Norms of assertion

Problém normatívnosti tvrdenia

by Ladislav Koren

Draft o the paper (in Slovak) - currently under review. Please don't quote without my permission.

Vďaka väzbám na pojmy pravdy, presvedčenia, poznania a odôvodnenia je tvrdenie stredobo-dom záujmu modernej filozofie... more Vďaka väzbám na pojmy pravdy, presvedčenia, poznania a odôvodnenia je tvrdenie stredobo-dom záujmu modernej filozofie jazyka od jej zrodu v diele Gottloba Fregeho. Cieľom tejto štúdie je vysvetliť motiváciu a podstatu filozofických koncepcií, podľa ktorých je tvrdenie normatívny fenomén. Začnem tým, že zmapujem kľúčové myšlienky k problematike tvrdenia, a lokalizujem na tejto mape typické normatívne prístupy. Potom rozoberiem, čo vlastne znamená povedať, že tvrdenie je normatívnym fenoménom špecifického druhu, a predložím špekulatívno-hypotetickú rekonštrukciu genézy tvrdiacej jazykovej hry – presnejšie, jej protoformy – ktorá by mala vyzdvihnúť jej sociálno-normatívne aspekty, ktoré považujem za charakteristické. Na tomto základe nakoniec postavím kritické porovnanie dvoch reprezentatívnych normatívnych prístupov k tvrdeniu: pragmatického inferencializmu Roberta Brandoma a Knowledge Account of Assertion Timothyho Williamsona. Hoci má Williamsonov výklad svoje prednosti, budem argumentovať, že Brandomov prístup adekvátnejšie vystihuje sociálnu povahu tvrdenia, esenciálnu pre túto rečovú hru.

Owing to its connections to concepts of truth, belief, knowledge and justification, assertion has been in the focus of modern philosophy of language ever since its birth in the work of Gottlob Frege. My aim in this study is to explain both motivation and main ideas of those philosophical accounts of assertion that take it to be a normative phenomenon of a sort. I first draw a map of key ideas pertaining to the problem of assertion and localize on it typical normative accounts. Then I take up the issue of what it means to say that assertion is a normative phenomenon of a special sort, and I dare to put forward a speculative-hypothetical reconstruction of the genesis of the assertoric game - or, rather, its protoform – in order to bring to the fore certain social-cum-normative aspects that I consider characteristic of it. This, finally, will provide the basis for a critical comparison of two representative normative approaches to assertion: pragmatic inferentialism of Robert Brandom, and Knowledge Account of Assertion of Timothy Williamson. Williamson’s conception has its merits, but I shall argue that Brandom’s approach to assertion is superior on the ground that it much better accounts for a social dimension of assertion that is essential to this language game.

8. Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: The Case of Testimony

by Sanford Goldberg

Assertion, Defeat, and Disagreement

by Sanford Goldberg

Does Ignorance Enjoin Silence

by Stephen Wright

Unpublished Draft - Comments Welcome, Please do not cite

At the axis between epistemology and the philosophy of language lies the question of what, if any, rules govern the... more At the axis between epistemology and the philosophy of language lies the question of what, if any, rules govern the act of asserting. Peter Unger argues that knowledge is the rule of assertion - that you should not assert what you do not know. A consequence of this rule is that ignorance enjoins silence. In this paper I consider Unger's argument to the conclusion that ignorance enjoins silence. I conclude that knowledge is not the rule of assertion, but this need not lead one to reject Unger's claim that ignorance enjoins silence. One might still defend this claim using Unger's argument that ignorance leads to irrationality, which in turn enjoins silence.

Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief

by Daniel Whiting

To appear in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming).

That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in... more That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, the criticism and defence of belief, and the value of knowledge. I argue that those considerations do not give us reason to give up the truth view in favour of the knowledge view and, moreover, that reflection on those considerations gives us some reason to reject the knowledge view. Thus, I conclude, we can continue to take the apparent platitude at face value.

How Do You Know that "How Do You Know" Challenges a Speaker's Knowledge?

by Rachel R McKinnon

Forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

It is often argued that the general propriety of challenging an assertion with ‘How do you know?’ counts as evidence... more It is often argued that the general propriety of challenging an assertion with ‘How do you know?’ counts as evidence for the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA). Part of the argument is that this challenge seems to directly challenge whether a speaker knows what she asserts. In this paper I argue for a re-interpretation of the data, the upshot of which is that we need not interpret ‘How do you know?’ as directly challenging a speaker’s knowledge; instead, it’s better understood as challenging a speaker’s reasons. Consequently, I argue that reasons-based norms can equally well explain this data.

The Normative Role of Knowledge

by Declan Smithies

Forthcoming in Nous

What is the normative role of knowledge? I argue that knowledge plays an important role as a norm of assertion and... more What is the normative role of knowledge? I argue that knowledge plays an important role as a norm of assertion and action, which is explained and unified by its more fundamental role as a norm of belief. Moreover, I propose a distinctive account of what this normative role consists in. I argue that knowledge is the aim of belief, which sets a normative standard of correctness and a corresponding normative standard of justification. According to my proposal, it is correct to believe, assert and act on a proposition if and only if one is in a position to know it, but one has justification to believe, assert and act on a proposition if and only if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know it.

What is the Normative Role of Logic?

by Peter Milne

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume (2009) 83(1): 269-298

In making assertions one takes on commitments to the consistency of what one asserts and to the logical consequences... more In making assertions one takes on commitments to the consistency of what one asserts and to the logical consequences of what one asserts. Although there is no quick link between belief and assertion, the dialectical requirements on assertion feed back into normative constraints on those beliefs that constitute one’s evidence. But if we are not certain of many of our beliefs and that uncertainty is modelled in terms of probabilities, then there is at least prima facie incoherence between the normative constraints on belief and the probability-like structure of degrees of belief. I suggest that the norm-governed practice relating to degrees of belief is the evaluation of betting odds.

Believing Things Unknown

by Aidan McGlynn

Forthcoming in Noûs. This is a pre-copyediting draft, so please ignore any (non-philosophical) mistakes.

Epistemically Proper Assertions

by Stephen Wright

Unpublished Draft - Comments Welcome, Please do not Cite

Assertions can be criticised on various grounds. One distinctive way in which a speaker's assertion that p can be... more Assertions can be criticised on various grounds. One distinctive way in which a speaker's assertion that p can be justly criticised is by the speaker not meeting the epistemic standard required to make such an assertion. This paper explores what the required standard for epistemically proper assertions is. In it, I defend what I call the authority norm of assertion, which states that a speaker's assertion that p is epistemically beyond reproach if the speaker's assertion is able to contribute to the listener's justificatory state with respect to p in some way. I compare this norm of authority with the knowledge norm of assertion, which states that one fails to meet the required standard if one does not know that p. I suggest that the considerations given by Tim Williamson in his seminal defence of the knowledge norm of assertion can be explained by the authority norm of assertion and the authority norm of assertion can be motivated in ways that speak against the knowledge norm of assertion.

Is Justification Knowledge?

by Brent Madison

(2010) Journal of Philosophical Research 35:173-191.

Analytic epistemologists agree that, whatever else is true of epistemic justification, it is distinct from knowledge.... more Analytic epistemologists agree that, whatever else is true of epistemic justification, it is distinct from knowledge. However, if recent work by Jonathan Sutton is correct, this view is deeply mistaken, for according to Sutton justification is knowledge. That is, a subject is justified in believing that p iff he knows that p. Sutton further claims that there is no concept of epistemic justification distinct from knowledge. Since knowledge is factive, a consequence of Sutton’s view is that there are no false justified beliefs.

Following Sutton, I will begin by outlining kinds of beliefs that do not constitute knowledge but that seem to be justified. I will then be in a position to critically evaluate Sutton’s arguments for his position that justification is knowledge, concluding that he fails to establish his bold thesis. In the course of so doing, I will defend the following rule of assertion: (The JBK-rule) One must: assert p only if one has justification to believe that one knows that p.

Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion

by Patrick Greenough

in J. Brown and H. Cappelen (eds), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: OUP, 2011.

The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but... more The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival.