Normativity

Razones y normatividad, el caso de las reglas sociales

by Sebastián Figueroa Rubio

Exposición de IV Jornadas Chileno Argentinas de Filosofia Jírídica y Social, Valparaiso 2011.

Gerald Postema señaló hace unos años que dos tesis intuitivamente plausibles van a dominar la discusión sobre la... more Gerald Postema señaló hace unos años que dos tesis intuitivamente plausibles van a dominar la discusión sobre la naturaleza del derecho en las últimas décadas: la tesis de la normatividad y la tesis social. Según la primera el derecho es una forma de razonamiento práctico y solo entendemos al Derecho cuando entendemos como éste da a los diferentes actores del sistema razones para actuar. La tesis social, en cambio, va a entender al derecho como un hecho social y lo que es derecho está determinado por el comportamiento humano comunitario y sus instituciones.
Tal vez los principales ponentes de ambas teorías en las últimas décadas han sido, por parte de la tesis de la normatividad, Joseph Raz, especialmente en su libro Razón Práctica y Normas (RPN) y, por parte de la tesis social, Herbert Hart en su libro El Concepto de Derecho (CD) , ambas obras son objeto de análisis de este trabajo, en los términos de la discusión que plantea Postema.
Trataré la discusión, como el titulo señala, en el ámbito de las reglas sociales. Esto, en primer lugar, porque las reglas jurídicas son primeramente reglas sociales y, en segundo lugar, porque gran parte de lo que es el Derecho se juega en la respuesta sobre lo qué es una regla. En este sentido, el problema se centra en determinar lo que significan las reglas en los lugares donde se encuentran presentes (las práctica según reglas), lo que permite ver que significa su normatividad y cual es el rol del razonamiento práctico de los individuos que las usan en este contexto. En este sentido, la pregunta a revisar es ¿Qué pasa cuando hay una regla? ¿Qué criterios tenemos para determinarlo?
En lo que sigue, en primer lugar, presentaré brevemente ciertas nociones sobre lo que hace a una regla en la propuesta de Hart desarrollada en CD; luego señalaré las ideas en torno a Hart desarrolladas por Raz en RPN, lo que implicará repasar tanto sus críticas como la propuesta propia que desarrolla a partir de dichas críticas; por último revisaré los planteamientos de Raz y presentaré algunas ideas sobre la temática que implican relativizar las críticas hechas a Hart y que pretenden leer con nuevos énfasis algunas tesis expuestas en CD.

Agency, Necessity, and Normativity

by Antti Kauppinen

This is a draft of a paper that was originally to be a blog post, but grew too long. Comments would be very welcome.

According to constitutivists like Korsgaard and Velleman, moral requirements can be (roughly speaking) derived from... more According to constitutivists like Korsgaard and Velleman, moral requirements can be (roughly speaking) derived from what is constitutive of agency, so we have internal reason to act morally simply in virtue of being agents. This is challenged by David Enoch, who argues that even if agency is inescapable and has a constitutive aim, it doesn't follow we have reason to care about or act on it. I argue that while Enoch's criticisms hit the mark, it may be possible to formulate a requirement of rationality that allows a kind of successful bootstrapping from agency to reasons even though we have no reason to be agents.

Foundations for Moral Relativism

by J. David Velleman

I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually... more I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually incompatible, but equally valid moralities.

Building Legality: Between Truthmaking and Constitution

by triantafyllos gkouvas

Presented at the 2012 McMaster Graduate Conference for Legal Theory
This is still a draft under development. Please do not cite without permission.

Building relations like making a proposition true or constituting a statue are shortcuts for an impressively nuanced... more Building relations like making a proposition true or constituting a statue are shortcuts for an impressively nuanced class of relations pertaining to the creation of less fundamental entities by more fundamental ones. Building relations are not metaphysical bedrock like universals, states of affairs or tropes but they do perform a salvaging task at least for those philosophers who are less willing to resort too quickly to reductive explanations of less fundamental phenomena. As I aspire to demonstrate building metaphors are no less frequent in debates about the nature of law and that’s not a matter of making one’s philosophical prose more illustrative. The argument I aim to bring forward is that no concerted effort has been made so far to explore the nature of the building relation that generates legal content. My target relation will be that of truth-making whose application to the grounds of legal propositions I will try to illuminate. My final argument will be that it is not just the case that there are legal propositions awaiting to be made true but propositions sortally identified as structural parts of the law of a legal system and it is qua structural parts that they are constituted (rather than simply made true) by what content the law practices of that system actually contribute.

Putnam and the Political

by Narve Strand

Philosophy and Social Criticism, 37, 7, 2011: 743-57

This article deals with how to talk about the political. After the introduction (I), I show, first, that Putnam’s... more This article deals with how to talk about the political. After the introduction (I), I show, first, that Putnam’s arguments against the root dichotomies between facts and values (II), and between values and norms (III), are valid. I then discuss Putnam’s resistance to drawing skeptical lessons from these negative arguments, a fight that is largely successful (IV). I go on to sketch his own middle position, looking at the way he expands cognitive meaning in the practical sphere (V). I end by addressing Putnam’s specific stance towards the political, arguing here that a relative distinction between facts, values and norms allows us to speak about the political both in a more direct and a balanced way. This means reopening the case of representation (VI).

Uma revisão crítica da leitura habermasiana da Dialéctica do Iluminismo de Adorno e Horkheimer [Habermas’ Reading of Dialectic of Enlightenment: a critical revision]

by João Pedro Cachopo

Published in Saberes, Natal – RN, vol. 1, no. 1 (December 2008), pp. 57-70 [in Portuguese].

Resumo:

O artigo visa levar a cabo uma revisão crítica da leitura habermasiana da Dialéctica do Iluminismo... more Resumo:

O artigo visa levar a cabo uma revisão crítica da leitura habermasiana da Dialéctica do Iluminismo de Adorno e Horkheimer, tendo como pano de fundo a perspectiva de uma reavaliação do potencial da filosofia adorniana, para lá das fronteiras teóricas da chamada segunda geração da Escola de Frankfurt. Atendendo ao teor crítico da leitura proposta por Habermas, tratar-se-á de discutir dois aspectos que lhe estão subjacentes: a identificação da dimensão mítica do iluminismo com a “racionalidade instrumental”, por um lado, e, por outro, o diagnóstico segundo o qual estaria em causa na Dialéctica do iluminismo uma totalização da crítica que conduziria inevitavelmente a filosofia a uma situação aporética que ameaça conduzi-la ao beco sem saída do cepticismo. Face a este duro diagnóstico, sugere-se que a dimensão paradoxal do pensamento de Adorno pode constituir – permanecendo fiel à sua definição enfática da filosofia como “pensamento que não se deixa travar” – uma vertente imprescindível do pensar filosófico capaz de desencadear, com o seu carácter perturbador, uma crítica imanente da razão.

From the Problem of the Nature of Psychosis to the Phenomenological Reform of Psychiatry. Historical and Epistemological Remarks on Ludwig Binswanger’s Psychiatric Project, Medicine Studies, 2012 (DOI) 10.1007/s12376-012-0076-x

by Elisabetta Basso

This paper focuses on one of the original moments of the development of the “phenomenological” current of psychiatry,... more This paper focuses on one of the original moments of the development of the “phenomenological” current of psychiatry, namely, the psychopathological research of Ludwig Binswanger. By means of the clinical and conceptual problem of schizophrenia as it was conceived and developed at the beginning of the twentieth century, I will try to outline and analyze Binswanger’s perspective from a both historical and epistemological point of view. Binswanger’s own way means of approaching and conceiving schizophrenia within the scientific, medical, and psychiatric context of that time will lead us to grasp the epistemological stakes at the origins of his project of reforming psychiatry by means of phenomenology. I will finally attempt to upgrade and update Binswanger’s project in light of the current reappraisal of phenomenology within the ongoing debate on psychopathology engaged by studies in the field of science and philosophy of mind.

Neoliberalising violence: of the exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments

by Simon Springer

Springer, S. 2012. Neoliberalising violence: of the exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments. Area 44 (2), 136-143.

This paper sets out to develop two related ideas. First, it seeks to identify how both violence and neoliberalism can... more This paper sets out to develop two related ideas. First, it seeks to identify how both violence and neoliberalism can be considered as moments. From this shared conceptualisation of process and fluidity, I argue that it becomes easier to recognise how these two phenomena actually converge. Building upon this conceived coalescence of neoliberalism and violence, the second aim is to recognise how the hegemony of neoliberalism positions it as an abuser, which facilitates the abandonment of those ‘Others’ who fall outside of neoliberal normativity. I argue that the widespread banishment of ‘Others’ under neoliberalism produces a ‘state of exception’, wherein because of its inherently dialectic nature, exceptional violence is transformed into exemplary violence. This metamorphosis occurs as aversion for alterity intensifies under neoliberalism and its associated violence against ‘Others’ comes to form the rule.

On the ‘Undialectical’: Normativity in Hegel

by Iain Macdonald

Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 45, no. 1 (2012): 121-141.

This paper addresses the question of normativity in Hegel’s thought by examining the possibility of ‘undialectical’... more This paper addresses the question of normativity in Hegel’s thought by examining the possibility of ‘undialectical’ resistance to dialectical development. Beginning with a general overview of dialectical normativity and what it might mean to be ‘undialectical’, the focus then shifts to a privileged example in Hegel’s writings: Sophocles’ Antigone. The central claim of the paper is the following: the very contradictions that fuel dialectical normativity can also trap individuals within an obsolete actuality, without immediate hope of escape. Indeed, the irreducible dependence of dialectical thinking upon the actions and decisions of individual consciousness expose it to the threat of continual stasis or regression. This ineliminable possibility of failure is what is here called the ‘undialectical’ moment of the dialectic, which Hegel understands rather as a negative condition of possibility of freedom and rationality.

Problém normatívnosti tvrdenia

by Ladislav Koren

Draft o the paper (in Slovak) - currently under review. Please don't quote without my permission.

Vďaka väzbám na pojmy pravdy, presvedčenia, poznania a odôvodnenia je tvrdenie stredobo-dom záujmu modernej filozofie... more Vďaka väzbám na pojmy pravdy, presvedčenia, poznania a odôvodnenia je tvrdenie stredobo-dom záujmu modernej filozofie jazyka od jej zrodu v diele Gottloba Fregeho. Cieľom tejto štúdie je vysvetliť motiváciu a podstatu filozofických koncepcií, podľa ktorých je tvrdenie normatívny fenomén. Začnem tým, že zmapujem kľúčové myšlienky k problematike tvrdenia, a lokalizujem na tejto mape typické normatívne prístupy. Potom rozoberiem, čo vlastne znamená povedať, že tvrdenie je normatívnym fenoménom špecifického druhu, a predložím špekulatívno-hypotetickú rekonštrukciu genézy tvrdiacej jazykovej hry – presnejšie, jej protoformy – ktorá by mala vyzdvihnúť jej sociálno-normatívne aspekty, ktoré považujem za charakteristické. Na tomto základe nakoniec postavím kritické porovnanie dvoch reprezentatívnych normatívnych prístupov k tvrdeniu: pragmatického inferencializmu Roberta Brandoma a Knowledge Account of Assertion Timothyho Williamsona. Hoci má Williamsonov výklad svoje prednosti, budem argumentovať, že Brandomov prístup adekvátnejšie vystihuje sociálnu povahu tvrdenia, esenciálnu pre túto rečovú hru.

Owing to its connections to concepts of truth, belief, knowledge and justification, assertion has been in the focus of modern philosophy of language ever since its birth in the work of Gottlob Frege. My aim in this study is to explain both motivation and main ideas of those philosophical accounts of assertion that take it to be a normative phenomenon of a sort. I first draw a map of key ideas pertaining to the problem of assertion and localize on it typical normative accounts. Then I take up the issue of what it means to say that assertion is a normative phenomenon of a special sort, and I dare to put forward a speculative-hypothetical reconstruction of the genesis of the assertoric game - or, rather, its protoform – in order to bring to the fore certain social-cum-normative aspects that I consider characteristic of it. This, finally, will provide the basis for a critical comparison of two representative normative approaches to assertion: pragmatic inferentialism of Robert Brandom, and Knowledge Account of Assertion of Timothy Williamson. Williamson’s conception has its merits, but I shall argue that Brandom’s approach to assertion is superior on the ground that it much better accounts for a social dimension of assertion that is essential to this language game.

Book Review: Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, eds., Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz :Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz

by Constantine Sandis

Bodies of science and law: forensic DNA profiling, biological bodies and biopower

by Victor Toom

Toom, Victor. 2012. "Bodies of science and law: forensic DNA profiling, biological bodies and biopower." Journal of Law and Society 39(1):150-66.
The paper is part of the Special Issue 'Material Worlds: Intersections of Law, Science, Technology, and Society', edited by Chris Lawless and Alex Faulkner.

How is jurisdiction transferred from an individual’s biological body to agents of power such as the police, public... more How is jurisdiction transferred from an individual’s biological body to agents of power such as the police, public prosecutor and judiciary, and what happens to these biological bodies when transformed from private into public objects? These questions are examined by analyzing bodies situated at the intersection of science and law. More specifically, the transformation of ‘private bodies’ into ‘public bodies’ shall be analyzed by going into the details of forensic DNA profiling in the Dutch jurisdiction. It will be argued that various ‘forensic genetic practices’ enact different ‘forensic genetic bodies’. These enacted forensic genetic bodies are connected with various infringements of civil rights, which become articulated in exploring these forensic genetic bodies’ ‘normative registers’.
The pdf is freely available, click the Wiley button.

The Performativity of Sovereignty in a Post-Colonial International Society: Discursive Power and the Construction of Kosovo’s Statehood

by Xavier Mathieu

Paper to be presented at the 2012 ECPR Joint Sessions (Antwerp - April 2012) in the workshop "The Institutions of International Society Revisited: Theory, Practice, Performativity"

This article analyses sovereignty from a performative perspective. Influenced by Geertz and Butler, I show how the... more This article analyses sovereignty from a performative perspective. Influenced by Geertz and Butler, I show how the specific problem encountered by International Relations scholars studying sovereignty – i.e. its lack of empiricity – can be effectively answered by a performative analysis. Indeed, a performative approach can shed a new light on the complex relationship between discourse and reality of sovereignty. In this article, sovereignty is performatively analysed in order to reveal: (i) the underlying normativity of the concept, and its subsequent action as a model for statehood; and (ii) the performative nature of sovereign discourses that appear to only describe what they in fact contribute to create. The ‘reality’ of sovereignty should thus be understood as a discursive reality, which enables the analyst to escape from the reality/discourse dichotomy. By deconstructing the dichotomy, and by merging performativity and post-colonial theory, this article also proposes a new understanding of emancipation. This approach to sovereignty is then applied to the case of Kosovo in order to reveal how sovereignty is has been performed in the case of this newly ‘independent state’.

An Immense Task. Hart sull'obbligo di obbedire al diritto

by Aldo Schiavello

Improvisation: Zwischen Experiment und Experimentalität? > PDF

by Alessandro Bertinetto

Peripheral normativity: Literacy and the production of locality in a South African township school

by Jan Blommaert

Toom, Victor. 2012. "Bodies of science and law: forensic DNA profiling, biological bodies and biopower." Journal of Law and Society 39(1):150-66.

by NUCFS - Centre for Forensic Science

The paper is part of the Special Issue 'Material Worlds: Intersections of Law, Science, Technology, and Society', edited by Chris Lawless and Alex Faulkner.

How is jurisdiction transferred from an individual’s biological body to agents of power such as the police, public... more How is jurisdiction transferred from an individual’s biological body to agents of power such as the police, public prosecutor and judiciary, and what happens to these biological bodies when transformed from private into public objects? These questions are examined by analyzing bodies situated at the intersection of science and law. More specifically, the transformation of ‘private bodies’ into ‘public bodies’ shall be analyzed by going into the details of forensic DNA profiling in the Dutch jurisdiction. It will be argued that various ‘forensic genetic practices’ enact different ‘forensic genetic bodies’. These enacted forensic genetic bodies are connected with various infringements of civil rights, which become articulated in exploring these forensic genetic bodies’ ‘normative registers’.

Interpersonal Checking or Learning through Training? On the Social Basis of Normativity in Later Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

by Jo-Jo Koo

[Feedback most welcome; please do not cite or refer to this draft without permission]

A contested but familiar understanding of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following is that he argues for a... more A contested but familiar understanding of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following is that he argues for a communitarian or social account of normativity in his later philosophy. This has come to be called the “community view” of rule-following in the literature. According to this view, the normative bindingness of rules or norms on one’s actions must have a social basis, which is often thought to consist in other people’s checking and assessments of the correctness of one’s rule-following. Michael Luntley has recently mounted a forthright critique of the “community view”, arguing that it is either question-begging or redundant as an account of normativity. If his line of criticism of the “community view” is cogent, its devastating conclusion is that the communitarian or social account of normativity is wrong. If so, the normativity of the meaning of linguistic entities like words, and (for that matter) of nonlinguistic entities like signposts or hammers, could not be fundamentally socially constituted.

I will argue in this paper that while Luntley’s powerful critique of the orthodox understanding of the “community view” of normativity is convincing, it does not apply to an alternative understanding of the social basis of normativity that most communitarian readers of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (PI) have overlooked or underemphasized to their detriment. On this alternative view, the social basis of normativity does not fundamentally consist in other people checking and sanctioning the correctness of one’s rule-following, but in the fact that we have each learned through training, starting from a very young age in our lives, how to correctly and incorrectly perform “bedrock” actions and activities, i.e., those that are correct and incorrect without justification (PI §§198, 201, 211, 217-19, 241-42, 289). Although such learning surely begins through interactions with others (e.g., parents and other caregivers), the point of these interactions is not justificatory but instructional, in a distinctive sense to be explained in this paper. The philosophical claim, then, is that the social basis of normativity consists in learning the correct uses of words and things through training, not fundamentally in the interpersonal checking of such uses by others. If this is right, those who defend the “community view” of rule-following will need to significantly alter their understanding of it.

The Normativity of Mathematics. A Neurocognitive Approach

by Mateusz Hohol

"The Many Faces of Normativity", eds. B. Brożek, J. Stelmach, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2012 [forthcoming].

Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between 'is' and 'ought'.

by Katinka Quintelier

co-authored with Dan Fessler; Commentary in Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first,... more Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between “is” and “ought.” Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.