Personal Identity

Identity in a virtual world

by Saša Radojčić

Experience machines, dreams, and what matters

by Christopher Tollefsen

Personal identity: A theoretical and experimental analysis

by Fernando Aguiar

Co-authored with Pablo Brañas, María Paz Espinosa, and Luis Miller; published in `Journal of Economic Methodology´, 2010.

This paper aims to analyze the role of personal identity in altruism. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically... more This paper aims to analyze the role of personal identity in altruism. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses on the concept of personal identity. A formal model to study how personal identity enters in individuals’ utility function when facing a dictator game decision is then presented.
Finally, this ‘identity-based’ utility function is studied experimentally. The experiment allows us to study the main parameters of the model, suggesting that we should move
with caution when attributing identities to individuals.

"Caller ID spoofing" Analisi civilistica e interdisciplinarietà del fenomeno

by Giorgio Giannone Codiglione

Objectos e Pessoas na Metafísica Analítica Contemporânea

by Carlos Santos

Content Analysis of Personal Constructs in Depression

by Adrian Montesano

Travelling between Two Worlds-the Tergdaleulebi, their Identity Conflict and National Life

by Oliver Reisner

Processing emotional expression and facial identity in schizophrenia

by Guy Tiberghien

“Substanz, Relation oder beides: Augustinus und Heidegger zur Frage ‘Was sind Personen?’” (“Substance, Relation or both: Augustine and Heidegger on the Question ‘What are Persons?’”)

by Anne Sophie Spann

forthcoming in: Crossing Borders. Grenzen (über)denken. Beiträge zum 9. Internationalen Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Wien, ed. by Alfred Dunshirn, Elisabeth Nemeth, Gerhard Unterthurner. http://phaidra.univie.ac.at/ (2012).

Was sind Personen? Die Antworten des abendländischen Denkens auf diese Frage lassen sich zwei Grundpositionen... more Was sind Personen? Die Antworten des abendländischen Denkens auf diese Frage lassen sich zwei Grundpositionen zuordnen, denen zwei weitgehend unabhängig voneinander verlaufende Traditionslinien entsprechen: Gemäß dem Relationsmodell (Cicero, Hobbes, Hegel) ist eine Person nichts anderes als eine Funktion ihrer Beziehung zu anderen Personen. Dagegen betrachtet das Substanzmodell (Aristoteles, Boethius, Descartes) die Person gerade als dasjenige, das sich unabhängig von Relationen und sonstigen akzidentellen Eigenschaften durchhält. Trotz der offenkundigen Gegensätzlichkeit beider Modelle finden sich in der Geschichte der philosophischen und theologischen Reflexion auf das Wesen von Personen vereinzelt Ansätze einer Vermittlung. Der Aufsatz möchte zwei dieser interessanten Vermittlungsversuche vorstellen und kritisch beleuchten: den im Rahmen seiner Trinitätsspekulation entwickelten Personbegriff Augustinus' sowie Heideggers frühe fundamentalontologische Theorie des Daseins, die der Sache nach eine Philosophie der Person ist. Augustinus stellt in der berühmten Formel "una essentia vel substantia, tres personae" dem traditionellen Substanzbegriff einen relationalen Personbegriff zur Seite, der auf dem Postulat einer nichtakzidentellen Relationalität basiert. Allerdings verbleibt dieser neue Gedanke in einer dependenten Position; die Relationalität des Personseins von Personen berührt nicht deren Sein qua Substanz. Demgegenüber sucht Heidegger Substantialität ganz in Relationalität aufzulösen, was pointiert in der These "Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz" zum Ausdruck kommt. Heideggers Dasein ist pure Relationalität, die freilich nicht nur zwangsläufig sich als Substanz mißversteht, sondern - qua Selbstbeziehung - gleichsam substanzhafte Züge trägt. Es ist zu fragen, inwieweit Augustinus' und Heideggers Konzept der Person systematisch überzeugend zwischen Substanzmodell und Relationsmodell zu vermitteln vermögen.

Review of: Cordula Brand: Personale Identität oder menschliche Persistenz. Ein naturalistisches Kriterium“, Paderborn: Mentis, 2010

by Anne Sophie Spann

forthcoming in: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119, 2 (2012)

Problems And Solutions For A Hypothetical Right Not To Exist

by Manolito Gallegos

In this paper I will describe and attempt to resolve one of the main problems of David Benatar’s text "Better... more In this paper I will describe and attempt to resolve one of the main problems of David Benatar’s text "Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence": whether it is possible for a right not to exist to be posited without there ever being a person in existence to hold such a right. I will conclude that this is indeed possible given an experience oriented view of personhood that I shall outline, and what other conclusions might be drawn from such a view.

Rezension von: Michael Quante: Person, (Grundthemen Philosophie), Berlin/ New York: de Gruyter, 2007

by Anne Sophie Spann

published in: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 116, 1 (2009), 221-225.

Zwischen Selbigkeit und Veränderung: Personen und ihre transtemporale Identität

by Anne Sophie Spann

Talk at the XXIInd German Congress for Philosophy, September 11 - 15, 2011, Ludwig Maximilian University Munich, Open Access LMU (2012),
URL: < http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12565/ >

That people are strictly the same over time is denied with reference to their changing just as much as, conversely,... more That people are strictly the same over time is denied with reference to their changing just as much as, conversely, strict sameness is presupposed for changing. Yet, both views – the reductionist and the non-reductionist – turn out to be unsatisfying by their dissolving the tension between sameness and changing instead of appreciating its constitutive significance for transtemporal personal identity.

Körper oder Organismus? Eric T. Olsons Cartesianismusvorwurf gegen das Körperkriterium transtemporaler personaler Identität

by Anne Sophie Spann

published in: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 117, 1 (2010), 88-120.

Eric Olson distinguishes his animalistic account of transtemporal personal identity from the apparently similar Bodily... more Eric Olson distinguishes his animalistic account of transtemporal personal identity from the apparently similar Bodily Criterion, among other things, by accusing the latter of being contaminated with Cartesian implications owing to its usage of the term ‚body‘. In contrast, Olson argues, Animalism is able to avoid these implications by substituting the concept of body for the concept of organism, which makes Animalism not only a distinct position, but also the better alternative to the Bodily Criterion. The paper critically reconstructs Olson’s charge of Cartesianism against the Bodily Criterion, thereby differentiating between several variants of it. This eventually adds up to an evaluation of how suitable these criticisms are for defending Animalism at the expense of the Bodily Criterion.

Prudence and Morality in Butler, Sidgwick, and Parfit

by Alessio Vaccari

Animalism

by Stephan Blatti

Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy, ed. A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle and N. Goulder (Continuum, 2006), vol. 1: 108–09.

This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim... more This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.

A New Argument for Animalism

by Stephan Blatti

Analysis (forthcoming, 2012)

The view known as “animalism” asserts that we are human organisms—that each of us is an instance of the Homo sapiens... more The view known as “animalism” asserts that we are human organisms—that each of us is an instance of the Homo sapiens species. The standard argument for this view is known as the “thinking animal argument.” Here I offer a second argument for animalism: the “animal ancestors argument.” This argument illustrates how the case for animalism can be seen as piggybacking on the credibility of evolutionary theory. Two related objections are considered and answered.

Our Deeds, Our Selves

by Adam Kern

Forthcoming in Analysis, 2012.

It is a mystery why we are bettered by successfully pursuing our projects, even when we fail to attain their objects.... more It is a mystery why we are bettered by successfully pursuing our projects, even when we fail to attain their objects. Here I propose a solution: when an agent undertakes a project, he constructs a part of himself; to successfully pursue a project is to benefit that part of oneself; and to benefit a part of oneself is to provide some benefit to one’s whole self. I then outline the following considerations in favor of my proposal: our pride towards our accomplishments, the stringent conditions on one’s being a benefactor, and the harm of having one’s projects thwarted.

Identità personale e testamento biologico: il caso della malattia di Alzheimer

by Matteo Galletti

published in "Bioetica. Rivista interdisciplinare", XII (2004), 3, pp. 400-412

The paper examines a criticism to the moral authority of living will in case of Alzheimer disease: there's a... more The paper examines a criticism to the moral authority of living will in case of Alzheimer disease: there's a disruption of identity over time between the person who signes the directive and the person who shall fall ill. Four thesis about personal identity (psychological identity, bodily identity, biological identity, and moral identity) are discussed in order to give some moral value to living wills.

Narrative Cosmology Article

by Kent Forbes