Naxalite Movement

Grievance, Mobilisation and State Response: An examination of the Naxalite Insurgency in India

by Chas Morrison

Published in the April 2012 issue of "Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security"

This paper explores the Naxalite insurgency in India in terms of causal mechanisms that lead to the intensification of... more This paper explores the Naxalite insurgency in India in terms of causal mechanisms that lead to the intensification of rural civil conflict by focusing specifically on grievance, mobilisation and government responses to rebellion. Realist theory is inadequate when analysing the causal factors of complex insurgencies and the mechanisms leading to their continuation. This case illustrates some aspects of intra-state conflict in a very large country, in terms of geography and population, and how the rebels have mobilised grievances at local level. New Delhi has addressed the conflict as both a development and a security challenge, and consequently has oscillated between repression and concession in its responses. This approach has resulted neither in reduction of grievances through adequate rural development, nor in consistent armed response to the Naxalite threat. Without a comprehensive and clear set of state responses, the violence is likely to continue.

The Naxalite Insurgency & India's Centralized Response (Oct 31 2009)

by Christopher Biggers

Recent reports emerging from New Delhi indicate a new centralized offensive to combat the Naxalite threat in... more Recent reports emerging from New Delhi indicate a new centralized offensive to combat the Naxalite threat in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra. Planned for November, this novel offensive will mark the beginning of a 5 year strategy coordinating, for the first time across individual states, the option of utilizing the Indian army and air force to further strengthen existing local paramilitary units.

India's Internal Security Outlook: Progress but Still Areas of Concern

by Bibhu Prasad Routray

Published as a RSIS Commentary, No. 002/2012, 3 January 2012

In spite of some improvements, internal security remains a critical area of concern for India in the new year. The... more In spite of some improvements, internal security remains a critical area of concern for India in the new year. The government's ability to end extremist violence and craft a counter-terror architecture continues to be hampered by bureaucratic inertia, inter-ministerial and inter-departmental rivalry and political division.

Kishenji’s end could be new beginning

by Bibhu Prasad Routray

Published in New Indian Express, 4 December 2011

By all means, the November 24 killing of Kishenji, the third-ranking leader of the Communist Party of India-Maoist... more By all means, the November 24 killing of Kishenji, the third-ranking leader of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) in West Bengal’s Jangalmahal area, is an achievement for the security forces. The usual allegations of the encounter being ‘fake’ by the Maoist bandwagon notwithstanding, the fact remains that in the war between the state and the extremists, the former’s policy of targeting the top leaders has met with a significant success.

A relatively event free Independence Day in India’s Naxal heartland

by Bibhu Prasad Routray

Published on 15 August 2011 on my blog.

On August 15, 2011, the day India celebrated its 65th Independence Day, the left-wing extremists, purportedly fighting... more On August 15, 2011, the day India celebrated its 65th Independence Day, the left-wing extremists, purportedly fighting for the cause of the tribals, did attempt to indulge in some acts of sabotage and violence, although the activity reported on the day did not match the anticipations of the government. The Home Ministry had earlier alerted the governments of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh about possible attempts by the Maoists to trigger violence.

No tears for the Salwa Judum of Chhattisgarh

by Bibhu Prasad Routray

Published in New Indian Express, 31 July 2011

The Raman Singh government has taken a decision to lower the recruitment benchmark so that the Special Police Officers... more The Raman Singh government has taken a decision to lower the recruitment benchmark so that the Special Police Officers (SPOs), facing a purge, can be recruited into the regular police force. Neither was the Salwa Judum movement the brightest of counter-insurgency ideas, nor will the sly attempt to circumvent the apex court’s decision add to the state’s capacity to deal with the extremists.

'People' factor missing in anti-Maoist operations

by Bibhu Prasad Routray

Published in Rediff.com, 20 June 2011

The government needs to get the tribals in the Maoist-dominated areas on their side, if they are going to win the... more The government needs to get the tribals in the Maoist-dominated areas on their side, if they are going to win the battle against the Maoists. But that is easier said than done, says Bibhu Prasad Routray.