Norms of belief

Justification as 'Would-Be' Knowledge

by Aidan McGlynn

Draft only. Final version forthcoming in Episteme.

In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists... more In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. A further aim is to defend a more traditional conception, according to which justification is a matter of sufficiently high evidential likelihood. In particular, I suggest that this conception of justification offers a plausible account of lottery cases: cases in which one believes a true proposition—for example that one’s lottery ticket will lose—on the basis of probabilistic evidence.

Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief

by Daniel Whiting

To appear in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming).

That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in... more That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, the criticism and defence of belief, and the value of knowledge. I argue that those considerations do not give us reason to give up the truth view in favour of the knowledge view and, moreover, that reflection on those considerations gives us some reason to reject the knowledge view. Thus, I conclude, we can continue to take the apparent platitude at face value.

Believing Things Unknown

by Aidan McGlynn

Forthcoming in Noûs. This is a pre-copyediting draft, so please ignore any (non-philosophical) mistakes.

Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion

by Patrick Greenough

in J. Brown and H. Cappelen (eds), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: OUP, 2011.

The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but... more The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival.