Time and Formal Authenticity: Husserl and Heidegger
published as Chapter 2 in The Many Faces of Time, ed.John B. Brough and Lester Embree (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000).
Husserl’s transcendental conception of the relation between time constitution and immanent time was still very far off... more
Husserl’s transcendental conception of the relation between time constitution and immanent time was still very far off conceptually when he delivered the 1905 Time Lectures. The conceptual framework of his General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology[1] of 1913 maintains that the status of all mental processes (or lived experiences, Erlebnisse) as occurring in the flux of immanent time is achieved through constitutive functions which cannot be authentically understood as occurring in time at all even though they also are bound to be identified as occurring at the present moment in the constituted flux and the flux as occurring to and through the lived body and the lived body as belonging to the life-world. The flux is, therefore, necessarily intended as belonging to world-time. The flux of mental processes and immanent time itself, therefore, are constituted, and the syntheses through which they get constituted do not occur in the flux or in immanent time. Through such synthetic transcendental occurrences, the self makes itself be in time and in the world. Accordingly, the transcendental subject coincides only partially with the subject in the world, but it does so necessarily and <38> can exist only by doing so, by “making” itself be in the world. If vast differences in nomenclature are overlooked, this later position is close in many ways to[2] the one Martin Heidegger was developing when he was engaged in editing the 1905 lectures for their first publication. For the relation of conditioned to conditioning here is mutual; the subject’s constitutive or transcendental functions are dependent upon the given “contents” whose temporal being they constitute. Moreover, there is in truth only one ego, the one that is in the world and is in it at all only by making itself be in time and in the world.
It is a vast improvement over the position of 1905 when Husserl later conceives immanent time to be entirely continuous and to be so through a complex of syntheses that occur as aspects of a single continuous identifying synthesis that enables it passively to constitute the flux of lived experiences as immanent time with its individual temporality or individual time-form, its being in time. Thus, Husserl came to conceive every mind or self to be constituted with its own unique time-form regardless of whether or not any of the lived experience occurring in the flux of immanent time is both doxic and active, i.e., is of a sort which alone can constitute categorial form. The later conception understands the “pure ego” to be a simple unity which this underlying synthesis achieves in a purely passive way so that there may exist egos whose mental lives include not even the obscurest awareness of logical or categorial form.
"CE QUI CHANGE ET LE DÉJÀ FAIT" Diachronie et synchronie dans les sciences sociales et historiques
by Bastien Bosa
Published in: Revue européenne des sciences sociales no 49-2 – p.169-196
Résumé. Cet article propose une réflexion sur la place de la diachronie et de la synchronie dans la recherche... more
Résumé. Cet article propose une réflexion sur la place de la diachronie et de la synchronie dans la recherche sociale, en partant de l’une des contradictions indépassables pour toute appréhension du temps. Celui-ci peut être pensé sous l’angle de la concomitance (dont chacun a fait l’expérience et qui revient à penser le temps comme une « succession de présents différents ») ou sous l’angle des processus (c’est-à-dire de la modification permanente des conditions de l’expérience en fonction d’une différentiation entre passé, présent et futur). Nous nous interrogerons sur ce que signifie travailler dans la diachronie ou dans la synchronie, en soulignant notamment la difficulté à distinguer clairement les deux approches : de nombreuses recherches habituellement pensées comme diachroniques ne le sont peut-être pas et, réciproquement, des approches pensées comme synchroniques s’articulent presque nécessairement avec une pensée des processus.
Abstract. This article proposes a reflection on the place of the synchrony-diachrony distinction in social research. The understanding of time is structured by a recurring contradiction: time can be thought of in terms of “concomitant experiences” (time appears in that perspective as a “succession of different presents”) or in terms of “processes” (insisting on the permanent modifications of social life on the basis of a differentiation between past, present and future). I will try to present as clearly as possible diachronic and synchronic approaches, before stressing the difficulty to separate them: some researches usually thought of as diachronic might include other dimensions, while conversely, investigations presented as synchronic almost necessarily articulate processual perspectives.
Collecting the 19th Century
by Sue Waterman
published in "Representations" Spring 2005
The linking of a series of 19th century collections of a prominent Belgian family reveals more than just the outlines... more The linking of a series of 19th century collections of a prominent Belgian family reveals more than just the outlines of the cultures of 19th century collecting. The bonds of scientific confraternity, of family and of love, are perhaps not as strong as those of time and memory. And the nature of the Archive may be at times both fluid and uncertain.
Introduction à la topologie du temps
communication à l'Atmoc du 17 février 2012
Le champ d’investigation ouvert par l’étude rigoureuse de la topologie du temps, qui demeure relativement marginal,... more
Le champ d’investigation ouvert par l’étude rigoureuse de la topologie du temps, qui demeure relativement marginal, est un bon exemple de l’intérêt du formalisme pour faire progresser nos intuitions confuses et réviser nos concepts inadéquats concernant le temps. On sait quelle fut toujours la difficulté des philosophes, depuis Aristote, à déterminer la nature exacte du temps sans sombrer dans le paradoxe et la métaphore. Réfléchir sur la topologie du temps permet précisément de s’interroger en détail sur les propriétés de tel ou tel système temporel, sans s’engager en faveur du platonisme (les « items » temporels, e.g. les instants, existent indépendamment des événements) ou du réductionnisme (ces items temporels sont réductibles à des collections d’événements). Il s’agit donc, au sens large, d’un exercice d’ontologie formelle, mais l’aspect empirique de l’enquête telle qu’elle est présentée par William Newton-Smith (1980) le situe également à la frontière de l’ontologie traditionnelle et de la physique théorique.
http://www.atmoc.fr/publications
Rules for Listening to Time: Hours of Infinity
Artist statement for three projects: "One Hundred Hours of Infinity," "Twelve Hours of Infinity: Amduat," and "An Hour of Infinity – the exhibitions and performance comprising my MFA thesis project "Hours of Infinity."
The solitary acts of drawing and listening are inextricably linked; they both observe and record each other.
The three projects comprising Hours of Infinity are based upon an imprecise drawing method that causes mistakes to be embedded within the work by separating the creator from the physical act of drawing, all the while maintaining focused attention on the sonic aspects of the experience – the sound of the pencil against the paper, and its merging with other sounds within the surrounding space. The visual symbols I have chosen to depict with this process have represented infinity within various cultures over long spans of time; thus there is a calculated contradiction inherent within the small size and impermanent materials of these drawings, between their own ephemerality and the eternity they represent. Incorporating in their construction elements of classical Egyptian and Greek philosophies, mindful meditation, and proofs from mathematical theory, these works investigate the timelessly beautiful imperfection inherent within the human experience of the Infinite. The drawings themselves are weightless objects, etched documents, their grooves and lines indicative of the sounds of specific durations of time: imperfect, absurd, fragile symbols for something believed to be symmetrical, profound and everlasting.
Bumps on the Road to Here (from Eternity)
In his recent book, _From Eternity to Here_, and in other more technical papers, Sean Carroll (partly in collaboration... more In his recent book, _From Eternity to Here_, and in other more technical papers, Sean Carroll (partly in collaboration with Jennifer Chen) has put forward an intriguing new way to think about the origin of the Universe. His approach, in a nutshell, is to raise certain worries about a standard Boltzmannian picture of statistical mechanics, and to present certain commitments that he thinks we ought to hold—commitments that the standard picture doesn’t share. He then proposes a cosmological model—one that purports to give us insight into what sort of process brought about the “initial state” of the universe—that can uniquely accommodate those commitments. The conclusion of Carroll’s argument is that statistical mechanical reasoning provides grounds for provisionally accepting that cosmological model. My goal in this paper is to reconstruct and critically assess this proposal. I argue that “statistical cosmology” requires a careful balance of philosophical intuitions and commitments against technical, scientific considerations; how much stock we ought to place in these intuitions and commitments should depend on where they lead us—those that lead us astray scientifically might well be in need of philosophical re examination.
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Seen by:Object Identity Over Time
In this paper I investigate the thought experiment of “The Ship of Theseus” in an attempt to compose an alternative... more In this paper I investigate the thought experiment of “The Ship of Theseus” in an attempt to compose an alternative theory, within the debate of persistence, which is capable of accounting for object identity. This I do by first using the unique bundle theory of universals to show how the problem presented by the thought experiment is in fact no problem at all, according to an analysis of the object’s content. However, according to our common sense, these problems persist and are unexplainable by the dominant theories of continuity of form and identity of original parts. After showing how the two theories are unsuccessful in explaining the problem, and only serve to bring more problems into the debate, I introduce the notion of an object’s role as grounding our common sense notion of identity. After clarifying the notion of a role as the strictly dependent continuing potential functions of an object I show how this new role-theory is capable of solving the problem introduced by the original thought experiment and also the mentioned problems introduced by the continuity of form and identity of original parts theories. In conclusion I show how the role-theory is capable of avoiding the problem of an object’s “history” that no other theory can explain.
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Seen by:Recensione di P. PORRO (ed.), The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy, Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2001
«SWIF» (Sito Web Italiano per la Filosofia, http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/archivio/recensioni.htm), ottobre 2002, ISSN 1126-4780
Book review. Book review.
36 views
Seen by:Recensione di U. SCHULTE-KLÖCKER, Das Verhältnis von Ewigkeit und Zeit als Widerspiegelung der Beziehung zwischen Schöpfer und Schöpfung. Eine textbegleitende Interpretation der Bücher XI-XIII der Confessiones des Augustinus, Bonn: Borengässer, 2000
«Adamantius. Rivista del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su “Origene e la tradizione alessandrina”», VIII (2002), ISSN 1126-6244, pp. 403-404
Book review. Book review.
The Indubitable Nature of Temporality in Perception
draft only
The flow of time is vital for perception. While philosophers disagree as to the nature of how time is represented,... more The flow of time is vital for perception. While philosophers disagree as to the nature of how time is represented, i.e. that the passage of time is that of mere tense or belonging to the nature of the experience, it is generally accepted that the represented somehow tells us about the future, present and past. My contention is that this temporal character is indubitable for perception. I will begin by providing a temporal model of how percepts are represented. After giving a detailed presentation of the model, some problems will be considered, namely that two things doom the temporal model: the experience of succession may be no different than a non-veridical perceptual experience, i.e. things are perceived as they are not, and second, because the experience of succession does not capture how things are, we cannot ground the experience metaphysically. My contention is that what is being represented in perception possesses fundamental temporal qualities that are indubitable for the experience, regardless of the worries mentioned above. If such temporal qualities belonging to the experience go without say, then a question remains as to the status of the temporal character of perception. After contrasting Kant’s position with Husserl’s position on the status of temporality in perception, I will argue that Kant’s position on the matter is more plausible.
151 views
Seen by:Systems in Context: On the Outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann-Debate
66-77, Ancilla Iuris, Sep., 2006.
Usually regarded as a 1970s phenomenon, this article demonstrates that the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Niklas... more Usually regarded as a 1970s phenomenon, this article demonstrates that the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann continued until Luhmann’s death in 1998, and that the development of the two theorists’ positions during the 1980s and 1990s was characterised by convergence rather than by divergence. In the realm of legal theory, the article suggests, convergence advanced to the extent that Habermas’ discourse theory may be characterised as a normative superstructure to Luhmann’s descriptive theory of society. It is further shown that the debate’s result was an almost complete absorption of Habermas’ theory by Luhmann’s systems theoretical complex – an outcome facilitated by Luhmann’s deliberate translation of central Habermasian concepts into systems theoretical concepts. The article argues that both the debate and Habermas’ conversion were made possible because not only Habermas’ but also Luhmann’s work can be considered a further development of the German idealist tradition. What Luhmann did not acknowledge was that this manoeuvre permitted the achievement of Habermas’ normative objectives; nor did he notice that it could eradicate a central flaw in the system theoretical construction, by allowing the context within which distinctions are drawn to be mapped – an issue of pivotal importance for grasping relationships between different social systems, and coordinating them, via the deployment of legal instruments.
Hegel e la filosofia contemporanea del tempo [Hegel and the contemporary philosophy of time]
Draft version of "Hegel e la filosofia contemporanea del tempo", published in "Verifiche" XXXIX, 1-4, 2010, pp. 135-85.
In this essay I compare Hegel’s theory of time and becoming with the contemporary debate, aiming on the one hand (A)... more In this essay I compare Hegel’s theory of time and becoming with the contemporary debate, aiming on the one hand (A) at presenting Hegel’s thought in contemporary terms, and on the other, (B) at offering new inputs to the present metaphysical debate from a Hegelian point of view. From a close reading of selected Hegelian texts I argue (1) that Hegel advocates a form of presentism and shares McTaggart’s thesis that the B-series (chronological time) presupposes the A-series (dynamical time); (2) that his position is pe-culiar because, although he admits that change is inconsistent, he puts in jeopardy the law of non contradiction (at least in its universality), instead of denying the reality of time and change, like McTaggart did. These considerations will then lead to Hegel’s speculative logic. According to the so called coherentistic reading of Hegel’s thought, he never seriously questioned the principle of non contradiction: he would be just a very sophisticated Aristo-telian, after all. I oppose this view, arguing (3) that Hegel was a proponent of an articulated form of dialetheism.
Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience
Philosophers’ Imprint 9, no. 12, 2009
We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things... more We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that is being experienced. Both claims have been made before, though usually separately from each other, and I don't believe the connection between them has been sufficiently recognized.

