The Development of Theory of Mind According to False Belief Performance of Children Ages 3 to 5
by Halil Eksi
Bahar KEÇELİ KAYSILI Funda ACARLAR
Educational Sciences: Theory & Practice - 11(4) • Autumn • 1821-1826
This study has examined the role of age in the false belief understanding in typically developing children and to
determine if the different type of false belief tasks affects performance on false belief. The survey research design
was used. False belief understanding was measured in 72 children between the ages of 3.00 to 5.11 year
old. The sample consisted of 12 children in each age group and age groups were divided into six month period.
Four false belief tasks were conducted. The findings of this study indicated that the false belief understanding
of Turkish speaking children between the ages of 3.0 to 5.11 year old had some similarities as well as some differences
to children speaking other than Turkish. 3 year old children seemed to have developed an understanding
of the own false belief before they developed a clear understanding of others’ false belief. It was clear that
the rapid change of understanding false belief seemed to have appeared at 4.6 year old.
Grounding Social Action and Phenomena in Mental Representations
“Advances in Cognitive Science: Learning, Evolution, and Social Action”. Proceedings of IWCogSc-10- ILCLI, Universidad del Pais Vasco, 2010, pp. 93-112
We will present a basic ontology of social action by examining the most important forms, with special focus on... more We will present a basic ontology of social action by examining the most important forms, with special focus on pro-social forms, in particular Goal Delegation and Goal Adoption. They are the basic ingredients of exchange, cooperation, group action, and organization. We will ground this in the mental representations (beliefs and goals) of the agent in a social (inter)action: the individual social mind. We need such an analytical account of social action to provide a good scientific conceptual apparatus for social theory. We will try to show why we need mind-reading and cognitive agents (and therefore why we have to characterize cognitive levels of coordination and social action); why we need goals about the mind of the other (in interaction and in collaboration), or ‘adhesion’ and social commitment to the other; why cognition, communication and agreement are not enough for modelling and implementing cooperation; why emergent pre- cognitive structures and constraints should be formalized, and why emergent cooperation is needed also among planning and deliberative social actors.

