) la manera en que la muerte era categorizada y experimentada, y 2) la naturaleza de la persona en este contexto socio-histórico. A partir del análisis de la localización y arquitectura de 160 tumbas, y de las ofrendas depositadas en las mismas, se argumenta que la muerte era parte integral de las experiencias y relaciones cotidianas y domésticas y que la individualidad se diluía en la matriz comunal dando lugar a personeidades relacionales.
Abstract: This article claims that we should be careful and reflexive regarding the theoretical tools and concepts that we employ to interpret the past. We should not assume that the nature of the categories, interactions, institutions, and social and experiential spheres of past societies was similar to that found in modernity (and late modernity) and capitalism. Taking into account the multiple ways in which the world is classified and ordered, and subjectivity constructed, and based on ethnographic knowledge, this paper examines the material order of funerary practices in the Calchaqui Valley, Southern Andes, during the Late Period (1000 – 1450 AD), in order to explore: 1) the way in which death was categorized and experienced, and 2) the nature of personhood in this socio-historical context. After analyzing the location and architecture of 160 burials, as well as the goods deposited in each of them, we argue that death was an integral component of daily and domestic experiences and relations and that individuality dissolved into a communal matrix, producing relational personhoods.
Recognizing persons
Journal of Consciousness Studies 2007, Vol. 14, No.5-6. (final draft)
"In this article a wide range of candidates for features that are defining of personhood are conceived of as... more "In this article a wide range of candidates for features that are defining of personhood are conceived of as interrelated, yet irreducible, layers and dimensions of what it is to be a person in the full-fledged sense of the word. Three layers of personhood – consisting of person-making psychological capacities, person-making interpersonal significances, and person-making institutional or deontic powers – are distinguished. Running through the layers there are then two dimensions – the deontic and the axiological – corresponding to the recognitive attitudes of respect and love. These recognitive attitudes of ‘taking something/-one as a person’ are responses to the psychological layer and directly constitutive of the interpersonal layer of the respective dimensions of personhood. The multiplicity of ways to understand what ‘personhood’ means is only apparently chaotic and reveals, on a closer look, a well-ordered and dynamic internal structure."
The Home Sanctuary. Personhood, Family and Religiosity, Religião e Sociedade, vol.3 n. se (special edition). Versão digital on-line SciELO Social Sciences, 2007
A study of the relations between family and religion, concentrating on the religious-like attitudes and values related... more A study of the relations between family and religion, concentrating on the religious-like attitudes and values related to the current experience of family life.
“Nervousness as a nosographic category in the early twentieth century”. Hist. cienc. saude-Manguinhos [online]. 2010, vol.17, suppl.2 [cited 2011-04-01], pp. 313-326 .
'Nervousness as a nosographic category in the early twentieth century' describes the usage of the semantic field of... more 'Nervousness as a nosographic category in the early twentieth century' describes the usage of the semantic field of the nerves in the work of an eminent Brazilian psychiatrist (Henrique Roxo) and its relation to the broader field of Western psychiatry in that period.
No Pain, No Gain. The Understanding of Cruelty in Western Philosophy
2010 Filozofia 65(2): 170-83
Almost daily, we read and hear of car bombings, violent riots and escalating criminal activities. Such actions are... more
Almost daily, we read and hear of car bombings, violent riots and escalating criminal activities. Such actions are typically condemned as “cruel” and their “cruelty” is taken as the most blameworthy trait, to which institutions are obliged, it is implied, to
respond by analogously “cruel but necessary" measures. Almost daily, we read and hear of tragic cases of suicide, usually involving male citizens of various age, race, and class, whose farewell notes, if any, are regularly variations on an old, well-known adagio: “Goodbye cruel world.” Additionally, many grave cruelties are neither reported nor even seen by the media: people are cheated, betrayed, belittled and affronted in many ways, which are as humiliating as they are ordinary. Yet, what is cruel? What meaning unites the plethora of phenomena that are reported “cruel”? How is it possible for cruelty to be so extreme and, at the same time, so common? This essay wishes to offer a survey of the main conceptions of cruelty in the history of Western thought, their distinctive constants of meaning being considered in view of a better understanding of cruelty’s role in shaping each person’s selfhood.
The Problem of Heaven
“The Problem of Heaven,” Ratio 24 (2011): 46-64
An argument against the rationality of desiring to go to heaven might be put in the form of a trilemma: (1) any state... more An argument against the rationality of desiring to go to heaven might be put in the form of a trilemma: (1) any state of being that both lasts eternally and preserves me as the person I am would be hellish and therefore would not be a state of being that I could have any reason to desire; (2) any state of being that lasts eternally and yet fails to preserve my personhood by turning me into a non-person would not be a state of being that I (qua person that I am) could have any reason to desire; and (3) any state of being that lasts eternally and yet fails to preserve my personhood by turning me into some other person would not be a state of being that I (qua person that I am) could have any reason to desire. This paper offers defenses of each of the three horns of this trilemma and concludes that there is no rationally compelling reason for any human being to desire to go to heaven.
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Seen by:Grounding the normative framework of personhood in Hegel's "Rechtsphilosophie"
by Harry Glass
draft only, undergraduate paper
If we are to disregard the structural-logical implications of the syllogistic conception of the will outlined in the... more If we are to disregard the structural-logical implications of the syllogistic conception of the will outlined in the Introduction to the "Philosophy of Right", then how are we to understand the continuing normative relevance of Abstract Right in Ethical Life? The normative framework which derives from the imperative; "be a person and respect others as persons" offers a suitable account of the basis and limits of legal freedom in modern society, and yet it remains unclear in Hegel how we are to conceptualise the normative grounding of this imperative such that it doesn't simply 'drop out' in Sittlichkeit.
Enchaining arguments and fragmenting assumptions: reconsidering the fragmentation debate in archaeology.
2010. World Archaeology 42(4): 581-94 (with O.Harris)
In this paper we examine the recent popularity of notions of fragmentation and enchainment in archaeology and aim to... more In this paper we examine the recent popularity of notions of fragmentation and enchainment in archaeology and aim to further the debate of these important approaches. Although we applaud the aims, and recognize the seductive power of these concepts, we suggest that there are a number of problems with the terms as they are currently used. By unpacking these expressions, we suggest these issues can be addressed and the vocabulary can continue to develop as a powerful tool for understanding materiality, exchange and personhood in the past.

