Normative Ethics

Una primera aproximación a la normativa en materia de conservación del patrimonio cultural de México

by Isabel Medina-González

Motive Utilitarianism

by Gwen Bradford

forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism, Continuum Press

Review of Thomas Hurka, The Best Things in Life

by Gwen Bradford

in Journal of Value Inquiry (2011) 45: 487-490.

Weg met de evolutionaire ethiek! Hoe evolutietheorie wél relevant is voor de normatieve ethiek

by Katinka Quintelier

Published in 'De Filosoof' 11 (54), http://fuf.phil.uu.nl/de-filosoof

Giving Each Person Her Due: Taurek Cases and Non-comparative Justice

by Alan Thomas

More Seminal Ethics Implications

by Mark Singer

Tandem works include: "Seminal Ethics," "Kant Concept Art," "Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications" - also on this site.

These implications are: moral, epistemology, love, happiness, time and space, psychological, art, education, medical, economic, war, capital punishment, and abortion.

"Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications" includes additional categories.

Virtudes cardeais no afresco de Rafael – Arte, Ética e Jusfilosofia

by Paulo Ferreira da Cunha

in "Vdetur", n.º 15, 2002, pp. 5-24

Este artigo procura arqueologias filosóficas para uma simbolização da Justiça. Tudo indica que Rafael não conhecia (ou... more Este artigo procura arqueologias filosóficas para uma simbolização da Justiça. Tudo indica que Rafael não conhecia (ou não aderiu) à perspectiva de autonomização do jurídico, cara a Aristóteles, nem ao desejo de laicização do Direito, protagonizado por Tomás de Aquino. Entre este último e o seu tempo interpusera-se, evidentemente, muita água nominalista e muita escolástica tardia sob as pontes da História. Porém, se a Prudência não é a virtude das virtudes em Rafael, tal se deve certamente ao facto de não estar a fazer teologia moral, mas representação da Justiça. E, mesmo assim, a Prudência surge no centro das virtudes e num plano superior. Aliás, o próprio Tomás de Aquino, na linha de Aristóteles, embora moderando o Filósofo, dá a maior relevância à Justiça, como suprema das virtudes morais, dependendo porém, na ordem do ser e da verdade, da Prudência.

Surveillance Ethics

by Kevin Macnish

Article for Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Introduction to history, terminology and concerns of surveillance ethics. Introduction to history, terminology and concerns of surveillance ethics.

Unblinking eyes: the ethics of automating surveillance

by Kevin Macnish

Published in Ethics and Information Technology

In this paper I critique the ethical implications of automating CCTV surveillance. I consider three modes of CCTV with... more In this paper I critique the ethical implications of automating CCTV surveillance. I consider three modes of CCTV with respect to automation: manual (or non-automated), fully automated, and partially automated. In each of these I examine concerns posed by processing capacity, prejudice towards and profiling of surveilled subjects, and false positives and false negatives. While it might seem as if fully automated surveillance is an improvement over the manual alternative in these areas, I demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case. In preference to the extremes I argue in favour of partial automation in which the system integrates a human CCTV operator with some level of automation. To assess the degree to which such a system should be automated I draw on the further issues of privacy and distance. Here I argue that the privacy of the surveilled subject can benefit from automation, while the distance between the surveilled subject and the CCTV operator introduced by automation can have both positive and negative effects. I conclude that in at least the majority of cases more automation is preferable to less within a partially automated system where this does not impinge on efficacy.

"Cosmopolitanizing Cosmopolitanism? Cosmopolitan Claims Making, Interculturalism, and the Bouchard-Taylor Report"

by Scott Schaffer

From Will Kymlicka and Kathryn Walker (eds.), <i>Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World</i>, 2012, UBC Press. Available at http://www.amazon.ca/Rooted-Cosmopolitanism-Canada-Will-Kymlicka/dp/0774822600/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1328886110&sr=8-1

Philosophical Utilitarianism

by Ben Bradley

Forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism (Continuum), ed. James Crimmins and Douglas Long.

Goodness and Justice

by Ben Bradley

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2012): 233-43

Review essay on Joseph Mendola's Goodness and Justice. Review essay on Joseph Mendola's Goodness and Justice.

Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem

by Ezio Di Nucci

forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology

Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently proposed a new argument
for the thesis that killing the one in the Trolley... more Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently proposed a new argument
for the thesis that killing the one in the Trolley Problem is not
permissible. Her argument relies on the introduction of a new scenario in which the bystander may also sacrifice herself to save the five. Thomson argues that those not willing to sacrifice themselves if they could may not kill the one to save the five. Bryce Huebner and Marc Hauser have recently put Thomson’s argument to the empirical test by asking people what they should do in the new trilemma case in which they may also sacrifice themselves. They found that the majority judge
that they should either kill the one or sacrifice themselves; Huebner and Hauser argue that those numbers speak against Thomson’s argument. But Thomson’s argument was about the dialectical effect of the new trilemma on the traditional dilemma, rather than about the trilemma itself. Here I present the results of a study in which I asked subjects first what they should do in the trilemma and then what they should do in the traditional Trolley Problem. I found that, if asked first about the trilemma, subjects then have the intuition that killing the one in the
traditional Bystander at the Switch is not permissible – exactly what Thomson’s argument had predicted.

Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming, and Creating

by Ben Bradley

Forthcoming in The Journal of Ethics

Doing Away With Harm

by Ben Bradley

forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Linguaggio, intenzioni e razionalità pratica: un'ipotesi interpretativa delle basi del giudizio morale

by Marta Clemente

Do I have more free will than you do?

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.

The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.

Why ‘Ought’ Detaches: Or, Why You Ought to Get With My Friends (If You Want to Be My Lover)

by Alex Silk

Agent-Relative Teleology, Hypothetical Preferences, and Centered Worlds

by Alex Silk

Defending the Right To Do Wrong

by Ori Herstein

Law and Philosophy (forthcoming, 2012)

Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the... more Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral self-constitution. This view has its critics. Responding to these objections reveals that none refute the coherence of the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral wrong.’ At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion, actual.

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