Michael Walzer

Is Walzer's Position on Iraqi Containment in Need of Humanitarian Intervention?

by Robert Sivulka

Journal of the Utah Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, Vol. 83, 2006 (139-56)

I evaluate the limitation on war in situations that seem to call for humanitarian intervention.  I begin with... more I evaluate the limitation on war in situations that seem to call for humanitarian intervention.  I begin with Walzer’s position on jus ad bellum (the justice of going to war).  This involves a discussion of his views on the sovereignty of states and the commitment to non-intervention.  I will also summarize Walzer’s view on when humanitarian interventions are justified.  I will examine his position on the Iraq war as an example of his general jus ad bellum views.  I will then critique Walzer’s position on humanitarian intervention.  I argue that a case may still be made for the permissibility of humanitarian intervention using Walzer’s own principles.  This will turn on empirical claims concerning the gravity of the Iraqi situation and the real life inadequacy of his proposal.  I also argue that he minimizes the objectivity of justice, and puts state rights above individual human rights.  Finally, I examine utilitarian concerns, which seem to motivate much of his limited war theory.

It is not my intent to argue for or against jus ad bellum regarding the intervention of Iraq beginning in March 2003.  Weighing all the empirical issues to provide material content for the formal principles of just war theory is simply beyond the scope of this paper.  Rather, my primary purpose is to demonstrate that Walzer’s position for Iraqi containment and against this humanitarian intervention is inadequately grounded.  I argue that humanitarian intervention is justified in a greater number of cases than Walzer’s criteria allow.

Shared Understandings, Collective Autonomy and Global Equality

by Chris Armstrong

unpublished paper

The relationship between the claims of global distributive justice, national self-determination and cultural diversity... more The relationship between the claims of global distributive justice, national self-determination and cultural diversity has attracted much attention recently. Three of the most commonly-voiced objections to global distributive justice – and especially, on some accounts, the egalitarian variety – are first that it is incompatible with respecting the collective autonomy of national communities; second that it cannot be achieved without endangering cultural diversity, perhaps even crushing it in instituting the kind of global state that egalitarian justice might require; and third that articulating and / or implementing principles of equality at the global level simply cannot be done. On this last view, we have no metric at the global level by way of which to judge whether resources or opportunities, for example, are equally held, given that different communities differ in the way they conceive and value the goods they distribute amongst themselves. The American philosopher Michael Walzer is a prominent theorist of equality at the domestic level, but his apparent resistance to any form of global distributive justice is much-noted; indeed he has been understood to advance all three of the above claims on the way to rejecting any version of global distributive justice.

This paper argues for a more nuanced view. In his most recent work – and also, to a lesser extent, in the very work that has been claimed to give evidence for his objections – Walzer demonstrates a surprising degree of sympathy for the claims of global distributive justice, even of the egalitarian variety. But the precise nature of this commitment to global equality remains to be explicated. The paper therefore examines the contours of Walzer’s global egalitarianism, paying particular attention to the conclusions we might draw firstly for our understanding of the opposition between global equality and national self-determination (which is more complex than has sometimes been thought), and secondly for the relationship between global equality and shared understandings.

Shared Understandings, Collective Autonomy and Global Equality

by Chris Armstrong

From Ethics and Global Politics, 2011

The political theorist Michael Walzer has usually been taken as an opponent of global distributive justice, on the... more The political theorist Michael Walzer has usually been taken as an opponent of global distributive justice, on the basis that it is incompatible with collective autonomy, would endanger cultural diversity, or simply on the basis that principles of global distributive justice cannot be coherently envisaged, given cross-cultural disagreement about the nature and value of the social goods which might be distributed. However in his recent work, Walzer demonstrates a surprising degree of sympathy for the claims of global distributive justice, even of the egalitarian variety. But the precise contours of his current position on global equality are not yet clearly developed. The paper therefore attempts to reconstruct what that position might be, paying particular attention to the conclusions we could draw firstly for our understanding of the opposition between global equality and national self-determination (which is more complex than has sometimes been thought), and secondly for the relationship between global equality and shared understandings.

Review of Michael Walzer's Thinking Politically

by Jan Kandiyali

A slightly altered version of this review was published in the 'Marx and Philosophy Review of Books', October 2010.

The Nature of Necessity in the Just War Theories of The West and Islam

by Eric Gallager

The second paper I wrote for my Peace Studies class with Professor Irene Oh in the fall semester of my junior year at GWU.

In this paper I argue that the argument of necessity serves similar purposes in the just war theories of both the West... more In this paper I argue that the argument of necessity serves similar purposes in the just war theories of both the West and Islam, and that what differs between how it is used in each is what exactly constitutes "necessity."

Technologie et Souffrance dans le Guerre (Forthcoming)

by Nolen Gertz

In "Les drones aériens: passé, présent et futur. Approche globale", La Documentation Française. Coll. Stratégie aérospatiale (2012)

French translation of my "Technology and Suffering in War" French translation of my "Technology and Suffering in War"

Fairness and Liability in the Just War: Combatants, Non-Combatants, and Lawful Irregulars

by Christopher Finlay

Forthcoming in Political Studies. For a slightly earlier version of the essay, please follow the link.

Critics of non-uniformed ‘irregular’ warfare argue that it is unfair both to non-combatants and to enemy ‘regulars’. I... more Critics of non-uniformed ‘irregular’ warfare argue that it is unfair both to non-combatants and to enemy ‘regulars’. I contest that view by asking how the leaders of a people forced to fight a just war should distribute risks within their own population. Insofar as all are the victims of aggression or unjust occupation, I argue, no citizens on the just side are morally liable to attack. But to benefit from the restraining effects of the principle of discrimination, some members must be rendered legally liable. Political leaders must therefore find the most appropriate distribution of the risk of harm, first, by deciding which and how many citizens to select as ‘combatants’; and second, by specifying how far to distance combatants from civilians. I identify four normative considerations that must be taken into account: each possible arrangement must (1) fulfil basic requirements of fairness domestically; then, between equally fair arrangements, leaders ought to determine which offers the most auspicious balance between (2) the goal of survival during the war (of the society and as many of its members as possible) and (3) the goal of winning it and, hence, eliminating the injustices that caused the war; finally (4) the arrangement should not be unfair to enemy combatants. On this basis, I argue that in spite of the increased risks it poses to civilians, limited ‘irregular’ warfare might be deployed legitimately against occupiers where the use of uniforms would have rendered insurgents vulnerable to targeted assassination or arrest prior to actual combat.

Three prejudices against terrorism

by Shawn Kaplan

Published in Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 2, No. 2, August 2009, 181-199.

This paper criticizes three common prejudicial assumptions regarding terrorism and the agents who carry it out. These... more This paper criticizes three common prejudicial assumptions regarding terrorism and the agents who carry it out. These three prejudices against terrorism are: 1) terrorists are always indiscriminate in their targeting, 2) terrorism is never effective in combating oppression or injustice, and 3) terrorists do not participate in meaningful and fair negotiations to justly resolve their grievances as they merely wish to switch places with their oppressors. This paper first questions the wisdom of defining terrorism as an indiscriminate attack upon noncombatants or the ‘innocent’ on both philosophical and historical grounds. It argues that definitions that identify indiscriminate targeting as an essential feature of terrorism make it indistinguishable from a wide range of war crimes that traditionally have been held to be distinct. The functionalist definition of terrorism that is briefly defended allows for an historical analysis of the terrorist activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka which both supports the existence of discriminate terrorism and shows the assumptions that terrorism cannot be effective and that terrorists are closed to negotiating political settlements to their grievances to both be oversimplifications. By criticizing these three prejudices against terrorism, the paper does not attempt to justify or excuse terrorism generally nor in the specific case of Sri Lanka. Instead, it argues that the possibility of such a justification or excuse cannot reasonably be dismissed starting from these three assumptions.

Reform Intervention and Democratic Revolution

by Christopher Finlay

Published in the 'European Journal of International Relations', 2007.

Can interventions be used to assist oppressed peoples in overthrowing their governments? According to the influential... more Can interventions be used to assist oppressed peoples in overthrowing their governments? According to the influential non-interventionist arguments of J.S. Mill and Michael Walzer, reform interventions are incompatible with a principle of national self-determination. This article challenges Mill and Walzer, arguing that, in limited cases, interventions could in principle support revolutionary movements in such a way as to facilitate democratic transition. It does so by tracing a lack of conceptual clarity back to Mill's argument in `A Few Words on Non-Intervention'. In particular, it is argued that Mill's and consequently Walzer's account of domestic revolutionary conflicts fails to distinguish the salience of military from properly political forces. Mill's Considerations on Representative Government provides the starting point for a clearer set of distinctions through which to reconstruct the principle of non-intervention on a stronger footing.

Terrorism, Supreme Emergency, and Killing the Innocent

by Anne Schwenkenbecher

published in Perspectives - Review of International Affairs, 2009, Vol. 17, No. 1

Terrorist violence is often condemned for targeting innocents or non-combatants. There are two objections to this line... more Terrorist violence is often condemned for targeting innocents or non-combatants. There are two objections to this line of argument. First, one may doubt that terrorism is necessarily directed against innocents or non-combatants. However, I will focus on the second objection, according to which there may be exceptions from the prohibition against killing the innocent. In my article I will elaborate whether lethal terrorism against innocents can be justified in a supreme emergency. Starting from a critique of Michael Walzer’s account of supreme emergency, I will argue that the supreme emergency exemption justifies the resort to terrorism against innocents to avert moral disasters such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, provided that the criteria of last resort, proportionality and public declaration are satisfied.

How much Inequality Is Just? On the Justification of Political Redistribution in John Rawls and Michael Walzer

by Markus Rutsche

(g) Wieviel Ungleichheit ist gerecht? Zur Begründung politischer Umverteilung bei John Rawls und Michael Walzer (Term Paper, Univ. of Tübingen, 2009)

Few questions have shaped the history of political thought as much as how to accomplish a just order of human... more Few questions have shaped the history of political thought as much as how to accomplish a just order of human societies. Since ancient times, the debate has always centred about the means by which various desirable goods - such as power, wealth or certain freedoms – ought be distributed among the members of a given society. Following the Aristotelian concept of distributive justice, the discussion of inter-subjective, reasonable principles helping to promote this idea has continued unabated. In contrast, the demand that any political order rest upon a certain degree of equality among its members represents a significantly younger insight. Ever since the days of the Enlightenment, the extent to which all individuals share the same rights and obligations has remained highly controversial: For instance, should future, yet unborn generations today be entitled to the same rights as current ones? And doesn’t the inviolable core of universal human rights suffer more from its continued expansion than it gains? Contemporary political philosophy hasn't evaded these complex issues and in fact dealt with them in very diverse and sophisticated ways. It is within this context that this paper examines the key concepts of the said debates, justice and equality, in an attempt to address both in a somewhat inverse emphasis: It is asked which forms of social inequality can be reasonably regarded as just, and on what grounds. To this end, the study investigates how two of the most distinguished thinkers of our time, John Rawls representing the liberal and Michael Walzer as a representative of the communitarian school, justify and legitimize the politically steered redistribution of material and immaterial goods.

The Burden of Autonomy: Non-combatant Immunity and Humanitarian Intervention

by William Cornwell

Ethical Perspectives 12.3 (September 2005): 341-355

Michael Walzer argues that except in cases involving genocide or mass slaughter, humanitarian intervention is... more Michael Walzer argues that except in cases involving genocide or mass slaughter, humanitarian intervention is unjustified because "citizens get the government they deserve, or, at least, the government for which they are 'fit.'" Yet, if people are autonomous and deserve the government that rules over them, then it would seem that they are responsible for the government's actions, including their nations' wars of aggression. That line of thought undermines the doctrine of non-combatant immunity, which is perhaps the most important of Walzer's jus in bello principles. In this way, the concept of self-determination frustrates Walzer's attempts to keep jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations separate.

What It Means To Be A Pluralist

by Jacob Levy

in Yitzakh Benjabi and Naomi Sussman, eds., Reading Walzer, forthcoming, Routledge.

Should We Justify War?

by Roger Berkowitz

This is a draft for a keynote address for a 2012 Conference on Theorizing Just War. Comments welcome.

At stake in the effort to justify war is not simply some academic exercise. We ought not to aim for a series of... more At stake in the effort to justify war is not simply some academic exercise. We ought not to aim for a series of justifications, legal or ethical, that will answer the question of when wars are justified and how they may be justly fought. War, like any deeply human activity, will exceed all efforts by humans to control and to regulate it. What is needed, rather, is a determination to recall that justice, and not merely strategy and utility, has a place in war. Instead of justifications, what just war thinking offers is the insistent determination that those who fight not blind themselves to the illumination of justice amidst the fog of war.