Metaphysics of Consciousness

Consciousness and the causal paradox

by Max Velmans

This is a clean PDF of my reply to the final BBS commentary by Sam Rakover (1996) on my BBS target article Velmans, M. (1991) Is human information processing conscious? BBS 14:651-726. In his commentary Rakover makes the valid point that information moves between unconscious processing and consciousness in a continuous stream. Consequently, he argues, consciousness has an effect on subsequent unconscious processing. In my reply, I agree—but point out that in order to understand this one needs to resolve the causal paradox that, viewed from a first-person perspective, the contents of consciousness appear to have many causal effects on subsequent mental events and overt behaviour, while viewed from a purely third-person perspective conscious contents appear to be entirely epiphenomenal. I then suggest some first principles for resolving this paradox (which I developed in more detail in later writings, for example in my book Understanding Consciousness, 2000, 2009).

Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity—but... more Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity—but viewed from a third-person perspective consciousness appears to play no role in the activity of brains, producing a "causal paradox". To resolve this paradox one needs to distinguish consciousness of processing from consciousness accompanying processing or causing processing. Accounts of consciousness/brain causal interactions switch between first- and third-person perspectives. However, epistemically, the differences between first- and third-person access are fundamental. First- and third-person accounts are complementary and mutually irreducible.

Consciousness, causality and complementarity

by Max Velmans

This is a clean PDF of my reply to 5 continuing commentaries in the Behavioral and Brain Sciences on my 1991 target article that in various ways expand on the original 36 commentaries and my original reply.

This reply to five continuing commentaries on my 1991 target article on “Is human information processing conscious”... more This reply to five continuing commentaries on my 1991 target article on “Is human information processing conscious” focuses on six related issues: 1) whether focal attentive processing replaces consciousness as a causal agent in third-person viewable human information processing, 2) whether consciousness can be dissociated from human information processing, 3) continuing disputes about definitions of "consciousness" and about what constitutes a “conscious process”, 4) how observer-relativity in psychology relates (and does not relate) to relativity in physics, 5) whether the first-person viewable causal efficacy of consciousness counts as ‘real’ causal efficacy and 6) a clarification of the sense in which first- and third-person causal accounts of mental processing are complementary and mutually irreducible.

Call for papers - La rivoluzione interiore (XVI e XVII secolo)

by Lo Sguardo - Rivista di Filosofia

Il numero X de Lo Sguardo ha come oggetto i secoli XVI e XVII. Il tema che si intende approfondire è quello dell'interiorizzazione del mondo e dello sviluppo di una interiorità individuale nel periodo compreso tra Rinascimento e prima età moderna. A questo scopo il numero esplorerà la psicologia cinque-seicentesca soffermandosi in particolare su alcune facoltà “ausiliari” dell'intelletto quali la memoria, l'immaginazione, la fantasia, in relazione al processo di apprehensio, alla pratica degli esercizi spirituali e all'ideale dell'homo faber sui.

Lingue accettate: Italiano, Inglese, Francese, Spagnolo, Tedesco.
Deadline: 10/09/2012

Per maggiori informazioni scrivere a: redazione@losguardo.net.

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Call for papers - The Inner Revolution (16th and 17th century) [English version]

by Lo Sguardo - Rivista di Filosofia

This tenth issue of Lo Sguardo will be dedicated to the “inner revolution” of he 16th and 17th century; in particular it will delve into the matter of the interiorization of the world” and the development of an “individual interiority” in the period included betweenthe end of the Renaissance and the early modern Age. With this purpose the issue will consider the “psychology of the soul” livering over the role of the “auxialiry faculties” –such as memory, imagination, fantasy – in relation to the notion of apprehensio, to the practice of spiritual exercises and to the concept of homo faber sui.

Accepted languages: English, French, Italian, Spanish, German
Deadline for the delivery: September, 10th 2012

Please feel free to contact us for any further informations: redazione@losguardo.net

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Consciousness from a first-person perspective

by Max Velmans

This is a clean PDF of my reply to 36 peer reviews of my target article in BBS, 1991 “Is human information processing conscious?” As it develops quite a few themes that are fundamental to consciousness studies, I have added an Abstract and references so that it can be read as a stand-alone paper. As this paper tries to address all the points raised by the commentaries it ranges widely, and to assist easier reading it has been subdivided into sections that separate experimental issues from the more theoretical and philosophical issues. The commentators included many of the experimentalists and theoreticians that were prominent in consciousness studies at the time, including scientists such as Bernie Baars, Francis Crick, Christoph Koch, John Gardiner, Jeffrey Gray, Marcel Kinsbourne, Ben Libet, Dan Lloyd, George Mandler, Bruce Mangan, Norman Dixon, Howard Shevrin, Keith Stanovich, Geoff Underwood and philosophers such as Ned Block, Fred Dretske, Valery Hardcastle, Georges Rey, Aaron Sloman and Robert van Gulick. Viewed historically, it is interesting to see how confused the literature was at the time concerning how phenomenal consciousness relates to information processing and particularly to attentional processing. Viewed 20 years later, I would still make a similar defence of my original target article although many of the themes introduced in these two papers have now been elaborated in my subsequent writings.

This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?”... more This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1991, pp. 651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics in the reply roughly follows that of the target article. The discussion begins with a reconsideration of the details of the empirical findings, whether they can be extrapolated to non-laboratory settings, and the extent to which one can rely on their use of subjective reports. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of what is meant by “conscious processing” and of how phenomenal consciousness relates to attentional processing. We then turn to broader philosophical and theoretical issues. I point out some of the reasons why I do not support epiphenomenalism, dualist-interactionism, or reductionism, and elaborate on how first- and third-person views of the mind can be regarded as complementary and mutually irreducible. I suggest how the relation of conscious experiences to their neural correlates can be understood in terms of a dual-aspect theory of information, and how this might be used to resolve some of the paradoxes surrounding the causal interactions of consciousness and brain. I also suggest that, viewed from a first-person perspective, consciousness gives purpose to existence, which allows a different way of viewing its role in evolution.

Reflexive monism

by Max Velmans

This is a summary of some of the main features of reflexive monism published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 2008. Some further implications of reflexive monism considered as an integrative philosophical system are summarised in "Reflexive Monism: psychophysical relations among mind, matter, and consciousness" due to be published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in October 2012

Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in... more Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense.

Goodbye to Reductionism

by Max Velmans

This paper is based on a plenary talk given at a conference on "Toward a Science of Consciousness: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates" at the University of Arizona in 1996, which was followed by a public debate with the philosopher John Searle. Given the predominance of physicalist reductionism within consciousness studies at that time, the anti-reductionist approach taken in this talk and paper was quite radical. However the challenges posed to reductionism were very simple ones--which, in my view, have never been adequately addressed.

This paper argues that within consciousness studies, dualist vs. reductionist debates typically characterise... more This paper argues that within consciousness studies, dualist vs. reductionist debates typically characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience, and that to understand consciousness one must start with an accurate description of its phenomenology. Only then can one develop an understanding of how experiences viewed from a first-person perspective relate to events in the brain viewed from a third-person perspective. The paper then lists some common arguments for conscious experiences (accurately described) being nothing more than brain states along with their fallacies. It concludes that there are fundamental problems with ontological reductionism of conscious experiences to brain states that cannot be resolved.

The Last Magic Show: A Blind Brain Theory of the Appearance of Consciousness

by Scott Bakker

Draft

According to the latest estimates, the human brain performs some 38 000 trillion operations per second. When you... more According to the latest estimates, the human brain performs some 38 000 trillion operations per second. When you compare this to the amount of information that reaches conscious awareness, the disproportion becomes nothing short of remarkable. What are the consequences of this radical informatic asymmetry? The Blind Brain Theory of the Appearance of Consciousness (BBT) represents an attempt to 'explain away' several of the most perplexing features of consciousness in terms of information loss and depletion. The first-person perspective, it argues, is the expression of the kinds and quantities of information that, for a variety of structural and developmental reasons, cannot be accessed by the 'conscious brain.' Puzzles as profound and persistent as the now, personal identity, conscious unity, and most troubling of all, intentionality, could very well be kinds of illusions foisted on conscious awareness by different versions of the informatic limitation expressed, for instance, in the boundary of your visual field. By explaining away these phenomena, BTT separates the question of consciousness from the question of how consciousness appears, and so drastically narrows the so-called explanatory gap. If true, it solves the hard problem. But at what cost?

I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2012). I can’t get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, in press.

Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness”... more Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness” worth solving in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I defend Chalmers against Dennett on this point: I argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, that it is distinct in kind from the so-called easy problems, and that it is vital for the sake of honest and productive research in the cognitive sciences to be clear about the difference. But I have my own rebuke for Chalmers on the point of explanation. Chalmers (1995, 1996) proposes to “solve” the hard problem of consciousness by positing qualia as fundamental features of the universe, alongside such ontological basics as mass and space-time. But this is an inadequate solution: to posit, I will urge, is not to explain. To bolster this view, I borrow from an account of explanation by which it must provide “epistemic satisfaction” to be considered successful (Rowlands, 2001; Campbell, 2009), and show that Chalmers’ proposal fails on this account. I conclude that research in the science of consciousness cannot move forward without greater conceptual clarity in the field.

Book review of T. Rego, La filosofía del sentido común según Aristóteles. Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, 2011. 137pp.

by David Torrijos-Castrillejo

"Anuario Filosófico" 45 (2012) 203-206

Rego compare Aristotle with a contemporary philosopher, Antonio Livi. He searchs his realism (that stands under the... more Rego compare Aristotle with a contemporary philosopher, Antonio Livi. He searchs his realism (that stands under the name of "philosophy of common sense or alethic logic") in Aristotelian philosophy. So he looks for the material logic in Aristotle.
The first part deals with the common sense in the methodology of Aristotle, while the second reviews the verification of the five judgments implicitly made ​​by common sense according to Livi.

Realistic Materialism

by Galen Strawson

'Realistic Materialist Monism' (1999)

by Galen Strawson

brief version of 'Real materialism' given at Tucson III, 1998. brief version of 'Real materialism' given at Tucson III, 1998.

'Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap' (1998)

by Galen Strawson

'The Experiential and the Non-Experiential' (1994)

by Galen Strawson

in The Mind-Body Problem edited by T. Szubka & R. Warner (Oxford: Blackwell), pp 69–86

Book Review of Pereboom - Prospects of Physicalism

by Tom McClelland

Forthcoming in The Journal of Consciousness Studies

Review of Derk Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism Review of Derk Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

Problems for the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness

by Ben Phillips

Draft (comments welcome)

How Does the Brain Produce a Sense of Self? Contribution of Prefrontal Executive Processes to Creating a Sense of Self

by William Hirstein

Il fenomeno e l'altro. Husserl e la trasformazione intersoggettiva della filosofia trascendentale

by Marco Cavallaro

Tesi di Laurea Triennale
Realtore: Prof. Mario Ruggenini

Even zombies get the blues+: The phenomenal concept strategy and the epistemology of the explanatory gap

by Evan Westra

How to Combine Experiential Subjects

by Luke Roelofs

This is an exploration of whether a certain problem that people have said afflicts panpsychist accounts of... more This is an exploration of whether a certain problem that people have said afflicts panpsychist accounts of consciousness is really as bad as they say. The problem is how the multitude of conscious subjects associated with material particles could combine to form cohesive large-scale subjects like human beings. I don't think the paper resolves the problem by any means, but it argues that the problem is probably soluble.