Personal and Moral Autonomy

Academic Autonomy: Authority, Self-Confidence, and Resistance

by Sylvia Burrow

Paper appears as a chapter in the anthology Academic Motherhood in a Post Second-Wave Context

Abstract

This paper shows that a masculine model of the ideal academic constrains academic mothers'... more Abstract

This paper shows that a masculine model of the ideal academic constrains academic mothers' autonomy. My account appeals to philosophy but its implications extend to all those academic disciplines dominated by masculine ideals of status and authority that create a chilly climate for women. Pressure, reproaches, and judgements from others in academia suggest that academic mothers are not serious academics, which can undermine self-confidence and self-appreciation. I argue that self-confidence underlies self-appreciation, such as self-respect, self-worth, and self-trust; and that together, these form the grounds for autonomy. In a climate in which academic mothers are not regarded as serious academics, doubt over choices regarding child or career commitments can erode self-confidence. Self-confidence is further challenged because women's status and authority are routinely undermined in a chilly climate that values the masculine and devalues the feminine. Academic mothers face additional stereotypes assuming that mothers are less serious academics than their colleagues. And so whether academic mothers alter academic or family commitments, we are exposed to masculine assumptions that undermine autonomy. The cost to autonomy is significant since it damages the possibility of both career success and personal integrity. I suggest that resisting pressures against autonomy is part of cultivating autonomy and so through resisting masculine stereotypes and ideals, academic mothers can advance or regain their own autonomy.

Freud, Sartre, Laing: power and authenticity

by stanley wilkin

The flaws in Freud's understanding of the mind. An article.

A matter of authenticity. A matter of authenticity.

Autonomy-minded Anti-perfectionism: novel, intuitive, and sound

by Ben Colburn

Journal of Philosophical Research 37 (2012): 233-241.

John Patrick Rudisill purports to identify various problems with my argument that the state promotion of autonomy is... more John Patrick Rudisill purports to identify various problems with my argument that the state promotion of autonomy is consistent with anti-perfectionism, viz., that it falsely pretends to be novel, is unacceptably counterintuitive because too restrictive and too permissive, and that it deploys a self-defeating formal apparatus. I argue, in reply, that my argument is more novel than Rudisill gives me credit for; that properly understood my anti-perfectionism implies neither the implausible restrictions nor the unpalatable permissions that Rudisill claims; and that my formal apparatus is innocent of the flaws imputed to it.

Adaptive Preferences and Autonomy

by Ben Colburn

Utilitas 23 (2011): 52-71.

Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options we have... more Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options we have available. Jon Elster has argued that this is bad because it undermines our autonomy. I agree, but think that Elster’s explanation of why is lacking. So, I draw on a richer account of autonomy to give the following answer. Preferences formed through adaptation are characterised by covert influence (that is, explanations of which an agent herself is necessarily unaware), and covert influence undermines our autonomy because it undermines the extent to which an agent’s preferences are ones that she has decided upon for herself. This answer fills the lacuna in Elster’s argument. It also allows us to draw a principled distinction between adaptive preference formation and the closely related – but potentially autonomy-enhancing – phenomenon of character planning.

The Concept of Voluntariness

by Ben Colburn

The Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2008): 101-111.

In her work on the distinction between freedom and voluntariness, Serena Olsaretti suggests the following definition... more In her work on the distinction between freedom and voluntariness, Serena Olsaretti suggests the following definition of voluntary action: an action is voluntary if it is not non-voluntary, and non-voluntary if it is performed because there are no acceptable alternatives, where ‘acceptable’ means conforming to some objective standard (which Olsaretti suggests might be well-being). Olsaretti suggests that ascriptions of responsibility are underwritten by judgments of voluntariness, rather than freedom. Also, Olsaretti notes that a concern for voluntary choice might be grounded in respect for autonomy. So, two important questions in political philosophy – when an agent is responsible for her actions and what we must do if we want agents to live autonomous lives – hang upon whether Olsaretti's account of voluntariness is correct once it has been developed in detail. This article is a contribution to that development. I show that well-informedness about our options is crucial to whether we act voluntarily or not, and I argue that we should restrict the scope of what we consider relevantly unacceptable to include only things which involve serious prudential harm. Inevitably there are some questions left unanswered, but what follows indicates what I take to be the strongest form of Olsaretti's theory, and one which can play the role described for it above.

Forbidden Ways of Life

by Ben Colburn

The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 618-629.

I examine an objection against autonomy-minded liberalism sometimes made by philosophers such as John Rawls and... more I examine an objection against autonomy-minded liberalism sometimes made by philosophers such as John Rawls and William Galston, that it rules out ways of life which do not themselves value freedom or autonomy. This objection is incorrect, because one need not value autonomy in order to live an autonomous life. Hence autonomy-minded liberalism need not rule out such ways of life. I suggest a modified objection which does work, namely that autonomy-minded liberalism must rule out ways of life that could not develop under an autonomy-promoting education. I conclude by suggesting some reasons why autonomy-minded liberals should bite the bullet and accept this.

Anti-Perfectionisms and Autonomy

by Ben Colburn

Analysis 70 (2010): 247-256.

Different types of liberal theory can be distinguished according to their commitments in respect of two claims. One... more Different types of liberal theory can be distinguished according to their commitments in respect of two claims. One the claim that the state ought to promote autonomy; the other is that the state ought not in its action to promote any value. Some liberals are committed to the former (which I call the Autonomy Claim) and reject the latter (generally dubbed 'Anti-Perfectionism'). Others have the converse commitments: they endorse Anti-Perfectionism, and deny that the state ought to promote autonomy.

In this article, I provide support for a liberal political philosophy that endorses both of the claims given above: that is, one that is fully committed to the state promotion of autonomy, and which also counts Anti- Perfectionism amongst its other commitments. I do so by defending it against the serious charge that it is prima facie self contradictory. After all, Anti-Perfectionism appears to demand that the state refrain from promoting any value – it looks as though that must preclude the promotion of autonomy, if the latter is conceived of as a value. I argue that this self-contradiction is a mirage, whose plausibility depends on an equivocation in the statement given above of Anti-Perfectionism. When that is removed, we can see that on its best understanding, Anti-Perfectionism is consistent with the Autonomy Claim.

Deprez, Stanislas et Lecuit, Jean-Baptiste, (dir.), L’Homme, une chose comme les autres ? Exploration interdisciplinaire de la frontière homme-chose, Collection « Ouverture philosophique », Paris, L’Harmattan, 2012

by Jean-Baptiste Lecuit

Liberty, Mill, and Public Health Ethics

by Yashar Saghai

Co-authored with Madison Powers and Ruth Faden

Public Health Ethics, 5 (1): 6-15, 2012
Advance access published February 15, 2012
doi:10.1093/phe/phs002

In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics.... more In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a presumption in favor of liberty; and interests that enjoy no such presumption. We argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well-being. Finally, we make the case for the plausibility of a more complex and nuanced Millian framework for public health ethics that would modify how the balancing of some liberties and public health interests should proceed by taking the thumb off the liberty end of the scale. Mill’s arguments and the legacy of liberalism support certain forms of state interference with marketplace liberties for the sake of public health objectives without any presumption in favor of liberty.

Beyond Dualism: A Plea for an Extended Taxonomy of Agency Impairment in Addiction

by Anke Snoek

Anke Snoek, Jeanette Kennett & Craig Fry (2012): Beyond Dualism: A Plea for an Extended Taxonomy of Agency Impairment in Addiction, AJOB Neuroscience, 3:2, 56-57

Pickard (2012) claims that the neurobiological or disease model of addiction hinders the recovery of people because it... more Pickard (2012) claims that the neurobiological or disease model of addiction hinders the recovery of people because it undermines their feeling of self-efficacy and agency. Substance
users are “not aided by being treated as victims of a neurobiological disease, as opposed to agents of their own recovery” (40). Although Pickard acknowledges that claims of powerlessness or loss of agency can have a functional role in the self-narratives of substance users in excusing them from blame, she primarily focuses on the negative effects of the disease model on the recovery of substance users. Preliminary evidence from in-depth interviews with heroin-dependent participants in our current cohort study on addiction and moral identity supports Pickard’s claims in part: Substance users describe grades of control, psychological distress, and loss of options, and an ambivalent attitude toward their belief in elf-efficacy. However the interviews also provide points of critique.

The metaphysics of autonomy: the reconciliation of ancient and modern ideals of the person

by Mark Coeckelbergh

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC ACCOUNT OF THE ROLE ETHICS PLAYS AT ACCESS UNLIMITED HEALTH SERVICES AND THE ETHICAL DELIMMAS FACED IN MY COLLEGUES AND MY OWN PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE AS A RESIDENTIAL DISABILITIES SUPPORT WORKER

by alexis stergakis

Australian Centre for Human Rights Education - RMIT University

The ethnographic account described below is a result of several months of participant observation within a residential... more The ethnographic account described below is a result of several months of participant observation within a residential care setting from August 2008 – January 2009. The research addresses one key critical incident. I carried a select range of research techniques including; interviews with key consultants (Clinical Co-ordinator), examination of, and reflection on the culture of the organisation through conversations with staff and personal reflection.

The critical incident and research is intended to examine what role ethics plays in the daily care of the client. Further I will explore the ethical dilemmas faced by staff and the effect the community of practice has on the application of care to the client. In examining the ethical dilemma that arises between client rights and carer service delivery, the impact of the infringement of the client’s rights will be explored.

Cold, Cold, Warm: Autonomy, Intimacy and Maturity in Adorno

by Iain Macdonald

Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 37, no. 6 (2011): 669-689.

When Adorno refers to the concept of maturity (Mündigkeit), he generally means having the courage and the ability to... more When Adorno refers to the concept of maturity (Mündigkeit), he generally means having the courage and the ability to use one’s own understanding independently of dominant heteronomous patterns of thought. This Kantian-sounding claim is essentially an exhortation: maturity demands self-liberation from heteronomy, or more simply: autonomy. The problem, however, is that in spite of Adorno’s general endorsement of Kant’s definition of maturity, he ultimately rejects the corresponding Kantian definition of autonomy, which posits a purely formal sphere of rational interiority in which the self-legislating subject is bound by the moral law. Yet Adorno does not simply set aside the Kantian concept of autonomy. On the contrary, he will try to correct it by returning to it what it lacks, namely, intimacy or ‘live contact with the warmth of things.’ In this gesture, he aims to restore to autonomy its ethical substance or its lived ethical context, not as a mere supplement to the necessary purity of duty, but rather as necessary to the very process of becoming autonomous, i.e., mature and responsible. This paper examines Adorno’s concept of maturity in the context of the dialectical relationship between autonomy and intimacy.

Does sexuality in ads work for everyone/anyone? An exploratory research of Muslim consumers' reactions to sexuality in ads

by Ahmet Bayraktar

conference paper 2012

BARRIERS TO SELF-RULE: AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, & SELF-TRUST

by Benjamin Wald

Rational autonomy and consumer sovereignty

by Benjamin Nelson

Conference paper.

I will show here that consumeristic behavior could be understood as a failure of rational autonomy if it involved... more I will show here that consumeristic behavior could be understood as a failure of rational autonomy if it involved flouting what I will call one's autonomic duties. It is most plausible to attribute the tenacity of consumeristic culture to the flouting of their autonomic duties across time. The flouting of autonomic duties across time entails habituation, not sour grapes. Since habituation is consistent with rational autonomy, consumeristic behavior appears to be rationally autonomous (or, at any rate, is not so obviously heteronymous as sour grapes).

Het subject en haar autonomie

by pieter meurs

Challenging the Idea of Corporate Responsibility: Physician's Obligation to Disclose Information

by Luca Chiapperino

Verslaving en autonomie: een probleem van karakter, capaciteiten of bijziendheid?

by Anke Snoek

Snoek, Anke. "Verslaving En Autonomie: Een Probleem Van Karakter, Capaciteiten of Bijziendheid?" NVBe Nieuwsbrief 18, no. 5 (2011): 8-10.

Addiction and autonomy: a problem of character, capacities or being myopic?

This article explores... more Addiction and autonomy: a problem of character, capacities or being myopic?

This article explores different hypothesis on how addiction or substance dependency can influence autonomy.

Do I have more free will than you do?

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.

The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.