Perception-Action

Energetic Costs of Incidental Visual Coupling during Treadmill Running

by Daniel Eaves

Audio-visual facilitation of the mu rhythm

by Lucy McGarry

Previous studies demonstrate that perception of action presented audio-visually facilitates greater mirror neuron... more Previous studies demonstrate that perception of action presented audio-visually facilitates greater mirror neuron system (MNS) activity in humans (Kaplan and Iacoboni in Cogn Process 8(2):103–113, 2007) and non-human primates (Keysers et al. in Exp Brain Res 153(4):628–636, 2003) than perception of action presented unimodally. In the current study, we examined whether audio-visual facilitation of the MNS can be indexed using electroencephalography (EEG) measurement of the mu rhythm. The mu rhythm is an EEG oscillation with peaks at 10 and 20 Hz that is suppressed during the execution and perception of action and is speculated to reflect activity in the premotor and inferior parietal cortices as a result of MNS activation (Pineda in Behav Brain Funct 4(1):47, 2008). Participants observed experimental stimuli unimodally (visual-alone or audio-alone) or bimodally during randomized presentations of two hands ripping a sheet of paper, and a control video depicting a box moving up and down. Audio-visual perception of action stimuli led to greater event-related desynchrony (ERD) of the 8–13 Hz mu rhythm compared to unimodal perception of the same stimuli over the C3 electrode, as well as in a left central cluster when data were examined in source space. These results are consistent with Kaplan and Iacoboni’s (in Cogn Process 8(2):103–113, 2007), findings that indicate audio-visual facilitation of the MNS; our left central cluster was localized approximately 13.89 mm away from the ventral premotor cluster identified in their fMRI study, suggesting that these clusters originate from similar sources. Consistency of results in electrode space and component space support the use of ICA as a valid source localization tool.

Toward a second-person neuroscience

by Bert Timmermans

Schilbach L and* Timmermans B, Reddy V, Costall A, Bente G, Schlicht T, & Vogeley K. Toward a second-person neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, target article accepted for publication. *equal contributions

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that... more In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.

Fulfillment in Perception: A Critique of Alva Noë’s Enactive View

by Kristjan Laasik

Ph.D thesis. Defended at the University of Miami on December 6, 2011.

In an apparently original and radical departure from mainstream ideas, Alva Noë argues that perception does not... more In an apparently original and radical departure from mainstream ideas, Alva Noë argues that perception does not involve inner representations but needs to be regarded a kind of active engagement with the environment. According to Noë’s enactive view, visual perception requires “sensorimotor knowhow”: the perceiver needs to have certain perceptual skills and expectations. In his influential book Action in Perception, Noë develops the enactive view as solution to the “problem of perceptual presence,” the problem of how to conceive of “the presence of that which, strictly speaking, I do not perceive” (Noë 2004, p. 60). According to Noë, the problem arises in various cases, e.g., the unattended parts of the perceptual scene, as well as objects’ back sides. Noë argues that it can be solved by appeal to the idea of sensorimotor knowhow. 
In a challenge to Noë, I argue for the thesis that his enactive view, as he states it in Action in Perception, does not succeed in solving or even adequately motivating the problem of perceptual presence, unless a Husserlian strand in his view is complemented by further Husserlian notions, especially fulfillment. For example, Noë has difficulty establishing that there even is a problem concerning the presence of the object’s back side. The prevalent view is that the object’s back sides are not perceptually present, i.e., they are not, in any sense, seen by the perceivers, and Noë has offered no argument to the contrary.
Noë’s problem of perceptual presence is, in fact, ambiguous: there are two quite different problems and it takes quite different resources to solve them. First, there is the problem that the unattended parts of the perceptual scene may not be genuinely present to us: Noë presents us with empirical data which suggest that what seems to be plainly in view can be, “strictly speaking,” not seen by us. We may be subject to an illusion when we regard ourselves as having experience of the entire detailed scene. But Noë argues that the entire scene is genuinely present in the sense that it is readily accessible, by shifting one’s attention or making eye movements.
Second, in cases like the object’s back side we are dealing with a different problem altogether. Noë concedes that the back side is not, “strictly speaking,” seen by the perceiver. Nevertheless, he argues, it is perceptually present, giving rise to the problem of how to account for its perceptual presence. Noë’s solution is that it is present by virtue of our having perceptual expectations about it. Notice that we cannot appeal to possible access to solve this problem: it may be impossible for the perceiver, say, to go round a house, to take a look. 
Husserl is centrally concerned with the latter problem, and the view Noë develops to solve it is rightly interpreted as a sketch of Husserl’s view, but it needs to be complemented with the crucial idea of fulfillment. When I look at an object, I experience the front side differently from the back side. This phenomenal difference can be captured by calling the experience of the front side “intuitive” and the experience of the back side “empty.” When I turn the object around, there is fulfillment, i.e., what was experienced emptily comes to be experienced intuitively. The back side can be regarded as perceptually present in the sense that we can have fulfillments (or disappointments) with regard to it. Husserl investigates perceptual content as determining fulfillment conditions, and not as determining accuracy conditions, as in the mainstream views. He engages in a kind of conceptual analysis, e.g., of the concept of shape or color, by investigating the fulfillment conditions pertinent to shape or color. Noë’s perceptual expectations are part of the Husserlian framework: they function to set the fulfillment conditions. Noë has given us parts and aspects of a comprehensive Husserlian framework. I aim to contribute to our understanding of it, and thereby of Noë’s enactive view. 

On Perceptual Presence

by Kristjan Laasik

Published in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):439-459. This is the last version before copy editing.

In his book Action in Perception, Alva Noë poses what he refers to as the “problem of perceptual presence” and... more In his book Action in Perception, Alva Noë poses what he refers to as the “problem of perceptual presence” and develops his enactive view as solution to the problem. Noë describes the problem of perceptual presence as the problem of how to conceive of the presence of that which, “strictly speaking,” we do not perceive. I argue that the “problem of perceptual presence” is ambiguous between two problems that need to be addressed by invoking very different resources. On one hand, there is the problem of how to conceive of the presence of objects as wholes, front side and back, and their constant properties. On the other hand, there is the problem of how to account for the presence of unattended detail. I focus on the first problem, which Noë approaches by invoking Husserlian ideas. I argue that Noë’s enactive view encounters difficulties, which can be dealt with by complementing it with Edmund Husserl’s idea of fulfillment and generally restoring the view to its original Husserlian context. Contrary to Noë’s purport, this involves regarding the view not as a theory of perception and perceptual content but as part of a descriptive-clarificatory project of conceptual analysis. The Husserlian phenomenologist analyzes, e.g., the concept of shape or color by investigating the fulfillment conditions pertinent to shape or color. In general, my critique of Noë’s enactive view serves to caution philosophers against unprincipled uses of Husserlian ideas.

Slepian, M.L., Masicampo, E.J., Toosi, N.R., & Ambady, N. (in press). The physical burdens of secrecy. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.

by Michael Slepian

The present work examined whether secrets are experienced as physical burdens, thereby influencing perception and... more The present work examined whether secrets are experienced as physical burdens, thereby influencing perception and action. Four studies examined the behavior of people who harbored important secrets, such as secrets concerning infidelity and sexual orientation. People who recalled, were preoccupied with, or suppressed an important secret estimated hills to be steeper, perceived distances to be farther, indicated that physical tasks would require more effort, and were less likely to help others with physical tasks. The more burdensome the secret and the more thought devoted to it, the more perception and action were influenced in a manner similar to carrying physical weight. Thus, as with physical burdens, secrets weigh people down.

Critique of an Argument for the Reality of Purpose

by Danny Frederick

Forthcoming, Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy

Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept... more Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theoretical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experience. As a consequence, it is conceivable that direct introspection of an event as a purposive action may be mistaken. I indicate ways in which the eliminativist may be able to explain why our perception and introspection is afflicted with systematic error.

Gaze behaviour during interception in children with Spastic Unilateral Cerebral Palsy.

by john van der kamp

van Kampen, P.M., Ledebt, A., Smorenburg, A.R.P., Vermeulen, R.J., Kelder, M.E., van der Kamp, J., & Savelsbergh, G.J.P. (2012). In: Research in Developmental Disabilities, 33, 45-53.

The effects of high pressure on the point of no return in simulated penalty kicks

by john van der kamp

Navarro, M., Miyamoto, N., van der Kamp, J., Morya, E., Ranvaud, R., & Savelsbergh, G.J.P. (2012). In: Journal of Exercise and Sport Psychology (in press)

The influence of viewing perspective on decision-making and visual search behaviour in an invasive sport

by Melissa J. Hopwood

Mann, D.L., Farrow, D., Shuttleworth, R., Hopwood,M. (2009) International Journal of Sport Psychology, 40, 546-564

Perceptual-cognitive skill was examined in a film-based task displayed from two different viewing perspectives.... more Perceptual-cognitive skill was examined in a film-based task displayed from two different viewing perspectives. Nineteen skilled youth football players observed identical simulations filmed from two different viewing perspectives; a ‘player’ perspective designed to simulate that experienced by a player in a game, and an ‘aerial’ perspective filmed from an elevated position overlying the same location on the field. Observation of the aerial perspective resulted in superior decision making performance, most likely a reflection of the additional specifying information available from this viewpoint. Visual search recordings demonstrated increased time spent observing open space in the aerial perspective, along with more fixations of lesser duration primarily due to an increase in the referential fixation transitions between the player in possession of the ball and other attacking features. For both
perspectives, participants fixated on the correct option however in the player view this correct option was chosen less frequently.

KEY WORDS: Expertise, Eye movements, Simulation, Soccer.

Modeling the face-to-face effect: Sensory population dynamics and active vision can contribute to perception of social context

by Nick Wilkinson

Int. Conf. on Development and Learning 2011

We introduce a novel dynamical model for visual attention based on stimulus induced population dynamics in an... more We introduce a novel dynamical model for visual attention based on stimulus induced population dynamics in an oscillatory medium, and apply this model to active perception of social content in still images. Making use of images from the newly emerging face-to-face paradigm in social developmental psychology, we show that this model generates patterns of eye movements that exhibit increased frequency of gaze shifts between actors in the social condition, as do infants at 16 months of age. The number of gaze shifts can inform useful levels of classification for the social content in the images, demonstrating a potential role for the dynamics of active perception in social cognition. This adaptive performance does not require any long term changes in structure or information storage. Our results further suggest a potential functional role in selective attention for the spiral wave activity recently observed in primary visual neo-cortex.

Imperceptibly off-centre goalkeepers influence penalty-kick direction in soccer.

by john van der kamp

Masters, R.S.W., van der Kamp, J., & Jackson, R.C. (2007). In: Psychological Science, 18, 222-223.

Left, right, left, right, eyes to the front! Müller-Lyer bias in grasping is not a function of hand used, hand preferred or visual hemifield, but foveation does matter

by john van der kamp

van der Kamp, J., & de Wit, M., & Masters, R.S.W. (2012). In: Experimental Brain Research (in press).

Exploring the merits of perceptual anticipation in the soccer penalty kick

by john van der kamp

van der Kamp, J. (2011).  In: Motor Control, 15, 342-358.

Timing a one-handed catch: II. Adaptation to telestereoscopic viewing.

by john van der kamp

van der Kamp, J., Bennett, S.J., Savelsbergh, G.J.P., & Davids, K. (1999). In: Experimental Brain Research, 129, 369-377.

An Ecological Approach to Nonconceptual Self-Awareness

by Michael J. Braund

"Draft Only"

In this paper I will advance and defend a minimal conception of self- consciousness, which I shall call nonconceptual... more In this paper I will advance and defend a minimal conception of self- consciousness, which I shall call nonconceptual self-awareness (henceforth, NCSA). As a contrastive term, the central idea behind NCSA is that the possession of a “self- concept” is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for representing oneself as an embodied agent in the ecological and social environments. To be sure, concept- possession is needed for activities such as mastering the grammar of the first-person pronoun, constructing autobiographical narratives, and formulating long term plans. It has its place in theoretical specifications of the contents of representational states, and as John McDowell points out, it allows us to “coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgment and belief.” However, I will argue that these “higher-order” cognitive achievements are parasitic on a more primitive and already-existing form of self-awareness that operates independently of concepts. This primitive capacity is built into the very structure of perceptual experience and manifests as co-perception of the embodied self and the environment. In what follows, I will elaborate the thesis that this co-perception constitutes the foundations for full-fledged self-conscious activities (such as the capacity to maintain some form of detached perspective on oneself as the enduring subject of oneʼs own actions and mental states) precisely because these activities are experientially grounded in a unified, albeit nonconceptual, form of perspectivity. While my approach draws broadly on recent developments in ecological psychology, the debate on conceptual/nonconceptual mental content provides a convenient starting point for discussion.

Multiple information sources in interceptive timing

by john van der kamp

van der Kamp, J., Savelsbergh, G.J.P., & Smeets, J.B. (1997). In: Human Movement Sciences, 16, 787-821.

Anticipation and visual search behaviour in expert soccer goalkeepers

by john van der kamp

Savelsbergh, G.J.P., van der Kamp, J., Williams, A.M., & Ward, P. (2005). In: Ergonomics, 48, 1686-1697.

Visual search, anticipation and expertise in soccer goalkeepers

by john van der kamp

Savelsbergh, G.J.P., Williams, A.M., Ward, P., & van der Kamp, J. (2002). In: Journal of Sports Sciences, 20, 279-287.

Body-scaled ratio as a control parameter for prehension in 5-to 9-year-old children

by john van der kamp

van der Kamp, J., Savelsbergh, G.J.P., & Davis, W. (1998). In: Developmental Psychobiology, 33, 351-361.