Metaphysics

How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption?

by Nils Kürbis

published in Teorema XXXI/2 (2012), pp.5-19.

The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a... more The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of providing a logical basis for metaphysics only relies on the restricted assumption.

Black's "Twin Globe" Counterexample

by William Ferraiolo

Dil, Anlamlandırma ve Yorumlama Üzerine Bir Deneme

by Ilyas Altuner

Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 2012

Bizim bu yazıda bahsetmeye çalıştığımız konu, daha çok metaontolojik ya da metafizik alan üzerinde yoğunlaşacaktır.... more Bizim bu yazıda bahsetmeye çalıştığımız konu, daha çok metaontolojik ya da metafizik alan üzerinde yoğunlaşacaktır. Nesnelerin kendinde varlığını bilemesek bile, en azından, dile gelmeyen bir şeylerden bahsediyoruz. Öyleyse bilemediğimiz alana ait yargılarımızın, bildiğimiz olgular alanıyla ilişkisi dolayısıyla az çok yorumlanabileceğini göz ardı etmememiz gerekir. Kendinde dünyanın yani numenin anlamını somut dünya tasarımıyla elde etmeye çabalamanın boşuna olacağı kesindir. Ancak bu durum, numen dünyasının araştırılmaması ve kendinde varlık alanının ne olduğu konusunda düşünmeye son verilmesi gerektiği manasını taşımaz. Çünkü somut dünya tasarımımızda sürekli değişen ve her değiştiğinde de anlamını değiştiren bir durum söz konusudur.

Genealogie del senso. Deleuze Lettore Di Husserl

by Fabio Treppiedi

Saggio sulla donazione di senso e sulla genesi del signifcato a partire dalla critica deleuziana del trascendentale in Husserl, in "Giornale di Metafisica" 1/2010

Deleuze’s theory of paradoxical constitution of sense is closely connected to Husserl’s Sinngebung. The fundamental... more Deleuze’s theory of paradoxical constitution of sense is closely connected to Husserl’s Sinngebung. The fundamental element of this connection is the return to a stoic conception of meaning as something “expressed”. Through an analytical comparison between Deleuze’s Logic of sense and Husserl’s Idea I, this article describes Deleuze’s Auseinandersetzung regarding the problem of expression in Husserl. In this connection, in his reading of Logical researches, Ideas I and Cartesian meditations, in fact, Deleuze radically criticizes some Husserlian “presuppositions” that could not make it possible to break with doxa. Deleuze’s interpretation – which admittedly deforms Husserl’s theoretical stance – outlines a particular relationship between “expression” and “signification” that Husserl, according to Deleuze, had not seen: this relationship is based on the key rule of nonsense in the transcendental determinability of sense and signification.

"Critica dell'assunzione" e "Costruzione metodica". Prospettive sull'empirismo trascendentale di Deleuze

by Fabio Treppiedi

Saggio critico sulle eredità humeane e kantiane di Deleuze , in "Giornale di metafisica", 1/2011

An Analysis of Some Mirroring Principles

by Matt Leonard

Work in progress. Still very rough.

A lot of people think that the mereological structure of material objects is perfectly mirrored by and is a perfect... more A lot of people think that the mereological structure of material objects is perfectly mirrored by and is a perfect mirror of the spacetime regions which host the objects (i.e., their locations). A number of principles have been offered in attempt to capture this thought. In this paper, I offer an analysis of some of my own principles as well as some offered by Achille Varzi.

Concepts in Complexity II: Emergence and the Difference Between Order and Organization

by Jon Lawhead

Still very much a draft. 

This paper would not have been possible without the help of Daniel Estrada and Tim Ignaffo.

There are a number of contemporary scientific problems that can benefit from good metaphysical analysis and... more There are a number of contemporary scientific problems that can benefit from good metaphysical analysis and philosophical clarification.  This paper examines one of these problems—explaining the nature of self-organized emergent behavior in dynamical physical systems.  While discussions of emergence have long been the province of metaphysicians, recent advances in network theory and complex systems theory have begun to suggest that there is both philosophical and metaphysical work to be done here, and that a rigorous, mathematically-grounded account of emergence might serve as the foundation upon which we can construct a tremendous number of other novel contributions to our understanding of the world. 

This paper explores the conceptual connection between this mathematically rigorous account of “strong emergence” (developed primarily by Yaneer Bar-Yam) and the still somewhat murky notion of self-organized systems.  I argue that a clear scientific understanding of emergence leads to a natural way of understanding the metaphysics of self-organization and (more generally) the difference between order and organization.  All three of these notions are central to the nascent field of complex systems theory, and getting a strong grasp on their conceptual relationships would represent not only a significant step toward developing a cohesive metaphysics of complex systems, but would also provide the theoretical tools necessary for continued philosophical and scientific work in that area. 

Given the sheer number (and diversity) of fields that stand to benefit from complexity-theoretic insights, this is work that urgently needs to be done.

Hegels Theorie der Intelligenz als Grundlegung der Unmöglichkeit des Unvernünftigen

by Hector Ferreiro

Paper read at the Conference “Irrationalität: Schattenseite der Moderne”,
7. Jahrestagung des Internationalen Forschungsnetzwerks Transzendentalphilosophie - Deutscher Idealismus, Technische Universität Berlin, Germany, February 19-21, 2009.

Univocism and Monadology in Post-Avicennan Iranian Philosophy: Mulla Sadra Shirazi and the Philosophical Development of Ibn al-'Arabi's Gnosis (Spanish)

by Carlos Segovia

"Univocismo y monadología en el pensamiento iraní postaviceniano: La prosecución filosófica del 'irfan de Ibn al-'Arabi en la obra de Mulla Sadra Shirazi," Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 18 (2001) 78-108.

Univocism and Monadology in Post-Avicennan Iranian Philosophy: Mulla Sadra Shirazi's Ishraqi Hermeneutics of Ibn 'Arabi's Gnosis and His Discussion of Avicennan Ontology

by Carlos Segovia

in: Endoxa. Series Filosóficas 16 (2002) 295-209.

Cause and Effect

by Shannon Nason

Rough draft of a paper to appear in Kierkegaard's Concepts, ed. Jon Stewart (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company, forthcoming)

I offer an analysis of the concept of cause and effect in Kierkegaard's thought. Particular attention is given to... more I offer an analysis of the concept of cause and effect in Kierkegaard's thought. Particular attention is given to Kierkegaard's metaphysical views about efficient and final causation

« Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) » (2002)

by Michel Weber

« Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) », in Mander, W. J. and Sell, A. P. F. (Senior Editors), Dictionary of Nineteenth-Century British Philosophers, Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 2002, Vol. II, pp. 1236-1241.

Mathematical philosopher, born on 15 February 1861, at Ramsgate (Kent) and deceased 30 December 1947, at Cambridge... more Mathematical philosopher, born on 15 February 1861, at Ramsgate (Kent) and deceased 30 December 1947, at Cambridge (Massachusetts, United States). Whitehead entered Trinity College in 1880 with a scholarship in mathematics; in 1884, he was elected Fellow in Mathematics with a dissertation (now lost) on Maxwell’s Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism and started teaching mathematics and mathematical physics.

Recension de "Le ciment des choses" de Claudine Tiercelin

by Raphaël Millière

publié dans REPHA n°5, printemps 2012

Science and Transcendence: Westphal, Derrida, and Responsibility

by Nathan Kowalsky

published in 'Zygon:  Journal of Religion and Science', March 2012.

A full copy of the paper is available from the author upon request.

On the naive reading, “radical social constructivism” would be the result of “deconstructing” science. Science would... more On the naive reading, “radical social constructivism” would be the result of “deconstructing” science. Science would simply be a contingent construction in accordance with social determinants. However, postmodernism does not necessarily abandon fidelity to the objects of thought. Merold Westphal's Derridean philosophy of religion emphasizes that even theology need not eliminate the transcendence of the divine other. By drawing an analogy between natural and supernatural transcendence, I argue that science is similarly called to responsibility in the encounter with that which lies outside its horizon of expectation. Science's rational autonomy is overcome by the heteronomy of realities that precede it. Understanding species as homeostatic property clusters is an example of nonessentialist, postmodern, and scientific realism. Science is still a vehicle for encountering natural alterity, thus decentering the relativism thought to characterize postmodernism. However, natural science must not attempt to place the whole of being at human disposal if it is to fulfill the potential of Westphal's philosophy of religion.

The Paradox of the Present

by Narve Strand

Opuscula 2, 2000: 39-55

Augustine on Predestination and Divine Simplicity: The Problem of Compatibility

by Narve Strand

Studia Patristica, 38, 2001: 290-305

Śrī Harṣa contra Hegel: Monism, Skeptical Method, and the Limits of Reason

by Ayon Maharaj

Forthcoming in Philosophy East and West

This essay brings Śrī Harṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya (c. 1170) into dialogue with Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes... more This essay brings Śrī Harṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya (c. 1170) into dialogue with Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), identifying salient points of affinity and divergence in the monistic metaphysics and skeptical methodologies of two thinkers working in entirely different traditions and separated by over six hundred years. Remarkably, both Śrī Harṣa and Hegel attempt to defend a monistic standpoint exclusively by means of a sustained critique of non-monistic philosophical positions. I will argue, however, that Śrī Harṣa and Hegel diverge sharply in their specific views on the powers and limits of philosophy and on the precise nature of monistic reality. In stark contrast to Hegel, Śrī Harṣa claims that the non-dual reality of Brahman lies beyond reason and hence rejects the very possibility of a philosophical justification of monism. Moreover, while Hegel drives a wedge between thought and empirical praxis by assuming the radical “independence of reason,” Śrī Harṣa insists that how we think and reason depends on the nature of our mind, which is itself conditioned by how we live.

In seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein: Toward a Recuperation of Hegel's Metaphysics of Agency

by Ayon Maharaj

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 11.1 (Fall 2006), 225-255.

This essay argues for a distinctly post-Kantian understanding of Hegel's definition of freedom as "being at home... more This essay argues for a distinctly post-Kantian understanding of Hegel's definition of freedom as "being at home with oneself in one's other." I first briefly isolate the inadequacies of some dominant interpretations of Hegelian freedom and proceed to develop a more adequate theoretical frame by turning to Theodor Adorno. Then I interpret Hegel's notion of the freedom of the will in the Philosophy of Right in terms of his speculative metaphysics. Finally, I briefly examine Hegel's treatment of agency in the Phenomenology of Spirit in order to establish important continuities between the early and late Hegel.

Quidquid Movetur, Ab Alio Movetur: On the Insufficiency of Strawson's “Basic Argument” to Invalidate the Thomistic Recognition of Moral Responsibility

by Thomas Sundaram

Written for a class offered in Fall 2010 by Fr. Anselm Ramelow at the Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology, "Do We Have Free Will?"

Galen Strawson has offered, with his modification of the Basic Argument, an intriguing argument with a deceptively... more Galen Strawson has offered, with his modification of the Basic Argument, an intriguing argument with a deceptively simple appearance for the refutation of moral responsibility and ultimately free will. It seems to stand up to a great deal of criticism. Nevertheless, it seems also to presume a great deal with regard to the metaphysical origin of morality, particularly in the notion of the moral agent and in his notion of "desert." I investigate the terms and notion of causality used in his argument and attempt to demonstrate that it does not apply to an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical and ethical frame.

Death's Distinctive Harm

by Stephan Blatti

American Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming, 2012)

Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue... more Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue this harm thesis (HT) from Epicurus’s challenge. Disagreements focus on two of the three issues that any defense of HT must resolve: the subject of death’s harm and the timing of its injury. About the nature of death’s harm, however, a consensus has emerged around the view that death harms a subject (when it does) by depriving her of the goods life would’ve afforded had she continued living. This deprivation view of death’s harm (DV) derives some of its credibility from the general deprivation theory of which it is an instance: mortal harm is subject to the same kind of analysis plausibly given of other non-mortal harms. Furthermore, note that the weak formulation of HT—asserting only that death can inflict harm, not that it always or necessarily does—accommodates the intuition that instances of rational suicide and justifiable euthanasia present cases in which death fails to harm. DV is equipped to explain how in these cases the harms involved in continued existence outweigh the goods of which death deprives the subject. I agree that suicide can be rational and that euthanasia can be justifiable. Likewise I accept both HT and DV as far as they go. But they do not go far enough. Specifically, I argue here that death harms even those who die as a result of rational suicide or justifiable euthanasia; that death’s harm is neither undifferentiated nor wholly contingent, but multifaceted and partly necessary; that the necessary part of death’s harm is distinctive, inflicting a peculiar restriction on the autonomy of one who dies; and, regarding the timing and subject issues, that this restriction harm is inflicted on the antemortem subject prior to her death.