Psychopatia – druga strona ewolucyjnej monety? (Psychopaty - a dark side of the evolutionary coin?)
Paper published on Interia.pl website and granicenauk.pl website.
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Seen by: and 2 moreSo far, so good with good! But what do I do? A Lewisian disambiguation of Moral Internalism.
draft 2.0
In the first section, I will introduce some fundamental quandaries of the main branches of moral internalism:... more In the first section, I will introduce some fundamental quandaries of the main branches of moral internalism: cognitivist moral internalism and Humean moral internalism. In the second section, I will sketch a typology which allows us to specify the kind of acts relevant to understand (Lewisian) moral internalism. In the third section, I will introduce the tenets of L-Dispositionalism and, therefore, in which sense the act of valuing entails a connection with being motivated to act. In the fourth section, on the one hand, I will show how we can derive a Lewisian moral internalism from Lewis's Dispositionalism and, on the other hand, how the derived sort of moral internalism passes the challenges raised against the two main orthodox branches of moral internalism. Finally, in the fifth section, I will list the main conclusions.
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Seen by: and 7 moreDo I have more free will than you do?
by Brian Earp
Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.
The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.
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Seen by:Janicke, S. H., & Raney, A., A. (2011).Exploring How We Enjoy Antihero Narratives: A Comparison of Fans and Nonfans of 24
Janicke, S. H., & Raney, A., A. (2011). Exploring How We Enjoy Antihero Narratives: A Comparison of Fans and Nonfans of 24. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Boston, MA, May 2011.
Affective disposition theory explains well the process of enjoying hero narratives. However, it is not... more Affective disposition theory explains well the process of enjoying hero narratives. However, it is not particularly well suited to explain the appeal of narratives featuring antiheroes. Recent exploratory scholarship on antiheroes suggests that character identification and the process of moral disengagement might be important factors in the enjoyment of such fare. The current study builds on this initial work and adds another piece of evidence in support of these claims. A sample of 101 self-identified fans and nonfans of the television series 24 viewed a condensed version of Season 1, providing evaluation of various protagonist perceptions, moral judgments, and emotional responses to the narrative, as well as overall enjoyment. As expected, fans reported greater liking of the protagonist Jack Bauer and greater enjoyment. But more importantly, regression analyses illuminated key differences between the groups in terms of the factors predicting enjoyment, providing a clearer picture of how we enjoy antihero narratives.
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Regarding Doing Being Ordinary
The individuation of actions is socially constructed, via a process of unmanaged coordination on a taxonomy of... more The individuation of actions is socially constructed, via a process of unmanaged coordination on a taxonomy of actions. Since our individual decisions are framed by the individuation of the alternatives, they are influenced by the results of social coordination.
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Seen by:Creatures in Captivity and Ethics
Prisons. Factory States. Low-Wage Workers. Child Sex Trade. Animal Abuse for: Clothing, Entertainment and Food. I... more Prisons. Factory States. Low-Wage Workers. Child Sex Trade. Animal Abuse for: Clothing, Entertainment and Food. I really could go on with other outlets of injust captivity, but this covers some major ones.
Anti-Social Engineering the Hyper-Manipulated Self
by Brian Taylor
When one does philosophy, one dismantles strings of concepts into their respective parts to examine both the parts... more
When one does philosophy, one dismantles strings of concepts into their respective parts to examine both the parts themselves and the relationships the parts have with each other. This semantic reduction provides us the best possible opportunities for finding truth. This was exactly the type of skill Brian Taylor needed to write his new book Anti-Social Engineering the Hyper-Manipulated Self, postpaper publishing, ISBN: 978-0-557-99909-5 http://stores.lulu.com/postpaper
The book began as a series of blogged essays in a response to the “Authenticity” movement presented by the like of Eckhart Tolle, Andrew Cohen and to a lesser extent, Dr. Phil. These men, and others, were coming to conclusions on the idea of authenticity that were, among other things, subjective fallacies, rife with interpretation and possibly counterproductive. On the other side of the coin we had skeptical guru Michael Shermer or perhaps Richard Dawkins making up one half of the “four horseman of the non-apocalypse.” These men, “scientists,” were and still are guilty of the same faults as their spiritual counterparts, interpretations rather than knowledge. Brian Taylor wanted to know, “Are there any actual answers in the arena of the self and its power?” As it turns out, reality is far stranger than ever before known and we actually know so much less than we think we do, if it can be said that we know anything authentically, at all.
After four years of research into our ideas about the self through the ages, the sciences of the self and what the self is, this book comes to the conclusion that the modern self, you and I today, are not only manipulated, but that manipulation is sought out, required and pre-programmed. This is a book about how we are all being intentionally hyper-manipulated without our knowledge, by whom and to what end.
To “anti-social engineer” is to counter this phenomenon of modernity through critical consciousness, dubbed “assignee's prerogative.” This self direction is aimed toward eudaemonia, which is an Aristotelian idea roughly meaning “happiness and promotion,” and it is further suggested that virtue is found in the mean between excess and deficiency, in these concerns. This sounds rather simple in such a paragraph form, rest assured, chasing the meanings and relationships of these ideas to any philosophical depth requires a maze of rabbit holes and someone to guide you through them. Taylor is nothing if not thorough in this regard.
Entertaining, personal, conversational, exact and profound, this book has a strange undercurrent, almost a charge running through it. Most clearly defined in it's most opinionated moments, there is a subtext, not a call to arms but to a social contract. Taylor says, throughout the book, that it is specifically battling social engineering, the command, hidden or not, “think this about that.” Yet, he too wants us to think a certain way, a centrist “golden mean,” a path of no extremes. Making an argument against his ideas is difficult, regardless of the talking points he uses. (These vary from possible moral objections we may hold for prostitution or murder, to social norms such as supporting the troops or the war on terror.) In his most controversial moments, when objectivity is at its thinnest, the author's existentialism shines through and he suggests it's better to not claim to know something than to suspect something incorrectly. The exception to this rule is when the social engineering is secret, malicious, degenerative or merely in error.
There are things that we can do anti-social engineer our hyper-manipulated selves and Taylor spells these tasks out clearly. Firstly, social engineering, be it delivered by a television commercial, ideology, civility, social construct, etc. is to be expected and recognized. Then Taylor presents us his Philosophy Generator which is described as “a dismantling of paradigm” and a way to determine if any particular social engineering is more persuasive or manipulative. If we are able to first know what it is we are deciding, then do our best possible thinking on the matter, which is what working through the Generator is for, we should be able to be confident in our decision, whatever it may be. Furthermore, given the standardization of awareness, contemplation and centrist philosophy, it should be expected that the same benefit experienced by individuals would transfer to societies.
The book ends with a chapter called “God wears a yellow hat.” It is concluded with a list of 24 interesting intentions, (23 actually, one of them is missing,) this list is not meant to be a complete index of the topics discussed, but rather an indication of the book's scope. The war on terror, the war on drugs, food transportation, consumerism, capitalism, communism, false flags, dehumanization via technology, God, 2012, patriotism, culture, globalization, human rights and religion. There is an entire chapter devoted to a reasonable discussion between the two sides divided over the conspiracies associated with September 11, 2001. This book discusses conspiracy as it dismantles thought, which is a strange dichotomy. Taylor seems to want to convince us that he is a reasonable man, with a reasonable method and if such a man can find a reasonable conspiracy, we can take the suggestion from the fringe to the mainstream. He may be right. However, this is not a conspiracy book, this is a book about thinking.
One comes away from the experience of reading this book enticed to do more and this is the goal. Anti-Social Engineering the Hyper-Manipulated Self is about taking responsibility and looking ahead, prudently. It doesn't want to take anything away from you, you're entitled to have your beliefs as the author has his. We need our beliefs and we even need social engineering, these things are part of a natural, healthy species. The dangers of our beliefs are represented by the lack of awareness of them and the inability to think critically about them. Taylor argues that, if in fact we are not thinking well about the things we believe, we are not living up to the reasonable purpose we have as human beings. This appreciation of hyper-reality and our place in it defines our authenticity and is the promise expressed by the 21st Century Enlightenment.
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Seen by: and 23 moreMoral Incentives
by Jacquelien van Stekelenburg
Van Stekelenburg, J. (2012). “Moral incentives”. In Snow, D. Donatella Della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam (Eds.). The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. Blackwell: US. Accepted for publication
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Seen by: and 4 morePerspectives on the Ecology of Decision Modes: Reply to Comments
full cite: Bennis, Will M., Douglas L. Medin and Daniel M. Bartels (2010), "Perspectives on the Ecology of Decision Modes: Reply to Comments," Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, 213-215.
We welcome and appreciate the insights and perspectives provided by Schwartz (2010, this issue), Tetlock and Mitchell... more We welcome and appreciate the insights and perspectives provided by Schwartz (2010, this issue), Tetlock and Mitchell (2010, this issue), and Bazerman and Greene (2010, this issue). Our thinking has benefited considerably from their responses, and we appreciate the opportunity to continue the discussion. In our reply, we address issues concerning the scope of moral rules and of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), including their relation to other decision modes. We then revisit the issue of closed-world assumptions (CWAs) and the question of how learning processes may operate for different decision modes.
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Seen by:The costs and benefits of calculation and moral rules
full cite: Bennis, Will M., Douglas L. Medin and Daniel M. Bartels (2010), "The Costs and Benefits of Calculation and Moral Rules," Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, 187-202.
There has been a recent upsurge of research on moral judgment and decision making. One important issue with this body... more There has been a recent upsurge of research on moral judgment and decision making. One important issue with this body of work concerns the relative advantages of calculating costs and benefits versus adherence to moral rules. The general tenor of recent research suggests that adherence to moral rules is associated with systematic biases and that systematic cost-benefit analysis is a normatively superior decision strategy. This article queries both the merits of cost-benefit analyses and the shortcomings of moral rules. We argue that outside the very narrow domain in which consequences can be unambiguously anticipated, it is not at all clear that calculation processes optimize outcomes. In addition, there are good reasons to believe that following moral rules can lead to superior consequences in certain contexts. More generally, different modes of decision making can be seen as adaptations to particular environments.
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Seen by: and 1 morePredicting Premeditation: Future Behavior Is Seen as More Intentional Than Past Behavior
full cite: Burns, Zachary C., Eugene M. Caruso, and Daniel M. Bartels (2011), "Predicting premeditation: Future behavior is seen as more intentional than past behavior," Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
People’s intuitions about the underlying causes of past and future actions might not be the same. In 3 studies, we... more People’s intuitions about the underlying causes of past and future actions might not be the same. In 3 studies, we demonstrate that people judge the same behavior as more intentional when it will be performed in the future than when it has been performed in the past. We found this temporal asymmetry in perceptions of both the strength of an individual’s intention and the overall prevalence of intentional behavior in a population. Because of its heightened intentionality, people thought the same transgression deserved more severe punishment when it would occur in the future than when it did occur in the past. The difference in judgments of both intentionality and punishment was partly explained by the stronger emotional reactions that were elicited in response to future actions than in response to past actions. We consider the implications of this temporal asymmetry for legal decision making and theories of attribution more generally.
Competing Theories of Blackmail: An Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory
full cite: Robinson, Paul H., Michael T. Cahill, and Daniel M. Bartels (2010), "Competing Theories of Blackmail: An Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory," Texas Law Review, 89, 291-532.
The crime of blackmail has risen to national media attention because of the David Letterman case, but this wonderfully... more
The crime of blackmail has risen to national media attention because of the David Letterman case, but this wonderfully curious offense has long been the favorite of clever criminal law theorists. It criminalizes the threat to do something that would not be criminal if one did it. There exists a rich literature on the issue, with many prominent legal scholars offering their accounts. Each theorist has his own explanation as to why the blackmail offense exists. Most theories seek to justify the position that blackmail is a moral wrong and claim to offer an account that reflects widely shared moral intuitions. But the theories make widely varying assertions about what those shared intuitions are, while also lacking any evidence to support the assertions.
This Article summarizes the results of an empirical study designed to test the competing theories of blackmail to see which best accords with prevailing sentiment. Using a variety of scenarios designed to isolate and test the various criteria different theorists have put forth as “the” key to blackmail, this study reveals which (if any) of the various theories of blackmail proposed to date truly reflects laypeople’s moral judgment.
Blackmail is not only a common subject of scholarly theorizing but also a common object of criminal prohibition. Every American jurisdiction criminalizes blackmail, although there is considerable variation in its formulation. The Article reviews the American statutes and describes the three general approaches these provisions reflect. The empirical study of lay intuitions also allows an assessment of which of these statutory approaches (if any) captures the community’s views, thereby illuminating the extent to which existing law generates results that resonate with, or deviate from, popular moral sentiment.
The analyses provide an opportunity to critique the existing theories of blackmail and to suggest a refined theory that best expresses lay intuitions. The present project also reveals the substantial conflict between community views and much existing legislation, indicating recommendations for legislative reform. Finally, the Article suggests lessons that such studies and their analyses offer for criminal law and theory.
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Seen by:A group construal account of drop-in-the-bucket thinking in policy preference and moral judgment
full cite: Bartels, Daniel M. and Russell C. Burnett (2011), "A Group Construal Account of Drop-in-the-Bucket Thinking in Policy Preference and Moral Judgment," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 50-57.
Decisions, both moral and mundane, about saving individuals or resources at risk are often influenced not only by... more Decisions, both moral and mundane, about saving individuals or resources at risk are often influenced not only by numbers saved and lost, but also by proportions of groups saved and lost. Consider choosing between a program that saves 60 of 240 lives at risk and one that saves 50 of 100. The first option maximizes absolute number saved; the second, proportion saved. In two studies, we show that the influence of proportions on such decisions depends on how items at risk are mentally represented. In particular, we show that proportions have greater influence on people's decisions to the extent that the items at risk are construed as forming groups, as opposed to distinct individuals. Construal was manipulated by means of animated displays in which resources at risk moved either independently (promoting individual construal) or jointly (promoting group construal). Results support the hypothesis that (a) decision makers form mental representations which vary in the degree to which resources at risk are construed as groups versus individuals and (b) construal of resources as groups promotes the influence of proportions on decisions and moral judgments
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