Pragmatism, International Relations and the Leap into the Dark Predicament
Paper presented at the 48th International Studies Association Convention, San Francisco, 26-29 March 2008
When contemplating a new policy initiative whose premises lie outside the boundaries of the commonsense dominating a... more When contemplating a new policy initiative whose premises lie outside the boundaries of the commonsense dominating a particular domain in world affairs, visionary policy-makers face a puzzling situation. On one hand, the normative context in which they are inserted does not provide them with the terms of reference necessary to validate the unconventional course of action they plan to undertake. On the other, the set of assumptions underlying the project they are formulating are not yet accepted as legitimate. Given these circumstances, there does not seem to be a reasonable way to justify the pursuit of the new initiative. Mainstream rationalist and sociological approaches to innovation and policy change in International Relations have not adequately addressed this ‘leap into the dark predicament’. To establish whether a reasonable solution to this predicament is possible, this essay outlines an alternative analytical framework based on the insights of the philosophical tradition of Pragmatism, and more specifically on the ideas of one of its founders, Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce’s critical commonsensism and his formulation of the logic of inquiry provide the conceptual foundations of a promising model to study innovation and normative change in IR. To assess its explanatory potential, this model is applied to examine a case of a leap into the dark in world politics, namely the recent establishment of a post-national regime to manage Europe’s borders.
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Seen by:Relocating cultural evolution: toward a melioristic paradigm of love in archaeology
by Marko Marila
draft only, published in Fiba 2, 2010
Towards a cyber-semiotic foundation of a scientifically adequate Functional Discourse Grammar
Abstract proposal for a paper within our project on Cybersemiotics and Functional Linguistics (esp., Functional Discourse Grammar and Distributed Language Theory).
Co-authored with Søren Brier, Dec. 2011.
Comments welcome
In this paper we shall try to give a foundation for a scientifically adequate Functional Discourse Grammar. By the... more
In this paper we shall try to give a foundation for a scientifically adequate Functional Discourse Grammar. By the term ’scientific adequacy’ Functional Grammar’s original types of adequacy, inherited by Functional Discourse Grammar, have been generalized: typological, psychological, and pragmatic, for we believe that a lot more has to be involved in scientific model building. Firstly, scientific adequacy will involve observational and descriptive adequacy, in addition to Functional Discourse Grammar’s adequacies. The former, observational adequacy, will deal with the problem of observing natural language and language use (e.g., ’the observer’s paradox’ of how to obtain samples of natural, vernacular speech, not distorted by observation), but in the first place we have to determine what counts as a linguistic observation (what is observed?). Then, how many and what kinds of observations do we need, for them to be representative of the whole population? Descriptive adequacy will have to define types of scientific model building – e.g., will a symbolic-diagrammatic description be adequate (e.g., Functional Discourse Grammar’s formulae and flow diagrams)? or should we use a connectionist, neural network model? – clearly the answers depend on (the type or aspect of) the observandum we are interested in, and on which aspects of it we abstract away, or on which level of granularity is needed (e.g., minute real-time factors in some topics of psycholinguistics).
With respect to explanatory (typological, psychological, and pragmatic) adequacy, we propose that Functional Discourse Grammar’s model of verbal language must be given a cyber-semiotic foundation (Brier 2008), and by this we mean, on the one hand, a cognitive (’second-order cybernetics’) and, on the other, a semiotic foundation. Cyber-semiotics implies that linguistic communication, the Natural Language User, and language (observandum) be investigated (trans- and inter-disciplinarily) in four irreducible dimensions (the ‘cybersemiotic star model’), viz., 1. as part of the physical world (perceptibe signs), 2. as part of the biological world (neurological-physiological embodiment), 3. as part of the psychological world (cognitive and phenomenological substrate), and 4. as part of the social world (socio-cultural situatedness). The four explanatory dimensions are not disparate, but complementary and united by a conception of ’absolute naturalism’, that is, that they all are integrated aspects of the natural world.
Cyber-semiotics is an evolutionary theory. Thus, we focus on language and linguistic communication as evolutionary phenomena. This may be self-evident but implies that a model of (a) language and of the Natural Language User (linguistic cyborg) should always ultimately be seen in this perspective, which again means that the model views (verbal) language as an integrated part of ’total integrated evolutionary multimodal communication’, involving, i.a., co-produced gesture.
The evolutionary perspective has the ramification that a Functional Discourse Grammar should be seen (at least) in the temporal perspective of: 1. the evolution of (human) language in the species, 2. the history of the speech tradition of a given speech community, and 3. the development of the language(s) of the individual Natural Language User (i.a. first-language acquisition, second-language acquisition, language loss, language impairment), as well as 4. the on-line incremental development of a given communication.
Keywords: Cybersemiotics, Functional Discourse Grammar, Functional Grammar, Natural Language User, linguistic cyborg, scientific adequacy: observational adequacy, descriptive adequacy, explanatory adequacy: psychological adequacy, pragmatic adequacy, typological adequacy, transdisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, the cybersemiotic star model: physical dimension, biological dimension, psychological dimension, sociological dimension; total integrated evolutionary multimodal communication
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Seen by: and 11 moreThe Significance-effect – A Communicational Effect : Introducing the DynaCom
Co-authored with Thellefsen, T. & Thellefsen M; Sign Systems Studies (2011), Volume 39(1): 209-223.
The paper presents the concept significance-effect outlined in a Peircean inspired communication model, named DynaCom.... more The paper presents the concept significance-effect outlined in a Peircean inspired communication model, named DynaCom. The significance-effect is a communicational effect; the formal conditions for the release of the significance-effect are the following: (1) Communication has to take place within a universe of discourse; (2) Utterer and interpreter must share collateral experience; and (3) The cominterpretant must occur. If these conditions are met the meaning of the communicated sign is likely to be correctly interpreted by the interpreter. Here, correctly means in accordance with the intensions of the utterer. The scope of the significance effect has changed from knowledge effects caused by technical terms to emotional effects caused by lifestyle values in brands, for example.
The Hypoiconic Metaphor and the Abductive Mode of Inference
Co-authored with Thellefsen, T., to be published in Chinese Semiotic Studies (2012).
In this article we suggest a possible relation between C. S. Peirce’s (1839-1914) concept of metaphor and abduction.... more
In this article we suggest a possible relation between C. S. Peirce’s (1839-1914) concept of metaphor and abduction. To our knowledge Peirce never did analyze nor even mention the two concepts in the same context. But we understand the hypoiconic metaphor as rooted in the abductive mode of inference; the hypoiconic metaphor is part of an intricate relation between experience, body, inference, and guessing instinct as a semeiotic mechanism which can convey novel ideas.
Keywords: C. S. Peirce; metaphor; hypoicon; inference; abduction; experience; guessing instinct
Exploring Research Data Interactively. Theme One : A Program of Inquiry
by Jon Awbrey
Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (August 1990), “Exploring Research Data Interactively. Theme One : A Program of Inquiry”, Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference on Applications of Artificial Intelligence and CD-ROM in Education and Training, Society for Applied Learning Technology, Washington, DC, pp. 9–15.
If computer programs were smarter, they would, like people, recognize sequences of events, form models of their... more
If computer programs were smarter, they would, like people, recognize sequences of events, form models of their environment, and formulate rules based on experience. This paper describes the development of a program designed to address the difficult computational problems involved in integrating the inductive and deductive reasoning necessary to perform such tasks. “Theme One” is a prototype program composed of “Index”, a learning algorithm for sequential data, and “Study”, an algorithm for building logical models. The project goal is an interactive research tool that assists students and investigators in the exploration of qualitative data using artificial intelligence.
Design como comunicação: uma abordagem semiótica
A etimologia da palavra design já revela a natural proximidade entre design e a teoria dos signos. A partir da... more
A etimologia da palavra design já revela a natural proximidade entre design e a teoria dos signos. A partir da semiótica de Charles Peirce, queremos mostrar que a atividade essencial do
designer é a de articular signos para atingir efeitos comunicativos pragmáticos. Um produto de design equivale a uma proposição a ser interpretada - num processo que Peirce chamou de
semiose. Nesse processo de ação sígnica, o designer é um emissor que faz a sintaxe entre a forma ou conceito que elaborou abdutivamente e os aspectos materiais de que dispõe para
comunicar suas idéias, produzindo uma proposição capaz de criar efeitos na mente dos intérpretes-receptores. Por fim, mostramos que o produto do design guarda sempre uma latitude
de possibilidades interpretativas por parte do intérprete, que tem certa autonomia para ressignificar o produto do design, dando a ele novos usos e interpretações, inclusive na forma de
novas proposições - e assim potencialmente ad infinitum.
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Seen by:Linguistic Stratification and the tri-unity Matter—Substance—Form: A Functional Discourse Pragmatics perspective (in memory of Eli Fischer-Jørgensen (1911-2010))
Updated version 11.01.2012. Work in progress. Comments are utterly welcome!
Parallels with Peircean Semiotics, von Uexküllian cognitive-semiotic/bio-cybernetic biology (behaviorism/ethology), and Brier's (2008) Cybersemiotics.
An orig. English version 2010 of a 'functional footnote' from 1998: "Stratifikation og "treenigheden" Materie--Substans--Form. Et Funktionelt Pragmatisk perspektiv". Published in 'DFG -- Funktionelle Fodnoter: Sprogligt indhold: substans og struktur. Funktionelle Fodnoter' 1998. 56-58.
This paper will investigate linguistic stratification – the crucial conception that language and speech, rather than... more
This paper will investigate linguistic stratification – the crucial conception that language and speech, rather than being monolithic, are organized on different ‘representational levels’.
Linguistic Stratification is originally a European structuralist notion, proposed (i.a.) by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1916) to deal with the fact that a language and its performance in speech occur on two different hierarchical levels of representation, viz. one of arbitrary ‘form’ and one of manifestational ‘substance’ (alias ‘matter’), both on the plane of Content (meaning) and on the plane of Expression (confusingly, “form” in the American tradition, however presumably going back to the Gr. morphé, not eidos). The claim is that language is (primarily) ‘form’ (structure, system), irrespective of its material manifestation. Form and substance, of course, originate in Aristotelian philosophy, where, however, the distinction was triadic rather than dyadic – the tri-unity ‘form’, ‘substance’, and ‘matter’ – and did not pertain to language-internal distinctions in the first place but to ontology in general – and thus did not mean levels of linguistic representation, but rather levels of reality. The Danish hard core, pseudo-algebraic linguist Louis Hjelmslev (1943, 1975), confusingly, wavers between the dyadic and the triadic conceptions (strangely calling ‘matter’ purport, Dan. mening ‘meaning’), but most often, it seems, he uses the dichotomy ‘form’ vs. ‘substance’ (Dahl 1998), however, in a rather Platonic conception, where linguistic ‘form’ exists in a “third” world, in casu of ideal Language, relegating phenomenal language to a subsidiary “shadowy” world of the “real” speaker-listeners and their speech communities. That is, in former formal European structuralism (like Hjelmslevian Glossematics) the essence of language was seen as ‘form’ (viz. “pure” ‘form’) presupposed by, but not presupposing a manifesting ‘substance’ (of sensibilia and intelligibilia). In functional European structuralism (e.g., esp. Jakobson and the Prague school), in Coseriu’s Integral Linguistics (a post-structuralist functionalism), as well as in present-day Danish Functional Linguistics, including Functional Discourse Pragmatics (developed by the present author), ‘form’ is “substantial”. This means that the distinction between vocal and sign language are different (medial-modal) ‘forms’, ruling out the possibility of postulating an underlying “pure” form uniting e.g. Danish vocal and sign languages – they are simply two different (historical) functional languages (competences). Likewise, the distinction between spoken and written language is a distinction in terms of (medial-modal) “substantial” ‘forms’: spoken and written Danish, e.g., are two different historical (medial-modal) forms, not united by any common underlying “pure” (‘empty’) form – the written language is a partial “translation” of the spoken language, the degree to which being determined by the kind of writing system developed (alphabetical, in the case of Danish, to be sure, so roughly it is only the sound shape of the language that is being translated). The concept of stratification is continued in different schools and trends of non-generative (functionalist) linguistics, like i.a. Lamb’s Stratificational Linguistics (cf. Lamb 1999), Pike's Tagmemics, Halliday’s Systemic-Functional Linguistics (Halliday 1961; Halliday and Matthiessen 1999), and Henning Andersen’s comprehensive structural-functional (semiotics-based) linguistics (1974, 1984), but also in Chomskyan generative (formal) linguistics, with its distinction, within the language faculty, between the conceptual-intentional (pragmatics) and articulatory-auditory (phonetics) peripheral input-output systems (performance systems) and the central logical-form (semantics) and phonetic-form (phonology) systems (plus, maybe, a lexico-grammatical-syntactic form) (computational competence system).
This paper will argue for the triadic conception within a Functional Discourse Pragmatics theory of language and speech (i.a., Nedergaard Thomsen 2006, 2009) – (proposed as) the linguistic part of Cybersemiotics (i.a., Brier 2008). In effect, the triadic stratification of language is integrated into the triadic ontological stratification. Seeing language and speech, in their foundation, as mental phenomena of individual speaker-listeners, these semiotic phenomena of signs (Expression) and their interpretations (Content) belong to the ontological Form level. The signs (Expression) are manifested at the level of ontological Substance, as output of articulation and as input to perception (Sinsigns), and in themselves they may be part of our sound surroundings without being perceived as functioning signs (Matter, Qualisigns). The interpretations (Content) – via the signs (Expression) – are “referenced” in the immediate referential sphere (Substance), our Umwelt, but the “same” objective world may exist objectively outside the grasp (domain) of our language and speech (Matter). This picture is complicated by the fact that language and speech, i.e. ontological Form, is internally stratified: here the level of internal Form consists of systematic invariants, manifested as norm-sanctioned variants (internal Substance) and projected as stylistic-situational usage variants (internal Matter). The Content side of the language (interpretations) form a linguistic ‘mentality’, whereby we (the speaker-listeners of different languages) come to live our (linguistic) lives in different “language worlds” (language-based Umwelts, or Cultural Signification Spheres, Brier 2008) – just as we as a biological species live in our species-specific Umwelt (von Uexküll) – e.g. we don’t hear the same sounds or smell the same scents as our dogs. The degree to which the linguistic interpretations (Content) influence the sensations and interpretations in perception – i.e., the degree to which linguistic semantics “construes” our experience (Halliday and Matthiessen 1999), we may speak of linguistic (“Whorfian”) relativity. On a higher level of socio-cultural behavior, cultural relativity is operative (language mirroring culture). The degree to which thinking (due to sensations and interpretations) is uninfluenced by (a historical) language (or other communication system, like e.g. music) and culture, i.e. is universal, we may speak of a ‘mentalese’ (Language of Thought). With respect to the processual mode of being of language as speech, or “languaging”, Slobin (1987) discovered that the obligatory, grammatical categories, influence our ‘thinking’ operative for/in (while) speaking, and communicating in general.
I dedicate this paper to the memory of the great Danish phonetician, Eli Fischer-Jørgensen (1911-2010), who, besides being a brilliant scientist, was a brave freedom fighter (during WWII), and a fine artist – and, relevant to this paper, a astute critique of Hjelmslev’s concept of ‘form’ and ‘substance’.
On a Computational Model of the Peircean Semiosis
by Joao Queiroz
Co-authored with Antonio Gomes and Ricardo Gudwin
In this work we propose computational approach to’ the Peircean triadic model of semiosis (meaning processes). We... more
In this work we propose computational approach to’ the Peircean triadic model of semiosis (meaning processes). We investigate several theoretical constraints onsthe feasibiliq of a simulated semiosis within digital computers. These constraints, which are basic requirements for the simulation of semiosis, refer to the synthesis of irreducible triadic relations (Sign - Object - Interpretant). We emmine the intemal organization of the
triad, thnt is, the relative position of its elements and how
they relate to each other by determinative relations. We
also suggest a computational approach based on self-organization principles. A this context, relations of
determination are described as emergent properties of rhe
system.
INTEGRATIVE EVOLUTIONARY COMMUNICATION: TOWARDS A CYBERSEMIOTIC FOUNDATION OF FUNCTIONAL DISCOURSE GRAMMAR AND PRAGMATICS
Co-authored with Søren Brier, Department of International Culture and Communication Studies
In this paper we shall outline a Cybersemiotic foundation for pragmatics-based linguistics, more precisely Functional... more In this paper we shall outline a Cybersemiotic foundation for pragmatics-based linguistics, more precisely Functional Discourse Grammar and Pragmatics. Language is viewed as communication, and communication is viewed as ‘total communication’, that is, integrative evolutionary communication, being an integration of three stages: 1. biological reflexive languaging (social coordination), 2. instinctual-motivational-emotional sign games (ethology), and 3. premeditated, intentional language games (human unitary thinking-speaking-gesturing). Language games subsume the other stages, and thus human evolutionary communication is primarily a symbolic praxis. It is intertwined with the praxis of living, i.e. with different life forms. Together they form a coherent socio-behavioral “package”.
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Seen by: and 5 more"Peirce's Search for a Graphical Modal Logic (Propositional Part)", with Ch. Gottschall
(c) Taylor&Francis Group, 2011.
This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of Taylor&Francis Group for personal use, not for redistribution. Definitive version: doi:10.1080/01445340.2010.543840
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2010.543840)
Can science tell us what's objectively true?
by Brian Earp
Earp, B. D. (2011). Can science tell us what’s objectively true? The New Collection, Vol. 6., No. 1, 1-9. Featured article in the graduate journal of New College, Oxford.
Can science tell us what’s objectively true? Or is it merely a clever way to cure doubt – to give us something to... more Can science tell us what’s objectively true? Or is it merely a clever way to cure doubt – to give us something to believe in, whether it’s true or not? In this essay, I look at the pragmatist account of science expounded by Charles Sanders Peirce in his 1877 essay, ‘The Fixation of Belief’. Against Peirce, I argue that science does not come naturally to our species, nor does the doubting open-mindedness upon which its practice relies. To the extent that science is successful in ‘curing’ doubt, it’s because it tracks the real state of the world; and I argue that Peirce himself – his pragmatist narrative notwithstanding – is implicitly committed to this view as well.
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Seen by: and 167 moreOntological realms and symbolic mediation of the hypoiconic metaphor
Co-authored with, Thellefsen, T., published in Semeiosis (2011).
C. S. Peirce defined the metaphor as a sign of the type hypo-icon. The metaphor depends on a special kind of... more
C. S. Peirce defined the metaphor as a sign of the type hypo-icon. The metaphor depends on a special kind of similarity, namely parallelism. But Peirce never gave an answer to the question “on which ontological level can the similarity of metaphor be identified?”. However, a tentative answer seems to be deducible from different text passages in Peirce’s grand oeuvre. Even though Peirce defined the metaphor as a hypoiconic sign, he was accentuating the metaphor’s most salient semeiotic mechanism, not describing the only one. Thus, the metaphor is e.g. also a symbolically mediated icon. In the following, we will try to focus on these two topics concerning the “Peircean metaphor.
C. S. Peirce define a metáfora como um signo hipoicônico. A metáfora depende de um tipo especial de similaridade, o paralelismo. Peirce não chegou a dar uma resposta à questão “em que nível ontológico pode-se identificar a similaridade da metáfora?”. No entanto, uma resposta inicial parece dedutível de diferentes passagens da sua obra. Quando Peirce define a metáfora como um hipoícone, ele está apenas destacando seu mecanismo semiótico mais proeminente, e não o único mecanismo. Assim, por exemplo, a metáfora é também um ícone simbolicamente mediado. Neste artigo, buscamos focar nestes dois tópicos concernentes à “metáfora peirceana”.

