Moral Dilemmas

Conflicts of Interest: Whose, What, Why and How

by Diana Constantinescu

Opinion piece resulted from the UCL Centre for Law&Ethics Think Tank, 25 April 2012

Nowadays we treat conflicts of interests as insurmountable obstacles, as wars where someone always gets hurt, as... more Nowadays we treat conflicts of interests as insurmountable obstacles, as wars where someone always gets hurt, as disrupting tragedies. We often forget how all-pervading, inescapable, an inherently human they are. As long as we are not Robinson Crusoes and we live in societies, our interests will always clash. Conflicts of interest are a part of our society. And even in Robinson Crusoe’s heart, you’ll find conflicting desires and choices to be made, as this is what distinguishes us as human beings, from instinct-driven animals. What I wish to argue here is that we can treat conflicts of interests less tragically and we can focus instead on finding practical solutions to them, if we clearly define from the beginning about what kind of things they are, and what they are not.

Moral Blackmail

by Aaron Sullivan

Reluctant Soldiers: The Moral Dilemma of an Unjust War

by Jeff Montrose

Think 26, Vol. 9 (Autumn 2010), The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2010

If called upon would you fight in a war you thought
unjust? This article attempts to explain why the majority... more If called upon would you fight in a war you thought
unjust? This article attempts to explain why the majority of
military officers and soldiers when faced with this question
do fight despite moral misgivings they may have.

Are morally motivated decision makers insensitive to the consequences of their choices?

by Daniel Bartels

full cite: Bartels, Daniel M. and Douglas L. Medin (2007), "Are Morally-Motivated Decision Makers Insensitive to the Consequences of their Choices?," Psychological Science, 18, 24-28.

Is morally motivated decision making different from other kinds of decision making? There is evidence that when people... more Is morally motivated decision making different from other kinds of decision making? There is evidence that when people have sacred or protected values (PVs), they reject trade-offs for secular values (e.g., ‘‘You can’t put a price on a human life’’) and tend to employ deontological rather than consequentialist decision principles. People motivated by PVs appear to show quantity insensitivity. That is, in trade-off situations, they are less sensitive to the consequences of their choices than are people without PVs. The current study examined the relation between PVs and quantity insensitivity using two methods of preference assessment: In one design, previous results were replicated; in a second, PVs were related to increased quantity sensitivity. These and other findings call into question important presumed properties of PVs, suggesting that how PVs affect willingness to make tradeoffs depends on where attention is focused, a factor that varies substantially across contexts.

Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

by Daniel Bartels

full cite: Bartels, Daniel M. (2008), "Principled Moral Sentiment and the Flexibility of Moral Judgment and Decision Making," Cognition, 108, 381-417.

Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral... more Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm – but not the do/allow distinction – influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.

The mismeasure of morals: Antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas

by Daniel Bartels

full cite: Bartels, Daniel M. and David A. Pizarro (2011), "The Mismeasure of Morals: Antisocial Personality Traits Predict Utilitarian Responses to Moral Dilemmas," Cognition, 121, 154-161.

Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment,... more Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments and a set of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. Participants who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness. These results question the widely-used methods by which lay moral judgments are evaluated, as these approaches lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral.

MORAL DILEMMAS AND INEVITABLE SIN

by Dennis Potter

Psychologie morale et philosophie morale

by Florian Cova

Published in Masala, A. & Ravat, J. (eds.), "La Morale Humaine et les Sciences", Editions Matériologiques, 2011.

Dans ce chapitre, mon objectif est double : tout d’abord fournir une introduction à partir de quelques exemples aux... more Dans ce chapitre, mon objectif est double : tout d’abord fournir une introduction à partir de quelques exemples aux recherches menées en psychologie morale, ensuite éclairer l’intérêt de ce type de recherches pour la philosophie et plus précisément pour l’éthique normative.

Breaking Ties: the Significance of Choice In Symmetrical Moral Dilemmas

by Carla Bagnoli

Value In the Guise of Regret

by Carla Bagnoli