Metaphysics of Science

Concepts in Complexity II: Emergence and the Difference Between Order and Organization

by Jon Lawhead

Still very much a draft. 

This paper would not have been possible without the help of Daniel Estrada and Tim Ignaffo.

There are a number of contemporary scientific problems that can benefit from good metaphysical analysis and... more There are a number of contemporary scientific problems that can benefit from good metaphysical analysis and philosophical clarification.  This paper examines one of these problems—explaining the nature of self-organized emergent behavior in dynamical physical systems.  While discussions of emergence have long been the province of metaphysicians, recent advances in network theory and complex systems theory have begun to suggest that there is both philosophical and metaphysical work to be done here, and that a rigorous, mathematically-grounded account of emergence might serve as the foundation upon which we can construct a tremendous number of other novel contributions to our understanding of the world. 

This paper explores the conceptual connection between this mathematically rigorous account of “strong emergence” (developed primarily by Yaneer Bar-Yam) and the still somewhat murky notion of self-organized systems.  I argue that a clear scientific understanding of emergence leads to a natural way of understanding the metaphysics of self-organization and (more generally) the difference between order and organization.  All three of these notions are central to the nascent field of complex systems theory, and getting a strong grasp on their conceptual relationships would represent not only a significant step toward developing a cohesive metaphysics of complex systems, but would also provide the theoretical tools necessary for continued philosophical and scientific work in that area. 

Given the sheer number (and diversity) of fields that stand to benefit from complexity-theoretic insights, this is work that urgently needs to be done.

Book review of T. Rego, La filosofía del sentido común según Aristóteles. Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, 2011. 137pp.

by David Torrijos-Castrillejo

"Anuario Filosófico" 45 (2012) 203-206

Rego compare Aristotle with a contemporary philosopher, Antonio Livi. He searchs his realism (that stands under the... more Rego compare Aristotle with a contemporary philosopher, Antonio Livi. He searchs his realism (that stands under the name of "philosophy of common sense or alethic logic") in Aristotelian philosophy. So he looks for the material logic in Aristotle.
The first part deals with the common sense in the methodology of Aristotle, while the second reviews the verification of the five judgments implicitly made ​​by common sense according to Livi.

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and Quantum Mechanics*

by Tomasz Bigaj

Co-authored with James Ladyman, published in 'Philosophy of Science', 2010, Vol. 77, pp. 117-136.

It is argued that recent discussion of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII) and quantum mechanics has... more It is argued that recent discussion of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII) and quantum mechanics has lost sight of the broader philosophical motivation and significance of PII and that the ‘received view’ of the status of PII in the light of quantum mechanics survives recent criticisms of it by Muller, Saunders, and Seevinck.

Ungrounded dispositions in quantum mechanics

by Tomasz Bigaj

forthcoming in 'Foundations of Science'

General metaphysical arguments have been proposed in favour of the thesis that all dispositions have categorical bases... more General metaphysical arguments have been proposed in favour of the thesis that all dispositions have categorical bases (Armstrong; Prior, Pargetter, Jackson). These arguments have been countered by equally general arguments in support of ungrounded dispositions (Molnar, Mumford). I believe that this controversy cannot be settled purely on the level of abstract metaphysical considerations. Instead, I propose to look for ungrounded dispositions in specific physical theories, such as quantum mechanics. I explain why non-classical properties such as spin are best interpreted as irreducible dispositional properties, and I give reasons why even seemingly classical properties, for instance position or momentum, should receive a similar treatment when interpreted in the quantum realm. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that quantum dispositions should not be limited to probabilistic dispositions (propensities) by showing reasons why even possession of well-defined values of parameters should qualify as a dispositional property. I finally discuss the issue of the actuality of quantum dispositions, arguing that it may be justified to treat them as potentialities whose being has a lesser degree of reality than that of classical categorical properties, due to the incompatibility relations between non-commuting observables.

Review of A. Bird, 'Nature's Metaphysics'

by Barbara Vetter

Four Theories of Pure Dispositions

by William Bauer

In 'Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism,' edited by Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis, and Howard Sankey. Routledge (2012).
This is an author-created final version.

The dispositional properties encountered in everyday experience seem to have causal bases in other properties, e.g.,... more The dispositional properties encountered in everyday experience seem to have causal bases in other properties, e.g., the microstructure of a vase is the causal basis of its fragility. In contrast, the Pure Dispositions Thesis maintains that some dispositions require no causal basis. This thesis faces the Problem of Being: without a causal basis, there appears to be no grounds for the existence of pure dispositions. This paper establishes criteria for evaluating the problem, critically examines four theories of the being of pure dispositions, and develops an explanation of how a pure disposition grounds itself via its own power.

An Argument for the Extrinsic Grounding of Mass

by William Bauer

Published in 'Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy' 74(1): 81-99 (2011).
This is an author-created final version.
Go to http://www.springerlink.com/content/bq42558l31112h16/ for the official published version.

Several philosophers of science and metaphysicians claim that the dispositional properties of fundamental particles,... more Several philosophers of science and metaphysicians claim that the dispositional properties of fundamental particles, such as the mass, charge, and spin of electrons, are ungrounded in any further properties. It is assumed by those making this argument that such properties are intrinsic, and thus if they are grounded at all they must be grounded intrinsically. However, this paper advances an argument, with one empirical premise and one metaphysical premise, for the claim that mass is extrinsically grounded and is thus an extrinsic disposition. Although the argument concerns mass characterized as a disposition, it applies equally well whether mass is a categorical or dispositional property; however, the dispositional nature of mass is relevant to some important objections and implications discussed.

Processes and Particles: The Impact of Classical Pragmatism on Contemporary Metaphysics

by Teed Rockwell

published in philosophical topics vol. 36, no. 1, spring 200

This article shows that contemporary debates in Analytic Metaphysics would be radically changed by considering the... more This article shows that contemporary debates in Analytic Metaphysics would be radically changed by considering the process philosophy defended by James, Dewey and Peirce. They offer a serious alternative to Kim's claim that "bits of matter and their aggregates" are all that exist. Kim's reductionism is not the only form of physicalism, indeed physics is arguably better explained as implying the existence of a fundamental process, rather than a set of fundamental particles. The article concludes with a thought experiment that shows that reductionism is based on some highly questionable speculations, not scientific facts.

A prolegomenon to the ontology of the Everett interpretation

by David Wallace

To appear in Alyssa Ney and David Z. Albert (ed.), The Wave Function: Essays in the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics (forthcoming)

In this article, I briefly explain the quantum measurement problem and the Everett (Many-Worlds) interpretation, in a... more In this article, I briefly explain the quantum measurement problem and the Everett (Many-Worlds) interpretation, in a way that is faithful to modern physics and yet accessible to readers without any physics training. I then consider the metaphysical lessons for ontology from quantum mechanics under the Everett interpretation. My conclusions are largely negative: I argue that very little can be said in full generality about the ontology of quantum mechanics, because quantum mechanics, like abstract classical mechanics, is a framework within which we can consider different physical theories which have very little in common at the level of ontology. Along the way I discuss, and criticise, several positive ontological proposals that have been made in the context of the Everett interpretation: ontologies based on the so-called "eigenstate-eigenvalue link", ontologies based on taking the "many-worlds" language seriously at the fundamental level, and ontologies that treat the wavefunction as a complex field on a high-dimensional space.

Concepts of Law of Nature

by Brendan Shea

This is my dissertation, which I successfully defended in May 2011.

Over the past 50 years, there has been a great deal of philosophical interest in laws of nature, perhaps because of... more Over the past 50 years, there has been a great deal of philosophical interest in laws of nature, perhaps because of the essential role that laws play in the formulation of, and
proposed solutions to, a number of perennial philosophical problems. For example,many have thought that a satisfactory account of laws could be used to resolve thorny
issues concerning explanation, causation, free-will, probability, and counterfactual truth.

Moreover, interest in laws of nature is not constrained to metaphysics or philosophy of science; claims about laws play essential roles in areas as diverse as the philosophy
of religion (e.g., in the argument from design) and the philosophy of mind (e.g., in the formulation of Davidson’s anomalous monism). In my dissertation, I consider and reject the widely-held thesis that the facts concerning laws can be reduced to the facts concerning the particular entities that the laws “govern,” and that the laws thus have no independent existence. I instead defend a version of nomic primitivism, according to which the facts about laws cannot be reducedto facts that are themselves non-nomic – i.e., to facts that do not fundamentally involve laws, counterfactuals, causes, etc. Insofar as the truth or falsity of reductionism about laws has implications for many of the problems mentioned above, I think that this result should be of interest even to those who who do not work in metaphysics or the philosophy of science.

My methodology, which I lay out and defend in Chapter One, is a version of Carnapian explication. This method emphasizes the importance of articulating and maintaining clear distinctions between (1) the vague concept (or concepts) law of nature inherent in ordinary language and scientific practice and (2) the precise analyses of “law of nature” that philosophers have proposed as potential replacements for this concept. I argue that metaphysics-as-explication has clear advantages over rival conceptions of metaphysical methodology; in particular, it allows us to formulate evaluative criteria for metaphysical claims.
In Chapter Two, I offer an example of how careful attention to concepts already in use can help resolve philosophical debate. Specifically, I argue that much recent literature has mistakenly assumed that there is only one concept of “law of nature” in use, while there are in fact at least two. Strong laws are the principles pursued by fundamental physics: they are true, objective, and bear distinctive relationships to counterfactuals
and explanation. Weak laws, by contrast, lack at least one of these distinctive characteristics but play central roles in both the “special sciences” and in everyday life.

In Chapters Three and Four, I offer extended arguments against the two most prominent versions of reductionism about laws – Humeanism and law necessitarianism. According to philosophical Humeans, the laws of nature supervene upon the non-modal, non-nomic facts concerning the behavior of particular things at particular times and places. Law necessitarians, by contrast, argue that the laws are in fact metaphysically
necessary, and that which laws there are is determined by a class of primitive, modally loaded facts concerning the essences, natures, or dispositions. I argue that both of these
views are mistaken insofar as they disagree with well-entrenched scientific practices and those in favor of reductionism have failed to provided sufficient reason for thinking that these practices should be revised. Much of my argument is focused on the role played by a number of supposed methodological principles, including appeals to intuition, parsimony, and methodological naturalism.
While the conclusions of this dissertation are explicitly constrained to laws, many of the arguments should be of interest to those who are concerned about philosophical
methodology (especially in the role of intuition in philosophical argument) or the
appropriate relation between metaphysics, science, and the philosophy of science.     

Specious Intrinsicalism

by Matt Barker

When traditional essentialism fails: biological natural kinds

by Matt Barker

Büyük ve Küçük Evrenlerdeki Paradokslar (Howard P. Kainz)

by Ilyas Altuner

Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 30, 2011

Yazar, Kant felsefesinde özel bir öneme sahip olan paradoks konusunu bilim felsefesinin önemli şahsiyetlerinin... more Yazar, Kant felsefesinde özel bir öneme sahip olan paradoks konusunu bilim felsefesinin önemli şahsiyetlerinin eserlerine başvurarak ele almakta ve konuyu bilimsel açıdan tartışmaktadır. Paradoksun çeşitli anlamları üzerinde durduktan sonra, felsefe ve bilim alanlarındaki paradokstan yani antinomiden bahsetmektedir. Bu yazıda, çağımızdaki bilimsel gelişmelerin daha önce filozoflar tarafından belli anlamda çözümlendiği ileri sürülmektedir. Bunun en güzel örneği Leibniz’in monad kuramıdır. Modern bilim, uzamsız ve kütlesiz atomlar olan kuarklardan bahsederek bu kuramı doğrulamıştır.

Challenging the Spacetime Structuralist

by Christian Wuthrich

published in _Philosophy of Science_ 76 (2009): 1039-1051

Structural realist interpretations of generally relativistic spacetimes have recently come to enjoy a remarkable... more Structural realist interpretations of generally relativistic spacetimes have recently come to enjoy a remarkable degree of popularity among philosophers. I present a challenge to these structuralist interpretations that arises from considering cosmological models in general relativity. As a consequence of their high degree of spacetime symmetry, these models resist a structuralist interpretation. I then evaluate the various strategies available to the structuralist to react to this challenge.

Physics, Metaphysics, and a Whiteheadian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: An Exploration

by Seth Miller

Undergraduate Thesis in Philosophy at the Colorado College

Whitehead died during the flurry of new discoveries from the quantum mechanics in the mid 1920's.  He did not... more Whitehead died during the flurry of new discoveries from the quantum mechanics in the mid 1920's.  He did not explicitly incorporate the new vision of the universe that was beginning to emerge from the scientific realm, but what if Whitehead were alive well into the 1990's?  How would Whitehead deal with the radical shifts in worldview brought by the quantum mechanics - and in particular, the experimental verification of Bell's Inequality by Alain Aspect in the 80's?  This essay attempts to explore these questions within a larger discussion concerning the relationship between physics and metaphysics.