Hypnosis and brain processes
by Gábor Szendi
Published in Hungarian language in Psychiatria Hungarica 2003/2 99-109 old.
Recently the new visualization techniques of brain give insight into the neurobiological processes of hypnosis,... more
Recently the new visualization techniques of brain give insight into the neurobiological processes of hypnosis, confirming the neuropsychophysiological theory developed and hallmarked by Crawford and Gruzelier. The essence of this modell is that at the beginning of hypnosis induction an increased left frontal activation can be detected, however later during the steady state the frontal activation gradually decreases bilaterally, being more expressive on left, and the activation of the posterior brain areas becomes more intensive. Findings from PET, SPECT, fMRI studies show that the changing activation of anterior cingular, inferior parietal and occipital cortex plays important role in hypnotic states. From these studies we can come to the conclusion that hypnotic suggestion modifies the low level neural process of sensory functions, not merely at the level of experience. It can be expected that these new findings radically change our views on hypnosis, and it would be a further step toward the integration between social and biological theories of hypnosis.
Keywords: hypnosis, neuropsychophysiological modell, brain functions, regional cerebral blood flow,
Action observation in the infant brain: The role of body form and motion
Much research has been carried out to understand how our brains make sense of another agent in motion. Current views... more Much research has been carried out to understand how our brains make sense of another agent in motion. Current views based on human adult and monkey studies assume a matching process in the motor system biased towards actions performed by conspecifics and present in the observer’s motor repertoire. However, little is known about the neural correlates of action cognition in early ontogeny. In this study, we examined the processes involved in the observation of full body movements in 4-month-old infants using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to measure localized brain activation. In a 2 x 2 design, infants watched human or robotic figures moving in a smooth, familiar human-like manner, or in a rigid, unfamiliar robotic-like manner. We found that infant premotor cortex responded more strongly to observing robotic-like motion compared to human-like motion. Contrary to current views, this suggests that the infant motor system is flexibly engaged by novel movement patterns. Moreover, temporal cortex responses indicate that infants integrate information about form and motion during action observation. The response patterns obtained in premotor and temporal cortices during action observation in these young infants are very similar to those reported for adults (Cross et al., in press). These findings thus suggest that the brain processes involved in the analysis of an agent in motion in adults become functionally specialized very early in human development.
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Seen by:Introduction to debates on embodied social cognition
(penultimate draft) forthcoming in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Embodied social cognition (ESC) aims to explicate how our embodiment shapes our knowledge of others, and in what this... more Embodied social cognition (ESC) aims to explicate how our embodiment shapes our knowledge of others, and in what this knowledge of others consists. Although there is much diversity amongst ESC accounts, common to all these accounts is the idea that our normal everyday interactions consist in non-mentalistic embodied engagements. In recent years, several theorists have developed and defended innovative and controversial accounts of ESC. These accounts challenge, and offer deflationary alternatives to, the standard cognitivist accounts of social cognition. As ESC accounts grow in number and prominence, the time has come for a dedicated, sustained debate on ESC and its most controversial and innovative elements. The goal of this special issue is to host such a debate with the aim of bringing clarity to the discussion of social cognition.
Mirror Neurons Are Not Evidence for the Simulation Theory
Forthcoming in Synthese.
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have... more Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have revitalized the languishing debate between the Theory Theory (TT) and the Simulation Theory (ST). The discovery of so-called mirror neurons has revived interest particularly in ST. Both ST proponents and theorists studying mirror neurons have argued that mirror neurons are strong evidence in favor of ST over TT. In this paper I argue against the prevailing view that mirror neurons are evidence for ST. My view is that on an appropriate construal of their function, mirror neurons do not operate like simulation theorists claim. In fact, mirror neurons are more appropriately understood as one element in an information-rich mindreading process. As such, mirror neurons fit in better with some sort of TT account of mindreading. I defend a positive account, the Model TT, which better explains the role of mirror neurons in social cognition.
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Seen by: and 15 more2012 - Image schemas in film: Over de lichamelijke verankering van de verbeelding van abstracte begrippen
Co-authored with Maarten Coëgnarts, published in CineMagie, vol. 278, Spring 2012, pp. 87-99.
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Seen by:From mirror neurons to joint actions
Pacherie, E. & Dokic, J. (2006). From mirror neurons to joint actions. Journal of Cognitive Systems Research, 7: 101-112.
The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with... more The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an eval- uation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves provide a sufficient basis for the forms of agentive understanding and shared intentionality involved in cooperative collective actions. On the other hand, we will also argue that mirror neurons can nevertheless play an important role in an account of the production and understanding of joint action, insofar as they provide the basic constituents of implicit agent-neutral representations and are useful elements in a process of online mutual adjustment of participants’ actions.
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Seen by:13 views
Seen by:Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition
forthcoming in Mind & Language
Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very... more Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and empirical considerations lead us to accord a fairly minimal role for mirror neurons in social cognition.
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Toward a second-person neuroscience
Schilbach L and* Timmermans B, Reddy V, Costall A, Bente G, Schlicht T, & Vogeley K. Toward a second-person neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, target article accepted for publication. *equal contributions
In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that... more In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.
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Seen by: and 28 moreMirroring in Dance/Movement Therapy: Potential mechanisms behind empathy enhancement
by Frank Russo
McGarry, L. M., & Russo, F.A. (2010). Mirroring in Dance/Movement Therapy: Potential mechanisms behind empathy enhancement. The Arts in Psychotherapy, 38, 178-184.
Facial expressions and emotional singing: A study of perception and production with motion capture and electromyography
by Frank Russo
Livingstone, S., Thompson, W.F., & Russo, F. A. (2009). Facial expressions and emotional singing: A study of perception and production with motion capture and electromyography. Music Perception, 26, 475-488.
Bridging a yawning chasm: EEG investigations into the debate concerning the role of the human mirror neuron system in contagious yawning
Nicholas R. Cooper, Ignazio Puzzo, Adam D. Pawley, Ruby A. Bowes-Mulligan, Emma V. Kirkpatrick, Pavlina A. Antoniou and Steffan Kennett
Constituting the musical object: a neurophenomenological perspective on musical research
submitted
Despite an apparent common agreement on the impossibility to define correctly the complex phenomenon of music, some... more Despite an apparent common agreement on the impossibility to define correctly the complex phenomenon of music, some authors continue to look explicitly for a strict definition, while other contributors assume implicitly a predefined notion of music, often based on a modular conception of the mind/brain. While musical analysis and standard musicology focus on the objectiveness of the musical material, some trends in psychology of music consider only the neural correlates of specific musical abilities. As those perspectives study distinctly subjective and objective aspects of musicality, the main goal of this paper is to provide a different approach for musical investigation, considering the relation between music and the perceiver/executer an inseparable feature of any musical experience. Analyzing the classical Husserlian position on intentionality, I will (i) introduce the pivotal notion of constitution of a musical object, (ii) consider the contributions of Merleau-Ponty and of the finding in cognitive neuroscience of a mirror mechanism of action understanding, and their implication for the concept of intentionality and (iii) claim that musical intentionality is a cross modal, but intrinsically motor, intentionality.
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Seen by:Mirror systems and simulation: a neo-empiricist interpretation
by John Michael
preprint, forthcoming in: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Special Issue: Debates on Embodied Social Cognition
Guest Editor: Shannan Spaulding
It is often claimed that the discovery of mirror neurons supports simulation theory (ST). There has been much... more
It is often claimed that the discovery of mirror neurons supports simulation theory (ST). There has been much controversy about this, however, as there are various competing models of the functional contribution of mirror systems, only some of which characterize mirroring as simulation in the sense required by ST. But a brief review of these models reveals that they all include simulation in some sense. In this paper, I propose that the broader conception of simulation articulated by neo-
empiricist theories of concepts can subsume the more specific conceptions of simu- lation presented by ST and by these other models, thereby offering a framework in which each of these models may play a role. According to neo-empiricism, conceptual thought in general involves simulation in the sense that it is grounded in sensory, motor, and other embodied systems (Barsalou, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577–609, 1999, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: Biological Scien- ces, 364, 1281–1289, 2009; Barsalou et al., Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(2), 84–
91, 2003; Prinz 2002, Mind & Language, 25(5), 612–621, 2010; Glenberg and Robertson, Journal of Memory and Language, 43, 379–401, 2000). Crucially, the term “simulation” here refers not to simulations of a target agent’s experience in the sense endorsed by simulation theory but to the activation of sensory, motor, affective, and introspective representations. This difference does not entail that neo-empiricism must be in competition with ST—indeed, I will propose that ST can be embedded as a special case within neo-empiricism.

