Metaethics

Agency, Necessity, and Normativity

by Antti Kauppinen

This is a draft of a paper that was originally to be a blog post, but grew too long. Comments would be very welcome.

According to constitutivists like Korsgaard and Velleman, moral requirements can be (roughly speaking) derived from... more According to constitutivists like Korsgaard and Velleman, moral requirements can be (roughly speaking) derived from what is constitutive of agency, so we have internal reason to act morally simply in virtue of being agents. This is challenged by David Enoch, who argues that even if agency is inescapable and has a constitutive aim, it doesn't follow we have reason to care about or act on it. I argue that while Enoch's criticisms hit the mark, it may be possible to formulate a requirement of rationality that allows a kind of successful bootstrapping from agency to reasons even though we have no reason to be agents.

Tempered Internalism and the Participatory Stance

by Kate Manne

Foundations for Moral Relativism

by J. David Velleman

I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually... more I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually incompatible, but equally valid moralities.

Is Gibbard a Realist?

by Laura Schroeter

co-authored with François Schroeter
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2005

Gibbard (2003) argues that his norm expressivist theory can vindicate realism: moral terms serve to pick out a natural... more Gibbard (2003) argues that his norm expressivist theory can vindicate realism: moral terms serve to pick out a natural property. We argue that Gibbard fails to capture what's distinctive about the realist position.

Do Moral Realists Need Convergence?

by Laura Schroeter

(with François Schroeter)

Doe a moral realist need to posit ideal convergence in moral judgments? Richard Boyd has argued that moral realists... more Doe a moral realist need to posit ideal convergence in moral judgments? Richard Boyd has argued that moral realists don't need to accept that all competent speakers will converge in their moral judgments, if they opt for a certain type of externalist account of the reference of moral terms. Boyd's account has been highly influential: even realists who reject naturalistic and causal aspects of his account have taken his approach as a template for reference determination for moral terms (e.g. Sayre-McCord, van Roojen). But a closer examination of Boyd’s account of reference and the ways it could be developed or modified, we’ll argue, suggests that explaining co-reference without convergence in the moral domain is a much more challenging problem than many realists have supposed.

How Desires Might Matter: The Veto Power of Desire

by Kate Manne

Draft paper, revised version of a thesis chapter.

Mill, Intuitions, and Normativity

by Christopher Macleod

Forthcoming, Utilitas

It is the purpose of this paper to offer an account of Mill’s metaethics. Expanding upon clues given recently by Dale... more It is the purpose of this paper to offer an account of Mill’s metaethics. Expanding upon clues given recently by Dale Miller, and previously by John Skorupski, I suggest that when it comes to the foundations of his philosophy, Mill might share more with the intuitionists than we are accustomed to think. Common wisdom holds that Mill had no time for the normativity of intuitions. I wish to dispute, or at least temper, this dogma, by claiming that Mill’s attitude towards intuitions is far more complex and ambivalent than is generally thought. The investigation, then, centres on the question of whether, for Mill, intuitions carry normative warrant: whether, in itself, the fact that a belief is intuitional provides reason to think that belief a warranted one. I argue that, according to Mill, our belief in the reliability of inductive moves and apparent memories, as well as the desirability of pleasure, is vindicated by something akin to intuition. Although his endorsement of the normativity of these intuitions might seem to be in tension with the arguments he offers against the ‘intuitionist school’, this tension is only apparent.

What's really wrong with (belief based) ethical relativism

by David Hunter

Draft paper - still likely to be revised further before submission

While typically given short shrift by philosophers various versions of what I will refer to as naïve moral relativism... more While typically given short shrift by philosophers various versions of what I will refer to as naïve moral relativism such as ethical subjectivism and cultural relativism are quite popular outside philosophical circles with both academics and non-academics. In this paper I will critique common philosophical objections to these positions and then develop a new objection, referred that in effect in some circumstances these positions must affirm that both A & ~A are simultaneously true. The basic form of my argument is that someone who believes that the truth of ethical claims is true only relative to the beliefs of an individual or group is committed to claiming that in some situations both A and ~A are true, since a specific individual or group could believe both A and ~A to be true, either through mistaken reasoning, a lack of knowledge or through an irresolvable attachment to contradictory intuitions. I will then see how this objection fares against more sophisticated versions of moral relativism such as that advanced by Gilbert Harman and conclude that this new objection shows us that versions of moral relativism that relate the truth of ethical claims to beliefs result in logical contradiction.

Is Reasons Internalism Counter-Intuitive?

by Kate Manne

Draft paper; comments sought.

W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, Knowing about Right and Wrong: Why Is It Wrong to Kill Innocent People? International Journal of Decision Ethics, 7.2 (2011).

by W Julian Korab-Karpowicz

In this article I challenge the positivist view that ethical statements are merely an expression of our emotions or... more In this article I challenge the positivist view that ethical statements are merely an expression of our emotions or preferences. I consider a moral statement, “Killing innocent civilians is wrong,” and argue that such a statement is a truthful moral norm. I show that what is fundamental to agreement in the realm of both facts and morals is a commonly shared attitude that determines human relatedness to the world. Scientific knowledge is a partial knowledge based on indifference, the state of mind that constitutes scientific attitude. However, knowledge in morals does not presuppose indifference, but love. Once we accept that our thoughts and feelings are not incommunicable, we can arrive at inter-subjective and non-objective moral knowledge which results from our recognition of others as persons and our affective engagement with the world.

Negation and Disjunction in Expressivist Semantics

by Alex Silk

Charles Taylor and ethical naturalism

by Nigel DeSouza

This short conference paper raises the question as to whether Charles Taylor can endorse the ethical naturalism of... more This short conference paper raises the question as to whether Charles Taylor can endorse the ethical naturalism of John McDowell and David Wiggins. It first tries to show how, despite recognizing that McDowell and Wiggins defend the reality of moral/ethical values in a manner congenial to his defence of moral phenomenology, Taylor fails to recognize how their understanding of naturalism is equally congenial to his objectives. The paper then turns to how the latter is true only up to a certain point: Taylor believes that an essential part of moral phenomenology is articulacy about values/goods, and this involves what he calls constitutive goods and moral sources. It is here where it appears Taylor must part ways with ethical naturalism.

Modern Fictionalism

by Mark Eli Kalderon

Respecting Value

by Mark Eli Kalderon

Respecting Value A paper presented to the conference In Pursuit of Reason: Engaging Joseph Raz on Reason and Value

by Mark Eli Kalderon

Moral fictionalism, the Frege-Geach problem, and reasonable inference

by Mark Eli Kalderon

Open questions and the manifest image

by Mark Eli Kalderon

Heuristic techniques for variable and value ordering in CSPs

by Malek Mouhoub

Malek Mouhoub, Bahareh Jafari Jashmi: Heuristic techniques for variable and value ordering in CSPs. GECCO 2011: 457-464

A Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) is a powerful framework for representing and solving constraint problems. When... more A Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) is a powerful framework for representing and solving constraint problems. When solving a CSP using a backtrack search method, one important factor that reduces the size of the search space drastically is the order in which variables and values are examined. Many heuristics for static and dynamic variable ordering have been proposed and the most popular and powerful are those that gather information about the failures during the constraint propagation phase, in the form of constraint weights. These later heuristics are called conflict driven heuristics. In this paper, we propose two of these heuristics respectively based on Hill Climbing (HC) and Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) for weighing constraints. In addition, we propose two new value ordering techniques, respectively based on HC and ACO, that rank the values based on their ability to satisfy the constraints attached to their corresponding variables. Several experiments were conducted on various types of problems including random, quasi random and patterned problems. The results show that the proposed variable ordering heuristics, are successful especially in the case of hard random problems. Also, when using the proposed value and variable ordering together, we can improve the performance particularly in the case of random problems.

Thesis - A Fregean Response to Moore and Altman

by Sean Martin

The philosophical sower

by Tawadeen Bankole

A philosophical medly A philosophical medly