Bodies, Selves
Originally published in American Imago (2008)
An avatar in Second Life is a fictional body with which the user performs fictional actions. The user's real body is... more An avatar in Second Life is a fictional body with which the user performs fictional actions. The user's real body is the avatar with which he performs real actions. The difference between the two is less than we might have thought.
Foundations for Moral Relativism
I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually... more I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually incompatible, but equally valid moralities.
117 views
Seen by: and 36 moreThere Are No "Reasons for Acting"
Parts of this paper were incorporated into "Time for Action"
The title says it all. The title says it all.
Nineteenth-‐Century Natural Theology, Oxford Handbook of Natural Theology, Russell Re Manning (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Natural theology came in different varieties during the nineteenth century. It functioned both as a way of seeing... more Natural theology came in different varieties during the nineteenth century. It functioned both as a way of seeing nature but also as a way of being in the world. This essay explores the intellectual and experiential facets of design arguments by focusing on who promoted them and, just as important, why they appealed to so many people on a daily basis. In short, we learn that natural theology was a way of knowing and doing. The essay is structured around three kinds of natural theologians: philosophers and theologians, savants and scientists, priests and pedagogues. Whilst I take care to address well-known names like William Paley and Charles Darwin and classical disciplines like physics and theology, my larger aim is to show the appeal of design to middle class readers and authors (especially women) and to the founders of the emerging human sciences like biomedicine and evolutionary anthropology.
Sticky predators: a comparative study of sticky glands in harpactorine assassin bugs (Insecta: Hemiptera: Reduviidae) [Acta Zoologica]
Published in 'Acta Zoologica'
For more than 50 years, specialized dermal glands that secrete sticky substances and specialized setae have been known... more For more than 50 years, specialized dermal glands that secrete sticky substances and specialized setae have been known from the legs of New World assassin bugs in the genus Zelus Fabricius (Reduviidae: Harpactorinae). The gland secretions and specialized ‘sundew setae’ are involved in enhancing predation success. We here refer to this predation strategy as ‘sticky trap predation’ and the specialized dermal glands as ‘sticky glands’. To determine how widespread sticky trap predation is among Reduviidae, we investigated taxonomic distribution of sticky glands and sundew setae using compound light microscopical and scanning electron microscopical techniques and sampling 67 species of Reduviidae that represent 50 genera of Harpactorini. We found sticky glands in 12 genera of Harpactorini and thus show that sticky trap predation is much more widespread than previously suspected. The sticky glands vary in shape, size and density, but are always located in a dorsolateral position on the fore tibia. Sundew setae are present in all taxa with sticky glands with the exception of Heza that instead possesses unique lamellate setae. The sticky trap predation taxa are restricted to the New World, suggesting a New World origin of this unique predation strategy.
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Seen by:Sinning Saints and Saintly Sinners: The Paradox of Moral Self-Regulation
With Rumen Iliev and Doug Medin
The question of why people are motivated to act altruistically has been an important one for centuries across various... more The question of why people are motivated to act altruistically has been an important one for centuries across various disciplines. Drawing on previous research on moral regulation, we propose a framework suggesting that moral (or immoral) behavior can result from an internal balancing of moral self-worth and the cost inherent in altruistic behavior. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to write a self-relevant story containing a set of either positive or negative traits. Participants who were asked to write a story with positive traits donated one fifth as much as those who wrote a story with negative traits. In Experiment 2, we showed that this effect was due specifically to a change in the self-concept. In Experiment 3, we replicated and extended these findings to cooperative behavior in environmental decision-making. We suggest that affirming a moral identity leads people to feel licensed to act immorally. However, when moral identity is threatened, moral behavior is a means to regain some lost self-worth.
The role of social expectations in forming moral judgments
With Rumen Iliev
It is one of the hallmarks of moral values that they do not rely on the customs of a particular society or the... more It is one of the hallmarks of moral values that they do not rely on the customs of a particular society or the conveniences of particular factions (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). Contrast this to conventional or other social norms which are fluid and adaptable to various situations. Yet, it appears that moral rules are not always treated as such1. People have different expectations of moral behavior depending on whom that behavior is directed toward. For example, avoiding full disclosure is immoral for a friend but not for a stranger (Baron & Haidt, 1996). And, people are sensitive to power relations when making culpability judgments (Hamilton and Saunders, 1981). The meaning of behavior changes depending on who it is directed toward. Whether you are a Republican or a Democrat, or from the high end of the social totem pole or the low end, affects how you view the world and also your definitions of what is right and wrong (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Harkness, Edwards, Super, 1981).
336 views
Seen by:Normative Concepts: a connectedness model
co-authored with François Schroeter
An elaboration of jazz model of meaning: we seek to characterize not just linguistic communication, but normative thinking. We focus on the cognitive role of concepts in keeping track of a topic, through changes in associated descriptive beliefs and motivations. A relational account of meaning identity, we argue, better explains this tracking ability. It also affords new resources for vindicating realism about normative properties.
This paper proposes a relational account concepts and explains how the model fits normative terms like 'is right'. Our... more This paper proposes a relational account concepts and explains how the model fits normative terms like 'is right'. Our connectedness model builds social and historical facts into the foundations of concept identity. This aspect of the model, we argue, reshapes normative epistemology and provides new resources for a vindication of realism in ethics.
Do Moral Realists Need Convergence?
(with François Schroeter)
Doe a moral realist need to posit ideal convergence in moral judgments? Richard Boyd has argued that moral realists... more Doe a moral realist need to posit ideal convergence in moral judgments? Richard Boyd has argued that moral realists don't need to accept that all competent speakers will converge in their moral judgments, if they opt for a certain type of externalist account of the reference of moral terms. Boyd's account has been highly influential: even realists who reject naturalistic and causal aspects of his account have taken his approach as a template for reference determination for moral terms (e.g. Sayre-McCord, van Roojen). But a closer examination of Boyd’s account of reference and the ways it could be developed or modified, we’ll argue, suggests that explaining co-reference without convergence in the moral domain is a much more challenging problem than many realists have supposed.
10 views
Seen by:How Desires Might Matter: The Veto Power of Desire
by Kate Manne
Draft paper, revised version of a thesis chapter.
The Mind Game: Invisible Cheating and Inferable Intentions
by Jiang Ting
LICOS Discussion Paper
This paper presents a novel cheating game, which I call the ‘mind game’, in which subjects can cheat purely in their... more This paper presents a novel cheating game, which I call the ‘mind game’, in which subjects can cheat purely in their minds so that it is invisible. However, since the mind game is a game of chance, the probability of cheating can be inferred. In this study, I show how a subtle variation in the rules of the game affects the extent of cheating. In one treatment, subjects can cheat purely in the mind, while in another treatment, the order of the steps in which subjects should play the game is changed so that subjects have to disregard the prescribed order in order to cheat. I find that subjects in this second treatment cheat significantly less. Since subjects play the game fully in private with a double-blind payment procedure, I conjecture that this is because of self-image maintenance and the role that intent inference plays in it. In the first treatment, the intent to cheat is unclear, while in the second, the act of disregarding the order of play cannot be easily accounted for by errors or ignorance but is due to the intent to cheat. The clearer awareness of the intent to cheat makes it harder for subjects to be self-deceptive for preserving a moral self-image while cheating. This study thus suggests a potential role of the ease of intent inference in deterring cheating.
10 views
Seen by:Do scientific theories affect men's evaluations of sex crimes?
Dar-Nimrod, I., Heine, S. J., Cheung, B. Y., & Schaller, M. (2011). Do scientific theories affect men's evaluations of sex crimes? Aggressive Behavior, 37(5), 440-449.
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Act/Impact Morality Scale (materials)
Please contact me for permission if you wish to use this scale in your studies. Co-authored with Fiery Cushman and Ryan M. Miller.
We are looking for collaborators who are interested in:
(1) translating the scale into other languages for... more
We are looking for collaborators who are interested in:
(1) translating the scale into other languages for purposes of a cross-cultural study, and/or
(2) collaborating on a cross-cultural research project by administering the scale along with a moral judgment task to participants at their home institutions.
If you are interested, please contact me at: i.hannikainen@sheffield.ac.uk

