Animal moral status: from science to context
[revising in process...]
I argue against the widespread view that the moral status of non-human animals derives merely from their intrinsic... more I argue against the widespread view that the moral status of non-human animals derives merely from their intrinsic capacities, as uncovered by empirical sciences. I provide a meta-ethical framework to analyze the various brands and scopes of animal ethics with respect to empirical facts about animals, and conclude that their weaknesses stem from a reluctance to take context and relations into account. I defend a contextual and relational theory that nevertheless purports to (i) appeal to science and (ii) turn out impartial and general results, beyond its debt to the critical stance of particularism, while being more attuned to the complexity of our relation to the various dimensions non-human world than other theories.
With Power Comes Vulnerability
Co-authored with Constantine Sandis and Alessandro Blasimme, forthcoming.
The psychological approach and the vulnerability approach to animal ethics are thought to be competing frameworks and... more The psychological approach and the vulnerability approach to animal ethics are thought to be competing frameworks and to generate independent arguments for or against current human practices involving non-human animals. The two approaches are rarely combined and it is even maintained that they have different areas of application. In this paper we argue that, at least within the debate on the treatment of non-human animals, the two approaches should not be seen as competitors. First, we maintain that whether non-human animals are minded is relevant both to whether they have moral status or moral rights and to whether they are vulnerable in some morally relevant respects and thus are the appropriate object of moral solicitude. Second, we defend the view that the possession of even the most sophisticated of psychological capacities does not rule out vulnerability. On the contrary, the possession of certain psychological capacities can increase an individual’s vulnerabilities to certain forms of harm.
Can the subject-of-a-life criterion help grant rights to non-persons?
Published in 2010 in Hayry et al. (eds.) Argument and Analysis in Bioethics (Rodopi), 241-248.
In this paper I compare different criteria for moral status, and assess Regan's notion of a "subject of a... In this paper I compare different criteria for moral status, and assess Regan's notion of a "subject of a life".