A most rare achievement: Dennett’s scientific discovery in Content and Consciousness
by Don Ross
Forthcoming in C. Munoz-Suarez & F. De Brigard, eds., CONTENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS 2.0
The paper re-visits Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), after four decades of developments... more The paper re-visits Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), after four decades of developments in cognitive science and related disciplines. It first argues that in that book Dennett reported a scientifically significant discovery about what minds are. This initially seems implausible, because at first sight C&C presents as an exercise in pure philosophical analysis of everyday discourse about the mental, and that is a profoundly unlikely method for achieving scientific progress. However, a reading of the text and its context is proposed that explains this apparent miracle. The pure philosophical analysis indulged in C&C merely serves to blunt the force of previous philosophy, for the benefit of those who might find it persuasive. Thereafter, the positive discovery for which Dennett deserves credit comes as a specimen of the only kind of contribution to objective knowledge to which any philosopher (qua philosopher) can aspire: unification of empirical findings. The paper then argues that because C&C does not try to integrate its unifying suggestions with any considerations from physics, it fails to offer a satisfying metaphysical account of the mental, even though most philosophical readers would see that as having been one of its central ambitions. Two decades after he wrote C&C, however, Dennett showed how to begin to close that gap. The paper closes with reflections on differences between Dennett's view of the potential contribution of philosophy to science and the view of James Ladyman and Don Ross.
Download (.pdf) Armstrong's Conception of Supervenience
published in 'Problems from Armstrong', Acta Philosophica Fennica 84.
In this article, I will focus on the notion of supervenience introduced and deployed by Armstrong. The aim is to... more In this article, I will focus on the notion of supervenience introduced and deployed by Armstrong. The aim is to settle the issue of whether it has any fruitful applications. My conclusions are negative. Armstrong gives to his notion of supervenience a major explanatory role of telling why one need not consider certain beings as a genuine ontic expansion, if one already assumes a certain meagre set of more basic entities. On closer inspection, however, Armstrong’s notion does not clarify such intuitions any further. The legitimate uses of the notion for the above purpose turn out to be redundant: the concepts of identity and partial identity can be employed instead.