Metaphysics of properties

Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection

by Tomasz Bigaj

published in 'Metaphysica' 2010, Vol. 11, pp. 39-47

Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties
are: dispositional monism, categorical... more Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties
are: dispositional monism, categorical monism and the mixed view. Dispositional
monism apparently involves a regress or circularity, while an unpalatable
consequence of categorical monism and the mixed view is that they are
committed to quidditism. I discuss Alexander Bird's defence of dispositional
monism based on the structuralist approach to identity. I argue that his solution
does not help standard dispositional essentialism, as it admits the possibility that
two distinct dispositional properties can possess the same stimuli and manifestations.
Moreover, Bird's argument can be used to support the mixed view by
relieving it of its commitment to quidditism. I briefly analyse an alternative
defence of dispositional essentialism based on Leon Horsten's approach to the
problem of circularity and impredicativity. I conclude that the best option is to
choose Bird's solution but amend the dispositional perspective on properties.
According to my proposal, the essences of dispositions are determined not directly
by their stimuli and manifestations but by the role each property plays in the
structure formed by the stimulus/manifestation relations.

Hume as a Trope Nominalist

by Jani Hakkarainen

I will give this paper at the panel on nominalism and relations in Hume Conference, Calgary, July 18-22, 2012.

Can 'Intrinsic' be Defined using only Broadly Logical Notions?

by Dan Marshall

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2009), no. 3, 646-672

An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related... more An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of `intrinsic' that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.

Analyses of Intrinsicality in terms of Naturalness

by Dan Marshall

Forthcoming in Philosophy Compass

Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and... more Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in terms of the facts about naturalness. This article discusses the three most influential of these attempts, each of which involve David Lewis. These are Lewis's 1983 analysis, his 1986 analysis, and his joint 1998 analysis with Rae Langton.

David Lewis and Contingent Second-Order Predication

by Christopher Gibilisco

Ways of owning: towards an economic sociology of privatisation

by Will Davies

to appear in Poetics, April 2012

Economic sociology has been preoccupied with the institution of markets, to the relative neglect of ownership. It has... more Economic sociology has been preoccupied with the institution of markets, to the relative neglect of ownership. It has inherited certain technical and governmental problematics regarding that which can or cannot be internalised within the market price system, leading to the assumption that the ‘social’ or the ‘public’ is a type of empirical externality. But by shifting attention towards institutions of ownership, the public and the private come to appear as primarily normative appeals, used to challenge and justify the drawing of boundaries in economic life. Boundaries are judged for their justice, as well as for their empirical efficacy. Adopting a pragmatist approach, this paper outlines three possible ‘orders of appropriation’ which can be appealed to when justifying and criticising privatisation in economic situations: the socialist, the neoliberal and the liberal. Beyond any scientific or technical account of property, each of these offers an ‘ultimate’ basis on which to view ownership, according to different and incompatible philosophical anthropologies.

The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional

by Galen Strawson

In Defence of Kantian Humility

by Tom McClelland

Forthcoming in Thought (Wiley-Blackwell) Please quote from published version.

Kantian Humility (KH) holds that the intrinsic properties of objects are unknowable for agents such as ourselves.... more Kantian Humility (KH) holds that the intrinsic properties of objects are unknowable for agents such as ourselves. Categorial properties, such as being an object, present a potential threat to KH. Cowling (2010) argues that knowing KH to be true requires knowledge of categorial properties. However, if such properties are shown to be intrinsic properties, then KH is committed to their being unknowable. I defend KH by presenting three alternative responses to this challenge. First, that categorial properties are not properties in the sense relevant to KH. Second, that if they are properties, they are not intrinsic properties. Third, that if they are intrinsic properties, KH is not committed to their being unknowable. I also show how these responses can be applied to a related objection to KH offered by Moore (2001).

Identificational Sentences and the Objects of Direct Perception

by Friederike Moltmann

accepted for publication in Natural Language Semantics

Do Fundamental properties Give an Explanation of Qualitative Similarities between Ordinary Objects? (In Japanese)

by Reina Saijo

recently published in Prospectus, 13, Philosophy Department of Kyoto University.
(non-reviewed)
original title「D.ルイスの基礎的性質としての自然的性質はものの類似性を説明できるのか」

Tropes, Intensional Relative Clauses, and the Notion of a Variable Object

by Friederike Moltmann

Proceedings of the 18th Amsterdam Colloquium

NPs with intensional relative clauses such as the impact of the book John needs to write pose a significant challenge... more NPs with intensional relative clauses such as the impact of the book John needs to write pose a significant challenge for trope theory (the theory of particularize properties), since they seem to refer to tropes that lack an actual bearer. I will propose a novel semantic analysis of such NPs on the basis of the notion of a variable object. This analysis avoids a range of difficulties that an alternative analysis based on the notion of an individual concept would face.

extract.MetOfRes

by Ghislain Guigon

The attached file is an extract from my PhD Thesis, "The Metaphysics of Resemblance", which contains the table of contents, a summary of the thesis chapter by chapter, and the first chapter of the thesis. If you would like to read more of my PhD thesis, please send me an email.

Two Types of Counterpart Relations: Can I be an Angel?

by Reina Saijo

published in Research Journal of Graduate Students of Letters, 11 (2011), Hokkaido University Collection of Scholarly and Academic Papers.
(non-reviewed)

The main question of this paper is whether any modal properties are ascribed to an object or not. According to David... more The main question of this paper is whether any modal properties are ascribed to an object or not. According to David Lewis’ counterpart theory, the answer is yes only if we provide appropriate contexts where counterpart relationships are held between possible objects. This sort of counterpart relations is mind-dependent. On the other hand, the answer is no only if counterpart relations are determined by Lewis’ theory of natural properties. This sort of counterpart relations is mind-independent. I shows that there are these two types of counterpart relations in Lewisian metaphysics. Moreover, I point out that the range of mind-independent counterpart relations corresponds to that of possibly nomological possibilities.

The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics and Four-Dimensinalism Stage View (In Japanese)

by Reina Saijo

published in 'Annals of the Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University', 44: 7-23, 2008.
(peer-reviewed, in Japanese)

Three Theories in The Contemporary Problem of Universals (In Japanese)

by Reina Saijo

published in The Kyoto Graduate Journal for Philosophy, Tetsugaku-Ronso, 38 (2011) supplement : S73-84 (non-reviewed and in Japanese)
original title 「現代普遍論争の諸相––普遍者・クラス・トロープ––」

Intrinsic value and intrinsic properties

by Josh Parsons

draft only (2006)

Distributional Properties.

by Josh Parsons

in _Lewisian Themes_ ed. Jackson and Priest.

This paper discusses a distinctive kind of property that I call "distributional" properties, which include,... more This paper discusses a distinctive kind of property that I call "distributional" properties, which include, for example, the property of being polka-dotted (a colour-distributional property) and the property of being hot at one end and cold at the other (a heat-distributional property). I argue that distributional properties exist in whatever sense other properties exist, that they do not simply reduce to the non-distributional properties of points, and that they are implicated in the correct analysis of change.

Langton and Lewis on Intrinsic

by Josh Parsons

co-authored with Dan Marshall, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63:2 (2001)

In their paper "Defining Intrinsic" Rae Langton and David Lewis propose a definition of intrinsicality in... more In their paper "Defining Intrinsic" Rae Langton and David Lewis propose a definition of intrinsicality in terms of modality and naturalness. We argue that this definition is subject to a clear counterexample. This counterexample highlights a deeper problem with Langton's and Lewis's approach: their account requires that there be facts about the relative naturalness of properties that the theories of natural properties they appeal to don't seem to provide.

On the Distinction between Abstract States, Concrete States, and Tropes

by Friederike Moltmann

To appear in Mari, A., Beyssade, C. and Del Prete, F. (forthcoming). Genericity. Oxford: OUP.

Stative verbs provide major challenges both for linguistic semantics and for ontology. On the common, Davidsonian view... more Stative verbs provide major challenges both for linguistic semantics and for ontology. On the common, Davidsonian view of the semantics of verbs, verbs take events as implicit arguments and adverbial modifiers generally act as predicates of such event arguments. This approach should naturally extend to stative verbs, which will then take a state as an implicit argument. However, stative verbs do not behave as expected: they for the most part allow only for a very limited set of adverbial modifiers and generally cannot form an infinitival complement of a perception verb, unlike eventive verb. I will discuss and defend a distinction between what I will call ‘abstract states’ and ‘concrete states’, a distinction that has recently been proposed by Maienborn to account for the peculiar semantic behavior of stative verbs. I will give an explicit ontological account of the notion of an abstract state and will relate the distinction between abstract and concrete states to the category of tropes (particularized properties). I will suggest that the category of concrete states can be dispensed with in favor of tropes, events, and abstract states.

Eliminating Properties in Quantum Mechanics

by Jonathan Erhardt

This paper is my attempt of making sense of three problems in physics and metaphysics. First and foremost the problem... more This paper is my attempt of making sense of three problems in physics and metaphysics. First and foremost the problem of what superpositions in quantum mechanics are, that is, what kind of object a superposed object is. Second, the question of what happens in the world, if anything, during measurement in quantum mechanics. What in the world (if anything) corresponds to the collapse of a state-vector of a physical system into an eigenvector of a Hermitian operator in quantum mechanics during measurement? And third, what is the nature of properties and how are they related to powers? Is the relation between properties and their causal powers contingent or necessary? I think one basic idea has the power to solve all those problems and to answer or dissolve the questions related to them. This idea is to abandon the idea of properties, to eliminate them or to deny their existence. A welcomed side-effect of this solution is that it opens a way to avoid the conclusion of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument without giving up locality in quantum physics. I will not say much about which events in the world count as measurement in quantum mechanics, simply because the property-eliminativistic interpretation of quantum mechanics doesn't entail any particular view in this area.

Roadmap: Section two deals with some terminological preliminaries. With the terminology at hand I want to have a look at superpositions in a specific experiment in section three. Section four shows how the standard interpretation deals with superpositions and how this leads to the mystery of superpositions. In the next two sections I want to try to solve the mystery by developing a metaphysical theory of properties and applying it to superposed objects.