Metaphysical Realism

God as Ipsum Intelligere Subsistens in Aquinas's De Potentia

by Andrew Haines

Presented at 2011 Patristics, Medieval & Renaissance Conference (Villanova University)

Why Hume Cannot Be a Realist

by Jani Hakkarainen

Revised version of the paper that I gave in Belief and Doubt in Hume conference in Prague, September 2011.

In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive... more In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy), paragraphs 15 to 16 (1748). The argument concludes with the contradiction between consistent reasoning (causal, in particular) and believing in the existence of Real entities. The problem with the Realist readings of Hume is that they attribute both to Hume. So their Hume is a self-reflectively inconsistent philosopher. I show that the various Realist ways to avoid this problem do not work. So this paper suggests a non-Realist interpretation of Hume's philosophy: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgment on Metaphysical Realism. As such, his philosophical attitude is neutral on the divide between materialism and idealism.

Some Convergences and Divergences in the Realism of Charles Peirce and Ayn Rand

by Marc Champagne

Published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Fall 2006), pp. 19-39.

Structured around Charles S. Peirce's three-fold categorical scheme, this article proposes a comparative study of Ayn... more Structured around Charles S. Peirce's three-fold categorical scheme, this article proposes a comparative study of Ayn Rand and Peirce's realist views in general metaphysics. Rand's stance is seen as diverging with Peirce's argument from asymptotic representation but converging with arguments from brute relation and neutral category. It is argued that, by dismissing traditional subject-object dualisms, Rand and Peirce both propose iconoclastic construals of what it means to be real, dismissals made all the more noteworthy by the fact each chose to ground them in indissoluble triads of self-evident first principles.