Mill, John Stuart

Diversité et tolérance dans le libéralisme de John Stuart Mill

by Marc-Antoine Dilhac

Mill, Intuitions, and Normativity

by Christopher Macleod

Forthcoming, Utilitas

It is the purpose of this paper to offer an account of Mill’s metaethics. Expanding upon clues given recently by Dale... more It is the purpose of this paper to offer an account of Mill’s metaethics. Expanding upon clues given recently by Dale Miller, and previously by John Skorupski, I suggest that when it comes to the foundations of his philosophy, Mill might share more with the intuitionists than we are accustomed to think. Common wisdom holds that Mill had no time for the normativity of intuitions. I wish to dispute, or at least temper, this dogma, by claiming that Mill’s attitude towards intuitions is far more complex and ambivalent than is generally thought. The investigation, then, centres on the question of whether, for Mill, intuitions carry normative warrant: whether, in itself, the fact that a belief is intuitional provides reason to think that belief a warranted one. I argue that, according to Mill, our belief in the reliability of inductive moves and apparent memories, as well as the desirability of pleasure, is vindicated by something akin to intuition. Although his endorsement of the normativity of these intuitions might seem to be in tension with the arguments he offers against the ‘intuitionist school’, this tension is only apparent.

Liberty, Mill, and Public Health Ethics

by Yashar Saghai

Co-authored with Madison Powers and Ruth Faden

Public Health Ethics, 5 (1): 6-15, 2012
Advance access published February 15, 2012
doi:10.1093/phe/phs002

In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics.... more In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a presumption in favor of liberty; and interests that enjoy no such presumption. We argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well-being. Finally, we make the case for the plausibility of a more complex and nuanced Millian framework for public health ethics that would modify how the balancing of some liberties and public health interests should proceed by taking the thumb off the liberty end of the scale. Mill’s arguments and the legacy of liberalism support certain forms of state interference with marketplace liberties for the sake of public health objectives without any presumption in favor of liberty.

Law and Society - InSite and Harm Reduction

by Kiarash Mostaghim

"Marx, Mil e il paradosso della libertà democratica. Interpretare l'America dopo Tocqueville"

by David Ragazzoni

ABSTRACT: Fellow citizens in London for more than twenty years (1849-1873), Karl Marx and J. S.Mill extensively... more ABSTRACT: Fellow citizens in London for more than twenty years (1849-1873), Karl Marx and J. S.Mill extensively commented on the features and contradictions of American democracy after Tocqueville’s pivotal work. In particular, both of them devoted a consistent number of letters, articles and systematic writings to the issue of slavery and to the events of the Civil War at the beginning of the 1860s. The literature has never compared their questioning of post-Tocquevillian America nor has it investigated the continuities and ruptures of both with the philosophical-political landscape drawn by the French historian. In reaction to this silence, the Author specifically focuses on Mill and Marx’s American pages and triangulates them with Tocqueville’s work. He suggests that, through the critique of slavery and its connections with capitalist economy, they questioned the relation between Europe and the States as part of a broader perspective over the fate of democracy and political modernity. In particular, the Author argues that the aristocratic liberalism of Tocqueville, the democratic liberalism of Mill and the anti-liberalism of Marx conveyed three diverging yet critical understandings of democratic government: Tocqueville criticized democracy to contain it, Mill to educate it, Marx to overcome it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:
1. Un dialogo mai avvenuto: un esercizio eccentrico di storia e storiografia filosofica?
2. Studiare la natura degli uomini e il carattere delle società prima delle istituzioni: Mill e l’umanità in catene dell’America democratica
3. La libertà degli eguali e l’illibertà dei diseguali: la «Democrazia (incompleta) in America» di Marx
4. Tocqueville, Mill, Marx: una democrazia e tre diversi assetti della modernità politica. Considerazioni conclusive

Book Review: John Stuart Mill and the Art of Life (B. Eggleston, D.E. Miller and D. Weinstein eds.)

by Christopher Macleod

Philosophical Quarterly, 62.247 (2012) pp. 429-432

Comprehensive liberalism and civic education in the Republic of Ireland

by Graham Finlay

Power and Development John Stuart Mill and

by Graham Finlay

Maria Cecília M. de Carvalho: O utilitarismo em foco

by Marco Antonio Azevedo

CARVALHO, Maria Cecília Maringoni de (Org.). O utilitarismo em foco. Um encontro com seus proponentes e críticos. Florianópolis: Editora da UFSC, 2007.

O utilitarismo em foco é uma obra que merece ser celebrada. Esse quinto volume da Série Ethica marca um estágio de... more O utilitarismo em foco é uma obra que merece ser celebrada. Esse quinto volume da Série Ethica marca um estágio de maturidade da pesquisa filosófica brasileira em ética normativa. Todos os artigos são excelentes e instigantes, e alguns são simplesmente notáveis. Nesta resenha, pretendo abordar de forma seletiva alguns de seus capítulos. Optei por abordar os que lidam de forma mais direta com a teoria utilitarista. Começarei, assim, pelo artigo de Luís Alberto Peluso (Capítulo 1), uma interpretação original de um velho tema benthamista: o Direito como um sistema não somente punitivo, e sim igualmente premial. A seguir, pretendo fazer algumas considerações sobre os conceitos abordados no belo artigo de Marcelo Araújo (Capítulo 2) sobre o utilitarismo em John Austin. O artigo seguinte é o de Maria Cecília Maringoni de Carvalho (Capítulo 3). Maria Cecília procura mostrar-nos como John Stuart Mill “reinventou” o utilitarismo (embora eu pessoalmente pense que Mill é, dentro da tradição utilitarista, uma espécie de “patinho feio”). Meus comentários serão breves (pois meu objetivo principal é corroborar a tese de que talvez Moore não tenha sido justo ao acusá-lo de falacioso). O artigo de Alcino Bonella (Capítulo 5) mereceria certamente uma análise crítica mais detalhada do que a que poderei aqui oferecer (Alcino é um conseqüencialista muito persuasivo e seus argumentos são bastante sofisticados). Caso meuscomentários críticos sejam considerados insuficientes ou não convincentes, remeto o leitor às críticas de Álvaro de Vita (no Capítulo 7) ao utilitarismo de preferências, bem com, em alguma medida, à defesa peculiar do conseqüencialismo por Philip Pettit, bem abordada por Maria Clara Dias (Capítulo 10) – ao final, farei alguns comentários breves a aspectos da visão de Pettit. A obra não se encerra nestes artigos. Geraldo Ormieres (Capítulo 4) faz uma bela apresentação da versão algo “especial” de Moore ao utilitarismo. Sônia Felipe (Capítulo 6) além de reconstituir a visão de Peter Singer sobre a igualdade preferencial entre humanos e seres sencientes, vai ainda mais além, dando continuidade à sua busca de superar as teorias morais tradicionais, enfatizando a diferença essencial por elas negligenciada entre “agentes” e “pacientes” morais. Luiz Felipe Sahd (Capítulo 8) e Mário Nogueira de Oliveira (Capítulo 9) procuram tratar de dois grandes críticos ao utilitarismo, Nozick e Dworkin, respectivamente. Seus artigos são altamente recomendáveis e valeriam uma resenha à parte.

Un punto de inflexión en el concepto de Justicia: de Adam Smith a John Stuart Mill (ESTRELLA TRINCADO AZNAR)

by Las Torres de Lucca Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política

Los economistas clásicos, incluidos John Stuart Mill, basaron sus teorías en el sistema de Adam Smith. En algún... more Los economistas clásicos, incluidos John Stuart Mill, basaron sus teorías en el sistema de Adam Smith. En algún momento, lo calificaron como una teoría utilitarista. Sin embargo, Smith no era utilitarista, tal vez incluso anti-utilitarista. Una de las más asombrosas diferencias entre la economía clásica y la teoría de Smith radica en su concepto de justicia. La economía clásica se basa en un concepto utilitario. Smith critica el concepto de justicia utilitarista. Al ser la utilidad un asunto subjetivo, a los economistas clásicos les resulta más difícil establecer los límites a la intervención estatal que a Smith. Este trabajo compara el concepto de justicia de Smith y de John Stuart Mill cuando se ocupan de la tenencia de la tierra. Mill sostiene que no se puede decir propiamente que la sociedad deba nada a los pobres. Sin embargo, no argumentando a partir de los derechos abstractos, sino desde la "utilidad" entendida en su sentido más amplio, Mill defendió la nacionalización de la tierra. Mill no pudo establecer ningún límite a la intervención estatal. Por el contrario, Smith defendió que la justicia no es un concepto utilitario. En este caso, los límites a la intervención son más fáciles de trazar.

Can Mill's Utilitarianism Be Reconciled With His Defence of Individual Freedom?

by Matthew Machowski

Moral Expertise: A Millian Perspective

by Dale E. Miller

Although the utilitarian moral theorist John Stuart Mill (1806–73) does not refer explicitly to the concept of moral... more Although the utilitarian moral theorist John Stuart Mill (1806–73) does not refer explicitly to the concept of moral expertise, it nevertheless plays an important implicit role in his thought. In order to explain what this role is, I first consider in more general terms what utilitarians have to say about moral expertise. With this as a foundation, I then introduce some of the distinctive features of Mill’s utilitarianism and construct a Millian account of moral expertise.

John Stuart Mill's Civic Liberalism

by Dale E. Miller

Although it is frequently overlooked, J.S. Mill's political philosophy has a significant civic component; he is a... more Although it is frequently overlooked, J.S. Mill's political philosophy has a significant civic component; he is a committed believer in the value of active and disinterested participation in public affairs by the citizens of liberal democracies, and he advocates a programme of civic education intended to cultivate public spirit. In the first half of this essay I present a brief but systematic exploration of his thought's civic dimension. In the second half I defend Mill's civic liberalism against various critics who have explicitly or implicitly charged that the civic and liberal components of his political philosophy are inconsistent.

Reparations for Emancipation: Mill's Vindication of the Rights of Slave Owners

by Dale E. Miller

Mill's Misleading Moral Mathematics.”

by Dale E. Miller

Internal Sanctions In Mill's Moral Psychology

by Dale E. Miller

India House Utilitarianism: A First Look

by Dale E. Miller

Brown on Mill's Moral Theory: A Critical Response

by Dale E. Miller

In this article, I argue that the reading of Mill that D.G. Brown presents in ‘Mill’s Moral Theory: Ongoing... more In this article, I argue that the reading of Mill that D.G. Brown presents in ‘Mill’s Moral Theory: Ongoing Revisionism’ is inconsistent with several key passages in Mill’s writings. I also show that a rule-utilitarian interpretation that is very close to the one developed by David Lyons is able to account for these passages without difficulty.

Key Words: Mill • utilitarianism • rule utilitarianism • David Lyons

On Millgram on Mill

by Dale E. Miller

In a recent article in Ethics, Elijah Millgram presents a novel reconstruction of J. S. Mill's ‘proof’ of the... more In a recent article in Ethics, Elijah Millgram presents a novel reconstruction of J. S. Mill's ‘proof’ of the principle of utility. Millgram's larger purpose is to critique instrumentalist approaches to practical reasoning. His reading of the proof makes Mill out to be an instrumentalist, and Millgram thinks that the ultimate failure of Mill's argument usefully illustrates an inconsistency inherent in instrumentalism. Yet Millgram's interpretation of the proof does not succeed. Mill is not an instrumentalist. Millgram may be right that instrumentalism is incoherent, but he has chosen the wrong figure to illustrate the point.

Mill's 'Socialism'

by Dale E. Miller

Insofar as John Stuart Mill can be accurately described as a socialist, his is a socialism that a classical liberal... more Insofar as John Stuart Mill can be accurately described as a socialist, his is a socialism that a classical liberal ought to be able to live with, if not to love.  Mill's view is that capitalist economies should at some point undergo a `spontaneous' and incremental process of socialization, involving the formation of  worker-controlled `socialistic' enterprises through either the transformation of `capitalistic' enterprises or creation de novo. This process would entail  few violations of core libertarian principles. It would proceed by way of a series of voluntary transactions. Capitalists' property rights would be respected  throughout. The process would take place within a national system of laws that permits private ownership of productive property and competition, and would not  result in that system's overthrow. And, if we accept some basic tenets of Mill's social philosophy, the outcome at which we should expect the process to arrive is a `patchwork' economy in which capitalistic and socialistic enterprises exist side by side.