Do I have more free will than you do?
by Brian Earp
Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.
The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.
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Seen by: and 47 morePersons in Prospect
Published in Philosophy and Public Affairs (2008)
Comprises three papers: (1) "The Identity Problem", on Derek Parfit's non-identity problem; (2) "The... more Comprises three papers: (1) "The Identity Problem", on Derek Parfit's non-identity problem; (2) "The Gift of Life", on the morality of donor conception; (3) "Love and Non-existence", on our intuition that some people should never have been born.
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Seen by:Sweet Old Things and Dirty Old Men[England and Rust] submission
Inspired by William F. May’s writings on the vices and virtues of the elderly we offer our reflections on his ideas as... more Inspired by William F. May’s writings on the vices and virtues of the elderly we offer our reflections on his ideas as they are revealed by Muriel Spark’s novel, Memento Mori.. May argues that exempting the old from moral criticism positions them as “moral nonentities” and relieves the old, their caretakers, and society of moral responsibility. We, the coauthors of this paper, are from two different disciplines, namely Renaissance and medieval literature (Martha Rust), and social work and critical gerontology (Suzanne England). We offer our individual readings of the ways the novel illustrates May’s ideas, and conclude with our thoughts about how our collaboration opened up space in our own thinking and for continuing cross-disciplinary dialogu
Review of Ted Honderich, Conservatism
by Kevin Magill
Scroll to p.43 in pdf. Published in Radical Philosophy, 59, Autumn 1991. Got it completely wrong in relation to where the Tory Party was headed vis-a-vis the EU, and a few other things. Reply by Honderich in RP 61 ('Conservatism, Ideology, Rationale, and a Red Light').
Prudencia y justicia en la obra antropológica de Bartolomé de las Casas
Publicado en: Corso de Estrada, Laura - Zorroza, Ma Idoya (eds.), Ius et virtus en el Siglo de Oro (“Colección de pensamiento medieval y renacentista”, n. 126), EUNSA, Pamplona, 2011, pp. 189-196 (ISBN 978-84-313-2792-7).
Para obtener información sobre el artículo o solicitar una fotocopia del mismo, favor de ponerse en contacto en la... more Para obtener información sobre el artículo o solicitar una fotocopia del mismo, favor de ponerse en contacto en la dirección zorrillavictor_01@yahoo.es.
A Perfectionist Defense of Free Speech
by J.K. Miles
(Forthcoming) in Social Theory and Practice (July 2012) For copywright reasons I cannot post a copy of this paper now that it is accepted. Please message me and I can send you an uncorrected draft.
It is often said that if free speech means anything it means freedom for the thought we hate. This core idea is... more It is often said that if free speech means anything it means freedom for the thought we hate. This core idea is generally referred to as “viewpoint neutrality” and is consistent with the liberal intuition that governments should remain neutral with regard to conceptions of the good life. None of the traditional defenses of free speech secure viewpoint neutrality, however. Instead, each justification leaves room to censor some viewpoints. Ironically my defense of viewpoint neutrality does not come from the liberal assumption that governments should remain neutral about the good life. I defend a version of the virtue argument for free speech that is explicitly perfectionist—government does not have to remain neutral when promoting good lives for its citizens. Free speech is not just a means to promote virtue but is part and parcel of intellectual virtue—a decidedly perfectionist value.
Reconsidering risk to women: Oocyte donation for human embryonic stem cell research
American Journal of Bioethics, September, 11(9), 2011, 37-39.
I argue that the authors’ analysis of ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome as a negligible risk factor in oocyte donation... more I argue that the authors’ analysis of ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome as a negligible risk factor in oocyte donation for research purposes is flawed, and that their recommendations for policy and for future research are inadequately supported. I demonstrate that the authors commit the fallacy of unrepresentative sample in their analysis of data concerning the risk of ovarian stimulation informing donation-opposing arguments. I also contend that the authors do not give sufficient attention to the global oocyte market, to psychosocial factors surrounding oocyte donation, and to race and ethnicity as risk factors in ooctye donation, all of which are relevant to their denial of the possibility of disproportionate medical risk to women of lower socioeconomic status. I provide examples from recent research on these factors in oocyte donation in order to fill the gaps in the authors’ argument on risk.
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Seen by:Blackout: Freedom without Power and Meritocratic Apartheid
This paper attributes a liberal-republican conception of “freedom-without-power” which dominates contemporary western... more
This paper attributes a liberal-republican conception of “freedom-without-power” which dominates contemporary western political philosophy to a reification of social agency that mystifies the historical social, political and economic contexts of human capacities and achievements. Such abstraction, I argue, is not harmless but functions ideologically amongst prevailing structures of domination and exploitation.
Following Plato’s analogy between the structure of the soul and the polis, I suggest that freedom may be thought a consequence rather than a condition of political relations. I draw on the work of Raymond Geuss to explain why the political contexts of origin and application of “freedom” are normatively significant. I argue against the use of pre-political ethical frameworks in political philosophy in favor of an historically and contextually sensitive, self-critical approach to the “necessary illusions” of ethics. Such ethical-political integration addresses problems of ideological complicity with an abstract distinction between freedom and power. I show this by drawing a critical account of African identity, from Steven Biko, which addresses ideological blind-spots in Thaddeus Metz’s influential liberal-communitarian interpretation of Ubuntu. The critical account illuminates symptoms of “meritocratic apartheid” in South Africa today, which the pre-political conception obscures. Through satisfaction with a legal, formal projection of freedom, abstracted from power, we have all learned to justify inequality.
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Seen by:Moral Conflict and the Idea of Order: On a Relationship between Ethics and Political Philosophy
by Byron Kaldis
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 88/3, pp 420-442.
7. "Rabbinic Nazi Camp Survivors and the Call for a Religious Protection of Human Prerogatives"
in: M. Neerland-Solime (ed.), Prisoners of War and Forced Labor: Histories of War and Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), pp. 138-149.
The will is caused, not 'free'
by Brian Earp
Bargh, J. A., & Earp, B. D. (2009). The will is caused, not 'free'. Dialogue, Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 24 No 1, 13-15.
303 views
Seen by: and 72 moreTerrorism, Supreme Emergency, and Killing the Innocent
published in Perspectives - Review of International Affairs, 2009, Vol. 17, No. 1
Terrorist violence is often condemned for targeting innocents or non-combatants. There are two objections to this line... more Terrorist violence is often condemned for targeting innocents or non-combatants. There are two objections to this line of argument. First, one may doubt that terrorism is necessarily directed against innocents or non-combatants. However, I will focus on the second objection, according to which there may be exceptions from the prohibition against killing the innocent. In my article I will elaborate whether lethal terrorism against innocents can be justified in a supreme emergency. Starting from a critique of Michael Walzer’s account of supreme emergency, I will argue that the supreme emergency exemption justifies the resort to terrorism against innocents to avert moral disasters such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, provided that the criteria of last resort, proportionality and public declaration are satisfied.
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Seen by: and 31 moreMoral obligations of states
published in Applied Ethics Series 2011
The starting point of the paper is the frequent ascription of moral duties to states, especially in the context of... more The starting point of the paper is the frequent ascription of moral duties to states, especially in the context of problems of global justice. It is widely assumed that industrialized or wealthy countries in particular have a moral obligation or duties of justice to shoulder (financial) burdens of poverty reduction or climate change adaptation and mitigation. But can collectives such as states actually hold moral duties? If answering this affirmatively: what does it actually mean to say that a state has moral obligations or duties of justice? In this paper I argue that states can be considered collective (institutional) agents which can hold moral duties. If a collective (for example a state) holds moral duties this entails duties for its individual members. I show how depending on their position within the collective these duties differ.
‘All Politics Must Bend Its Knee Before Right’: Kant on the Relation of Morals to Politics
by Paul Formosa
Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 2 (2008): 1-25
Kant argues that “all politics must bend its knee before right” (PP: 8:380), and this means that “right must never be... more
Kant argues that “all politics must bend its knee before right” (PP: 8:380), and this means that “right must never be accommodated to politics, but politics must always be accommodated to right” (SRL: 8:429). Kant’s uncompromising stance on the relation of morals to politics has often been branded unrealistic and impractical. Indeed, it has often been argued that putting Kantian morality into political practice would, according to Alasdair MacIntyre, amount to “a dereliction of political duty”. While justice (and morality) can afford to be blind, politics must keep its eyes wide open. Does this accusation of naïve impracticality against Kant stand up to criticism? With these difficulties in mind, this paper will address the question of the relation of morals to politics in Kant’s work by first offering an interpretation of Kant’s moral and political theory. In section two I reject those readings of Kant, which are not uncommon, that claim that his moral theory absolutely forbids lying under any circumstances. In section three I also reject those readings of Kant, which again are not uncommon, that claim that his political theory absolutely forbids civil disobedience and rebellion under any circumstances. Drawing upon this reconstructive exegesis, I argue in section four that Kant’s position on the relation of morals to politics is both morally uncompromising and yet politically flexible, both principled and practical. Further, I also examine in depth the claim that political progress is impossible without accompanying moral progress. A fully politicised public realm requires not only a rights-respecting but also a virtuous citizenry.
WHO WAS CYRIL JOAD, AND WHAT DID HE CONTRIBUTE TO PHILOSOPHY ?
Essayette
ESSAYETTE 6 - "WHO WAS CYRIL JOAD AND WHAT DID HE CONTRIBUTE TO PHILOSOPHY ?"
BY RICHARD W. SYMONDS
BY RICHARD W. SYMONDS
Dr. Cyril Joad (1891-1953) (Teacher, Philosopher, Writer, Broadcaster, Outcast)
is best remembered, if remembered at all, as the wartime Brains Trust
'Professor' with the famous catchphrase "It all depends what you mean by...",
who popularized philosophy for millions, and "quickened the sluggish mind of
the nation" (London Evening Standard, 1953).
C.E.M. Joad published over 70 books in this country, nearly 30 in America, over
80 Papers, and countless newspaper and magazine articles. He was Head of
Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London for 23 years, until his
death in 1953, aged 61.
Cyril Edwin Mitchinson Joad (CEMJ) was a very gifted, but very fallible, human
being. His private life appears to be 'a disaster area', and celebrity hubris
ended with a nemesis in 1948. His popularity and reputation were destroyed by
Winston Churchill in 'Gathering Storm', by the media in a train ticket
'scandal', and by the cruel humiliations of Bertrand Russell, and his
professional disciples. Joad was sacked from the BBC, and the chances of a
Peerage from Clement Attlee, or a Professorship at Birkbeck, were lost.
Cyril Joad's life and work can be usefully divided into three main phases - its
beginning, middle and end - each of which can be sub-divided into 3 main areas:
Joad the Political Philosopher, Pacifist and Atheist
(a) "The Diary of a Dead Officer". Edited by CEMJ in 1919
(re: war poet and friend, Arthur Graeme West).
(b) Federation of Progressive Societies and Individuals,
F.P.S.I. (1933).
(c) The 1933 Oxford Union Debate "That under no
circumstances will we fight for King and Country". [Joad
proposed the motion and won the debate, an event which was
later cited by Churchill as one of the reasons for Hitler's
belief that Britain would never go to war.]
Joad the Wartime Celebrity Philosopher and Brains Trust Man of Reason
(a) The BBC Brains Trust (1941-1948).
(b) 'Teach Yourself Philosophy' (1944).
(c) The fare-dodging scandal (1948).[Joad was successfully
prosecuted for failing to buy a train ticket.]
Joad the Moral Philosopher and Man of Faith
(a) The 1950 Oxford Union Debate "That this house regrets
the influence exercised by the US as the dominant power
among the democratic nations", with the young Robin day
presiding.
(b) 'Shaw and Society' (1953).
(c) 'Recovery of Belief' (1952) and posthumous 'Folly Farm'
(1954).
It is primarily to the third phase we must look, for an answer the second part
of the question.
Joad also made an original contribution to philosophy; that of Christian
Philosophy - a contribution almost entirely disregarded in the late 20th
Century. Cyril Joad said in 1943: "If you object that Christ was not a
philosopher, I can only beg you to wait until you know as much philosophy as I
do before venturing to contradict."
Joad wrote 'The Recovery of Belief - A Restatement of Christian Philosophy', a
year before his death. In this, he clearly explains with great originality, his
Christian 'Transcendence- Immanence' Theory of the Universe.
Joad's Christian Theory of the Nature of Values
Joad adhered to the 'philosophia perennis', which affirms that Values are
Objective not Subjective, and can reduce themselves to Truth, Goodness and
Beauty.
These three Values are "OBJECTIVE in the sense that they are found by the human
mind - found as 'given' in things - and not projected into things or contributed
to them by our own minds, and ULTIMATE, in the sense that whatever we value can
be shown to be valued because of the relation of the thing valued to some one
or other of the three Values. Thus, while other things are valued as means to
one or other of these three, they are valued as ends in themselves.
"Moreover, these Values are not just arbitrary, pieces of cosmic furniture
lying about, as it were, in the universe without explanation, coherence or
connection, but are revelations of a unity that underlies them; are, in fact,
the ways in which God reveals Himself to man. Hence, those human activities
which consist in, or which arise out of, the pursuit of Truth, the cultivation
of moral goodness, or the creation and enjoyment of Beauty, are such that we
cannot help but value and revere them."
"What we call the Values - and it is under this term that the Forms may, I
think, be most appropriately referred to in respect of their most outstanding
manifestations, as Truth, Goodness and Beauty - are the modes of God's
revelation of His Nature to man. For if this is indeed the case, the revelation
must be regarded as the IMMANENCE of a TRANSCENDENT Being in a medium which,
though it manifests, is itself other than, the Being manifested. Now, we
cannot, I suggest, expect to achieve a 'know-how' of the mode of manifestation
of a Divine Being ..."
The Cartesian Mind-Body Problem and Joad's Christian Mind-Body-Soul Theory.
Joad believed that the relation between Mind and Body (Brain) is
"indescribable" because it is "incomprehensible", and therefore rejects the
Cartesian 'Mind-Body' Theory. He puts forward an alternative Christian
'Mind-Body-Soul' Theory.
"The Mind is, it is clear, constantly interacting with the Body and Brain, yet
all attempts to envisage the mode of this interaction have been lamentable
failures. I venture to develop, in an admittedly purely speculative direction,
the hypothesis that there is included, in the make-up of the human personality,
a timeless element. The traditional division of the human being is not twofold
into mind and body, but threefold into mind, body and soul (or spirit). I
suggest that this (threefold) division may approximate more closely to the
truth than any other."
Classic Joad on the difficulty of philosophy
"Philosophy is an exceedingly difficult subject, and most books on philosophy
are unintelligible to most intelligent people. This is partly, but not wholly,
due to the difficulty of the subject matter, which, being the universe, is not
surprisingly complex and obscure. There is no reason, at least I know of none,
why the universe should necessarily be intelligible to the mind of a
twentieth-century human being, and I...remind him how late a comer he is upon
the cosmic scene, and how recently he has begun to think...
"If we put the past of life at one hundred years, then the past human life
works out at about a month, and of human civilisation (giving the most generous
interpretation to the term "civilisation") at about one-and-three-quarter hours.
On the same time-scale, the future of "civilisation" - that is to say, the
future during which it may be supposed that man will continue to think - is
about one hundred thousand years.
"By any reckoning, then, the human mind is very young, and it is not to be
expected that it should, as yet, understand very much of the world in which it
finds itself. Indeed, there is a sense in which the more we know, the more we
become aware of the extent of our ignorance. Suppose, for example, that we
think of knowledge as a little lighted patch, the area of the known, set in a
sea of environing darkness, the limitless area of the unknown. Then, the more
we enlarge the area of the lighted patch, the area of the known, the more also
we enlarge the area of contact with the environing darkness of the unknown. In
philosophy, then, as in daily life, cocksureness is a function of ignorance,
and dunces step in where sages fear to tread. The wise man is he who realises
his limitations."
Joad on the function of philosophy
"It is the business of philosophy, as I conceive it, to seek to understand the
nature of the universe as a whole, not, as do the sciences, some special
department of it, but the whole bag of tricks to which the moral feelings of
the Puritan, the herd instinct of the man in the street, the religious
consciousness of the saint, the aesthetic enjoyment of the artist, the history
of the human race and its contemporary follies, no less than the latest
discoveries of science, contribute.
"He looks for a clue to guide him through the labyrinth, for a system wherewith
to classify, or a purpose in terms of which to make meaningful. Has the
universe, for example, any design, or is it merely a fortuitous concourse of
atoms? Is mind a fundamental feature of the universe, in terms of which we are
ultimately to interpret the rest, or is it a mere accident, an eddy in the
primeval slime, doomed one day to finish its pointless journey with as little
noise and significance as it began it? Are good and evil real and ultimate
principles existing independently of men, or are they merely the names we give
to the things of which we happen to approve and to disapprove?"
__________________________________________________________________________________
Richard W. Symonds is a member of the International Society For Philosophers (http://www.isfp.co.uk), founder member of The Cyril Joad Society viewtopic.php?f=5&t=1008&start=0, and author of “Mega Theory & The Moral Instinct”.
He can be contacted by email : richardsy5@aol.com or at his website: Gatwick City of Ideas viewtopic.php?f=2&t=2&start=0
Sorel, Nietzsche and ethical reasoning about violence: further thoughts on ‘Justifications for violence’, K. Magill, in L. Kurtz ed. The Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict, Academic Press, 2008 (2nd Edition)
by Kevin Magill
Unpublished: originally written as part of 'Justifications for Violence' (http://wlv.academia.edu/KevinMagill/Papers/449679/Justifications_for_V
Discusses claims and arguments, not considered in 'Justifications for Violence', against the idea of reasoning morally... more Discusses claims and arguments, not considered in 'Justifications for Violence', against the idea of reasoning morally about violence.
Justifications for Violence
by Kevin Magill
10,000 word essay, published in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict, 2nd edn, ed. Lester Kurz, Elsevier, 2008.
See also 'Sorel, Nietzsche and ethical reasoning about violence: further thoughts on "Justifications for violence" ...’ http://wlv.academia.edu/KevinMagill/Papers/515618/Sorel_Nietzsche_and_
Examines various arguments about whether and under what circumstances political violence can be justified and how they... more Examines various arguments about whether and under what circumstances political violence can be justified and how they can be employed in thinking ethically about violence. It begins by looking at arguments about the justifiability of violence that draw on major ethical theories such as deontology, utilitarianism and consequentialism. It then discusses more specific considerations and arguments concerning obligations to obey the law, the relationship between violence and reason, and between violence and democracy, and whether our duties and obligations regarding the use of violence are universal in scope or are limited by national, religious, community and class affiliation. Finally, it makes some novel suggestions about the overall purpose and conduct of discussions about the justifiability of violence in political theory and philosophy.
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Seen by: and 7 morePhilosophical Foundations of Habermas’ Critique of Particularistic Liberalism
by Ali Rizvi
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy
Jürgen Habermas has emerged as a sharp, and occasionally harsh, critic of the Bush administration’s policies since the... more
Jürgen Habermas has emerged as a sharp, and occasionally harsh, critic of the Bush administration’s policies since the Iraq war. Habermas has developed this critique in several of his short pieces and interviews, some of which are available in fine collections in both English and other languages. However, the occasional and journalistic character of Habermas’ political interventions often hide the theoretical basis of his critique. In this paper, I argue that Habermas’ critique of the Bush administration’s foreign policy emanates from, and is founded upon, his conception of modernity, and specifically his views about the relationship between “particularity” and “generality.” The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate how Habermas’ critique can actually be read as a critique of particularism, which Habermas sees operating behind American (and British) foreign policy, and which, in his view, compromises the key achievements of modernity (especially in its Kantian version.)
