Moral Status

Human Dignity as High Moral Status

by Manuel Toscano

published in Les Ateliers de l'éthique / The Ethics Forum, vol. 6 no 2, 2011, pp. 4-25

In this paper I argue that the idea of human dignity has a precise and philosophically relevant sense. Following... more In this paper I argue that the idea of human dignity has a precise and philosophically relevant sense. Following recent works, we can find some important clues in the long history of the term. Traditionally, dignity conveys the idea of a high and honourable position in a hierarchical order, either in society or in nature. At first glance, nothing may seem more contrary to the contemporary conception of human dignity, especially in regard to human rights. However, an account of dignity as high rank provides an illuminating perspective on the role it plays in the egalitarian discourse of human rights. In order to preserve that relational sense regarding human dignity, we can use the notion of moral status, to which some moral philosophers have paid attention in recent years. I explore the possibilities of the idea of moral status to better understand the idea of human dignity and its close relationship with human rights.

Robot rights? Towards a social-relational justification of moral consideration

by Mark Coeckelbergh

[on a relational account of the moral significance of birth--title omitted]

by Lindsey Porter

Currently under review
Key words Moral status, marginal persons, contextualism, abortion, infanticide.
Draft available on request.

According to Mary Anne Warren’s account of the moral significance of birth—that is, whether and how birth can change... more According to Mary Anne Warren’s account of the moral significance of birth—that is, whether and how birth can change the moral status of the foetus/neonate—being a party to social relationships makes one morally considerable. On this picture, social community membership confers full moral community membership on minimally sentient beings. I argue that social community membership cannot so alter moral status, but that social facts are relevant to determining the moral quality of a particular act. An explicitly contextualist account of the moral quality of acts can better explain our intuitions about the moral difference between abortion and infanticide.

[on abortion and infanticide--title omitted]

by Lindsey Porter

currently under review. draft available on request.

In ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, Giubilini and Minerva argue that infanticide should be permitted... more In ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, Giubilini and Minerva argue that infanticide should be permitted for the same reasons abortion is. In particular, they argue that infanticide should be permitted even for reasons that do not primarily serve the interests (or would-be best interests) of the newborn. They claim that abortion is permissible for reasons that do not primarily serve the interests (or would-be interests) of the foetus because foetuses lack a right to life. They argue that newborns also lack a right to life, and they conclude that therefore, the same reasons that justify abortion can justify infanticide. This conclusion does not follow. The lack of a right to life is not decisive. Furthermore, the justificatory power of a given reason is a function of moral context. Generalisations about reasons across dissimilar moral contexts are invalid. However, a similar conclusion does follow—that foetus-killing and newborn-killing are morally identical in identical moral contexts—but this conclusion is trivial, since foetuses and newborns are never in identical moral contexts.

On the Moral Equality of Artificial Agents

by Christopher Wareham

Sentience, the Moral Significance of

by Lisa Bortolotti

Forthcoming, and co-authored with Matteo Mameli and Alessandro Blasimme

Entry for the International Encyclopedia of Ethics edited by Hugh LaFollette for Blackwell. Entry for the International Encyclopedia of Ethics edited by Hugh LaFollette for Blackwell.

Disputes over moral status: philosophy and science in the future of bioethics

by Lisa Bortolotti

published in Health Care Analysis in 2007

Various debates in bioethics have been focused on whether non-persons, such as marginal humans or non-human animals,... more Various debates in bioethics have been focused on whether non-persons, such as marginal humans or non-human animals, deserve respectful treatment. It has been argued that, where we cannot agree on whether these individuals have moral status, we might agree that they have symbolic value and ascribe to them moral value in virtue of their symbolic significance. In the paper I resist the suggestion that symbolic value is relevant to ethical disputes in which the respect for individuals with no intrinsic moral value is in conflict with the interests of individuals with intrinsic moral value. I then turn to moral status and discuss the suitability of personhood as a criterion. There some desiderata for a criterion for moral status: it should be applicable on the basis of our current scientific knowledge; it should have a solid ethical justification; and it should be in line with some of our moral intuitions and social practices. Although it highlights an important connection between the possession of some psychological properties and eligibility for moral status, the criterion of personhood does not meet the desiderata above. I suggest that all intentional systems should be credited with moral status in virtue of having preferences and interests that are relevant to their well-being.

Embryos and Eagles: Symbolic Value in Research and Reproduction

by Lisa Bortolotti

co-authored with John Harris and published in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics in 2006

On both sides of the debate on the use of embryos in stem cell research, and in reproductive technologies more... more On both sides of the debate on the use of embryos in stem cell research, and in reproductive technologies more generally, rhetoric and symbolic images have been evoked to influence public opinion. Human embryos themselves are described as either “very small human beings” or “small clusters of cells.” The intentions behind the use of these phrases are clear. One description suggests that embryos are already members of our community and share with us a right to life or at least respectful treatment, whereas the other focuses on the differences between embryos and adult human beings with normal capacities, that is, their lack of sentience and of personal identity. The research on stem cells has been nicknamed “Frankenstein science” or presented as “research that could stop Parkinson disease.” Again, one description reminds us of scary science-fiction scenarios where the scientist is guilty of “playing God,” whereas the other description highlights the worth and potential benefits of the research outcomes.

Stem cell research, personhood and sentience

by Lisa Bortolotti

co-authored with John Harris and published in Reproductive Biomedicine Online in 2005

In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is defended. It is argued that, in order... more In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is defended. It is argued that, in order to have moral status, an individual must have an interest in its own wellbeing. Sentience is a prerequisite for having an interest in avoiding pain, and personhood is a prerequisite for having an interest in the continuation of one's own existence. Early human embryos are not sentient and therefore they are not recipients of direct moral consideration. Early human embryos do not satisfy the requirements for personhood, but there are arguments to the effect that they should be treated as persons nonetheless. These are the arguments from potentiality, symbolic value and the principle of human dignity. These arguments are challenged in this paper and it is claimed that they offer us no good reason to believe that early human embryos should be treated as persons.