Metaphysics of free will and moral responsibility
Free will in Mīmāṃsā
draft only, to be published in a volume edited by E. Bryant and M. Dasti
The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience... more
The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience of one's freedom of action is asumed to be valid, since one experiences one's actions as free and since the karman- or apūrva-based causalities cannot be ascertained to eliminate all precincts of application of free will. In fact, human beings are lead to act, according to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors, by their desires, and, according to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā authors, by Vedic injunctions which, in turn, identify them through their desires. Consequently, their precinct of free will seems exactly to lie in one's faculty to train their desires. Even from the point of view of Prābhākaras, who stress the role of Vedic commands, free will is presupposed by the claim that, although the Veda tells one what to do, it does not make one do it.
Agency does not accrue to an underlying \emph{ātman}, but rather seems to constitute one of the subject's essential characters. Accordingly, the agent subject is said not to be immutable and does instead change through time.
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Seen by: and 5 moreA superação hegeliana do dualismo entre determinismo e liberdade
Paper reat at the Symposium `Sujeito e liberdade na filosofia moderna alemã´, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, Brazil, August 26-28, 2011.
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Seen by:2009, « Habitus, Freedom and Reflexivity », in Theory and Psychology Volume 19, no. 6, pp. 728-755.
The question of freedom is recurrent in the theory of habitus. In this paper I propose that the notion of freedom is... more The question of freedom is recurrent in the theory of habitus. In this paper I propose that the notion of freedom is an essential and necessary component for the coherence of the analyses which mobilize habitus both in terms of their theoretical articulation and in terms of their grounding in empirical reality. This argument can seem surprising considering that the theory of habitus has often been accused of being deterministic. Yet I show that, from an epistemological point of view, habitus theory is not deterministic. Bourdieu’s treatment of this concept implies at least three principles that exclude determinism: (1) the production of an infinite number of behaviors from a limited number of principles, (2) permanent mutation, and (3) the intensive and extensive limits of sociological understanding. After identifying and describing these principles, I show the reason for their incompatibility with a deterministic perspective and consider their implications for the corresponding model of action. I illustrate this analysis by a discussion of Loïc Wacquant’s carnal sociology of the pugilistic universe which reveals why it is essential to understand and explain the relation between habitus and freedom.
L'intervento di Gherush92 sulla "Commedia": una mancata occasione di diplomazia culturale
by Marina Decó
In 10 days on MonteCovello News, 4-2012, too
The paper considers Gherush92's statements about Dante's Comedy as a phaenomenon of cultural pyrrhonism, which deletes... more The paper considers Gherush92's statements about Dante's Comedy as a phaenomenon of cultural pyrrhonism, which deletes Dante's exegesis and hermeneutics, not worthing free will.
Do I have more free will than you do?
by Brian Earp
Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.
The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.
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Seen by:Epistemic Freedom
Originally published in the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1989). Reprinted in The Possibility of Practical Reason, online in the SPO Monograph Series
We are not metaphysically free to do just anything that is within our power, but we are epistemically free to believe... more We are not metaphysically free to do just anything that is within our power, but we are epistemically free to believe that we will do just anything that is within our power.
Processes and Particles: The Impact of Classical Pragmatism on Contemporary Metaphysics
published in philosophical topics vol. 36, no. 1, spring 200
This article shows that contemporary debates in Analytic Metaphysics would be radically changed by considering the... more This article shows that contemporary debates in Analytic Metaphysics would be radically changed by considering the process philosophy defended by James, Dewey and Peirce. They offer a serious alternative to Kim's claim that "bits of matter and their aggregates" are all that exist. Kim's reductionism is not the only form of physicalism, indeed physics is arguably better explained as implying the existence of a fundamental process, rather than a set of fundamental particles. The article concludes with a thought experiment that shows that reductionism is based on some highly questionable speculations, not scientific facts.
Some Potential Benefits of a Universal System
This is a thought paper on the power of the fusion of knowledge, love and diversity and what I believe that has to... more This is a thought paper on the power of the fusion of knowledge, love and diversity and what I believe that has to offer humanity.
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Seen by:How Does Agent-Causal Power Work?
This is the version that will be appearing in a special issue of The Modern Schoolman.
Agent-causalism or the agency theory is the thesis that agents qua objects/substances cause at least some of their... more Agent-causalism or the agency theory is the thesis that agents qua objects/substances cause at least some of their decisions (or at least their coming to have an intention that is constitutive of a decision). In this paper, I examine the tenability of an attractive agent-causal account of the metaphysics of the springs of free action developed and defended in the recent work of Timothy O’Connor. Against the backdrop of recent work on causal powers in ontology, I argue that, however attractive the account, O’Connor’s agent-causal theory of free agency is ultimately untenable.
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Seen by: and 4 moreWHO WAS CYRIL JOAD, AND WHAT DID HE CONTRIBUTE TO PHILOSOPHY ?
Essayette
ESSAYETTE 6 - "WHO WAS CYRIL JOAD AND WHAT DID HE CONTRIBUTE TO PHILOSOPHY ?"
BY RICHARD W. SYMONDS
BY RICHARD W. SYMONDS
Dr. Cyril Joad (1891-1953) (Teacher, Philosopher, Writer, Broadcaster, Outcast)
is best remembered, if remembered at all, as the wartime Brains Trust
'Professor' with the famous catchphrase "It all depends what you mean by...",
who popularized philosophy for millions, and "quickened the sluggish mind of
the nation" (London Evening Standard, 1953).
C.E.M. Joad published over 70 books in this country, nearly 30 in America, over
80 Papers, and countless newspaper and magazine articles. He was Head of
Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London for 23 years, until his
death in 1953, aged 61.
Cyril Edwin Mitchinson Joad (CEMJ) was a very gifted, but very fallible, human
being. His private life appears to be 'a disaster area', and celebrity hubris
ended with a nemesis in 1948. His popularity and reputation were destroyed by
Winston Churchill in 'Gathering Storm', by the media in a train ticket
'scandal', and by the cruel humiliations of Bertrand Russell, and his
professional disciples. Joad was sacked from the BBC, and the chances of a
Peerage from Clement Attlee, or a Professorship at Birkbeck, were lost.
Cyril Joad's life and work can be usefully divided into three main phases - its
beginning, middle and end - each of which can be sub-divided into 3 main areas:
Joad the Political Philosopher, Pacifist and Atheist
(a) "The Diary of a Dead Officer". Edited by CEMJ in 1919
(re: war poet and friend, Arthur Graeme West).
(b) Federation of Progressive Societies and Individuals,
F.P.S.I. (1933).
(c) The 1933 Oxford Union Debate "That under no
circumstances will we fight for King and Country". [Joad
proposed the motion and won the debate, an event which was
later cited by Churchill as one of the reasons for Hitler's
belief that Britain would never go to war.]
Joad the Wartime Celebrity Philosopher and Brains Trust Man of Reason
(a) The BBC Brains Trust (1941-1948).
(b) 'Teach Yourself Philosophy' (1944).
(c) The fare-dodging scandal (1948).[Joad was successfully
prosecuted for failing to buy a train ticket.]
Joad the Moral Philosopher and Man of Faith
(a) The 1950 Oxford Union Debate "That this house regrets
the influence exercised by the US as the dominant power
among the democratic nations", with the young Robin day
presiding.
(b) 'Shaw and Society' (1953).
(c) 'Recovery of Belief' (1952) and posthumous 'Folly Farm'
(1954).
It is primarily to the third phase we must look, for an answer the second part
of the question.
Joad also made an original contribution to philosophy; that of Christian
Philosophy - a contribution almost entirely disregarded in the late 20th
Century. Cyril Joad said in 1943: "If you object that Christ was not a
philosopher, I can only beg you to wait until you know as much philosophy as I
do before venturing to contradict."
Joad wrote 'The Recovery of Belief - A Restatement of Christian Philosophy', a
year before his death. In this, he clearly explains with great originality, his
Christian 'Transcendence- Immanence' Theory of the Universe.
Joad's Christian Theory of the Nature of Values
Joad adhered to the 'philosophia perennis', which affirms that Values are
Objective not Subjective, and can reduce themselves to Truth, Goodness and
Beauty.
These three Values are "OBJECTIVE in the sense that they are found by the human
mind - found as 'given' in things - and not projected into things or contributed
to them by our own minds, and ULTIMATE, in the sense that whatever we value can
be shown to be valued because of the relation of the thing valued to some one
or other of the three Values. Thus, while other things are valued as means to
one or other of these three, they are valued as ends in themselves.
"Moreover, these Values are not just arbitrary, pieces of cosmic furniture
lying about, as it were, in the universe without explanation, coherence or
connection, but are revelations of a unity that underlies them; are, in fact,
the ways in which God reveals Himself to man. Hence, those human activities
which consist in, or which arise out of, the pursuit of Truth, the cultivation
of moral goodness, or the creation and enjoyment of Beauty, are such that we
cannot help but value and revere them."
"What we call the Values - and it is under this term that the Forms may, I
think, be most appropriately referred to in respect of their most outstanding
manifestations, as Truth, Goodness and Beauty - are the modes of God's
revelation of His Nature to man. For if this is indeed the case, the revelation
must be regarded as the IMMANENCE of a TRANSCENDENT Being in a medium which,
though it manifests, is itself other than, the Being manifested. Now, we
cannot, I suggest, expect to achieve a 'know-how' of the mode of manifestation
of a Divine Being ..."
The Cartesian Mind-Body Problem and Joad's Christian Mind-Body-Soul Theory.
Joad believed that the relation between Mind and Body (Brain) is
"indescribable" because it is "incomprehensible", and therefore rejects the
Cartesian 'Mind-Body' Theory. He puts forward an alternative Christian
'Mind-Body-Soul' Theory.
"The Mind is, it is clear, constantly interacting with the Body and Brain, yet
all attempts to envisage the mode of this interaction have been lamentable
failures. I venture to develop, in an admittedly purely speculative direction,
the hypothesis that there is included, in the make-up of the human personality,
a timeless element. The traditional division of the human being is not twofold
into mind and body, but threefold into mind, body and soul (or spirit). I
suggest that this (threefold) division may approximate more closely to the
truth than any other."
Classic Joad on the difficulty of philosophy
"Philosophy is an exceedingly difficult subject, and most books on philosophy
are unintelligible to most intelligent people. This is partly, but not wholly,
due to the difficulty of the subject matter, which, being the universe, is not
surprisingly complex and obscure. There is no reason, at least I know of none,
why the universe should necessarily be intelligible to the mind of a
twentieth-century human being, and I...remind him how late a comer he is upon
the cosmic scene, and how recently he has begun to think...
"If we put the past of life at one hundred years, then the past human life
works out at about a month, and of human civilisation (giving the most generous
interpretation to the term "civilisation") at about one-and-three-quarter hours.
On the same time-scale, the future of "civilisation" - that is to say, the
future during which it may be supposed that man will continue to think - is
about one hundred thousand years.
"By any reckoning, then, the human mind is very young, and it is not to be
expected that it should, as yet, understand very much of the world in which it
finds itself. Indeed, there is a sense in which the more we know, the more we
become aware of the extent of our ignorance. Suppose, for example, that we
think of knowledge as a little lighted patch, the area of the known, set in a
sea of environing darkness, the limitless area of the unknown. Then, the more
we enlarge the area of the lighted patch, the area of the known, the more also
we enlarge the area of contact with the environing darkness of the unknown. In
philosophy, then, as in daily life, cocksureness is a function of ignorance,
and dunces step in where sages fear to tread. The wise man is he who realises
his limitations."
Joad on the function of philosophy
"It is the business of philosophy, as I conceive it, to seek to understand the
nature of the universe as a whole, not, as do the sciences, some special
department of it, but the whole bag of tricks to which the moral feelings of
the Puritan, the herd instinct of the man in the street, the religious
consciousness of the saint, the aesthetic enjoyment of the artist, the history
of the human race and its contemporary follies, no less than the latest
discoveries of science, contribute.
"He looks for a clue to guide him through the labyrinth, for a system wherewith
to classify, or a purpose in terms of which to make meaningful. Has the
universe, for example, any design, or is it merely a fortuitous concourse of
atoms? Is mind a fundamental feature of the universe, in terms of which we are
ultimately to interpret the rest, or is it a mere accident, an eddy in the
primeval slime, doomed one day to finish its pointless journey with as little
noise and significance as it began it? Are good and evil real and ultimate
principles existing independently of men, or are they merely the names we give
to the things of which we happen to approve and to disapprove?"
__________________________________________________________________________________
Richard W. Symonds is a member of the International Society For Philosophers (http://www.isfp.co.uk), founder member of The Cyril Joad Society viewtopic.php?f=5&t=1008&start=0, and author of “Mega Theory & The Moral Instinct”.
He can be contacted by email : richardsy5@aol.com or at his website: Gatwick City of Ideas viewtopic.php?f=2&t=2&start=0
Review of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza
by Kevin Magill
3000 word review, published in Mind Volume 109, Number 434, 1 April 2000, pp, 343-9.
Long review of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza,... more Long review of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, CUP, 1998. Evaluates and critiques Fischer's and Ravizza's Frankfurtian Compatibilism about moral responsibility, concluding in favour of the main Compatibilist alternative tradition in post-war philosophising about moral responsibility: Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment' naturalism.
The will is caused, not 'free'
by Brian Earp
Bargh, J. A., & Earp, B. D. (2009). The will is caused, not 'free'. Dialogue, Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 24 No 1, 13-15.
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Seen by: and 84 moreFreedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions, Macmillan, 1997.
by Kevin Magill
Table Of Contents
Preface ix
1 Are The Problems Of Free Will Resolvable? 1
Meanings, Attitudes and Illusions 5
Ifs, Cans and Consequences 10
Attitudes 19
Do the Problems of Free Will all Have
to do with Attitudes? 22
Incoherence 25
Conclusion 29
2 Moral Responsibility 34
Justification 42
The Impulse to Justify 46
Ourselves and Those Closest to Us 50
Conclusion 52
3 Free Will 54
Free Will as Doing What You Really Want, Because
it is What You Really Want 54
Morality and Free Will 56
Freedom of Action and Free Will 59
Unwanted Wants 63
Control by the Past 66
Incommensurable Choices and Ultimacy 69
Conclusion 75
4 Can We Experience Our Decisions as Caused? 77
The Experience of Causation 78
Causation and Decisions 83
Deliberating, Deciding and Intending 86
Difficult Decisions 97
How Much Can We Know To Be True? 100
The Future 103
Conclusion 105
5 What are Actions? 108
Defining Actions 110
Causation 114
Guided Behaviour 117
Agent-Causation 120
Conditions of a Satisfactory Theory of Action 123
A Defensible Causal Analysis of Action 124
Why A Causal Analysis Of Action
Cannot Include Intentions 129
Resolution of Conditions (1) and (2) 134
Intentionality 137
Control 141
Dual-Control and Dual-Rationality 143
Demons and Manipulators 144
Conclusion 146
6 Free Agency 148
Self-Determination and Identification 150
Reason, Values and Desires 162
Free Agency 166
Conclusion 170
7 Conclusion 172
Notes 175
References 196
Index 202
Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and... more Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and those of others, that we have choices about how to do so and that we are responsible for what we do. But are we really justified in believing this? For centuries philosophers have argued about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism or natural causation, and they seem no closer to agreeing about it now than at any time in the past. Many contemporary philosophers have come to the conclusion that the intractability of the old argument about free will and determinism is caused by deep rooted illusions and inconsistencies in our unreflective attitudes about moral responsibility and freedom to act. Kevin Magill challenges this view and argues that the philosophical stalemate about free will has arisen through lack of attention to the content of the experiences that shape our understanding of free will and agency and through a mistaken belief that the concept of moral responsibility requires a moral and metaphysical justification. The book sets out an original account of the various ways we experience choosing, deciding and acting, which reconciles the apparently opposing intuitions that have fuelled the traditional dispute.

