Meta-Ethics

Brief summary of the doctoral dissertation — Ethics and value-reality. Aurel Kolnai's legacy: an analytic ethic based on the phenomenology of value-consciousness and moral awareness.

by Chris Bessemans

What's really wrong with (belief based) ethical relativism

by David Hunter

Draft paper - still likely to be revised further before submission

While typically given short shrift by philosophers various versions of what I will refer to as naïve moral relativism... more While typically given short shrift by philosophers various versions of what I will refer to as naïve moral relativism such as ethical subjectivism and cultural relativism are quite popular outside philosophical circles with both academics and non-academics. In this paper I will critique common philosophical objections to these positions and then develop a new objection, referred that in effect in some circumstances these positions must affirm that both A & ~A are simultaneously true. The basic form of my argument is that someone who believes that the truth of ethical claims is true only relative to the beliefs of an individual or group is committed to claiming that in some situations both A and ~A are true, since a specific individual or group could believe both A and ~A to be true, either through mistaken reasoning, a lack of knowledge or through an irresolvable attachment to contradictory intuitions. I will then see how this objection fares against more sophisticated versions of moral relativism such as that advanced by Gilbert Harman and conclude that this new objection shows us that versions of moral relativism that relate the truth of ethical claims to beliefs result in logical contradiction.

Aristotele, Metafisica - Giordano Bruno, De l'Infinito: confronto e commento.

by Stefano Ulliana

W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, Knowing about Right and Wrong: Why Is It Wrong to Kill Innocent People? International Journal of Decision Ethics, 7.2 (2011).

by W Julian Korab-Karpowicz

In this article I challenge the positivist view that ethical statements are merely an expression of our emotions or... more In this article I challenge the positivist view that ethical statements are merely an expression of our emotions or preferences. I consider a moral statement, “Killing innocent civilians is wrong,” and argue that such a statement is a truthful moral norm. I show that what is fundamental to agreement in the realm of both facts and morals is a commonly shared attitude that determines human relatedness to the world. Scientific knowledge is a partial knowledge based on indifference, the state of mind that constitutes scientific attitude. However, knowledge in morals does not presuppose indifference, but love. Once we accept that our thoughts and feelings are not incommunicable, we can arrive at inter-subjective and non-objective moral knowledge which results from our recognition of others as persons and our affective engagement with the world.

More Seminal Ethics Implications

by Mark Singer

Tandem works include: "Seminal Ethics," "Kant Concept Art," "Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications" - also on this site.

These implications are: moral, epistemology, love, happiness, time and space, psychological, art, education, medical, economic, war, capital punishment, and abortion.

"Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications" includes additional categories.

Charles Taylor and ethical naturalism

by Nigel DeSouza

This short conference paper raises the question as to whether Charles Taylor can endorse the ethical naturalism of... more This short conference paper raises the question as to whether Charles Taylor can endorse the ethical naturalism of John McDowell and David Wiggins. It first tries to show how, despite recognizing that McDowell and Wiggins defend the reality of moral/ethical values in a manner congenial to his defence of moral phenomenology, Taylor fails to recognize how their understanding of naturalism is equally congenial to his objectives. The paper then turns to how the latter is true only up to a certain point: Taylor believes that an essential part of moral phenomenology is articulacy about values/goods, and this involves what he calls constitutive goods and moral sources. It is here where it appears Taylor must part ways with ethical naturalism.

The Hebrew Bible and meta-ethics

by Jaco Gericke

Ethical Pragmatism

by Raff Donelson

Working draft

Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, I motivate, explain, and attempt to defend a... more Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, I motivate, explain, and attempt to defend a view I call Ethical Pragmatism. Ethical Pragmatism is the view that we can and should carry on our practice of moral deliberation without reference to moral facts, if such entities exist, or more broadly, without reference to metaethics. The defense I mount in the paper tries to show that neither prior commitments about moral motivation, nor suspicions about the tenability of fact-value distinctions, nor doubts about the viability of global pragmatism, nor worries about the ‘force’ of ethical injunctions without reference to moral facts, nor superficial similarities between Ethical Pragmatism and objectionable ethical quasi-realism constitute good reason to reject Ethical Pragmatism.

Normativity and Best Explanations

by Benjamin Wald

Contextualism in Ethics

by Gunnar Björnsson

Forthcoming in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFolette, Wiley-Blackwell

http://www.hughlafollette.com/IEE.htm

Philosophical Utilitarianism

by Ben Bradley

Forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism (Continuum), ed. James Crimmins and Douglas Long.

Subjective Rationality and Its Value (Blind Review Format)*

by Michael Neal

Updated. Comments Appreciated.

Niko Kolodny makes the following claims. Claim 1: We don’t have reason, in general, to comply with rational... more Niko Kolodny makes the following claims. Claim 1: We don’t have reason, in general, to comply with rational requirements for their own sake. Claim 2: Even if we do have reason to comply with rational requirements, in general, for their own sake, it doesn’t follow that we have that same reason in any particular case. In this paper, I argue that both Claim 1 and Claim 2 are false. I provide a novel argument which explains why we have reason to comply with rational requirements (for their own sake) both in general, and in particular cases. The general structure of my argument looks like this:

The Value Argument
P1: If doing something would produce (or, constitute) something of (at least) pro tanto final value (where ‘final’ just means ‘valuable for its own sake’ and, thus, not merely instrumentally valuable), then that is, ceteris paribus, a reason to do it.
P2: Being subjectively rational (i.e. complying with rational requirements) is an achievement.
P3: Achievements have pro tanto final value.
Therefore, we have reason to be subjectively rational, for its own sake, both in general, and in particular cases.

In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle

by Simon Rippon

Published in the Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 2011. Open access.

I make the observation that English sentences such as “You have reason to take the bus or to take the train” do not... more I make the observation that English sentences such as “You have reason to take the bus or to take the train” do not have the logical form that they superficially appear to have. I find in these sentences a conjunctive use of “or,” as found in sentences like “You can have milk or lemon in your tea,” which gives you a permission to have milk, and a permission to have lemon, though no permission to have both. I argue that a confusion of genuine disjunctions with sentences of the above form has motivated the mistaken acceptance by some philosophers of principles like the one I call “Liberal Transmission.” This is the principle that if you have a reason to do something, then you have a reason to do it in each of the possible ways in which it can be done (though not more than one of them). I argue that Liberal Transmission and its close relatives are false. Wide-scope reasons are defined as reasons that have a conditional or other logical connective within the scope of the reason operator. For example, a wide-scope instrumental reason might be: reason(if you have an end, take the means). By refuting Liberal Transmission, I show that you could have wide-scope instrumental reasons like this while nevertheless lacking any narrow-scope reason to take the means, or narrow-scope reason to not have the end. This enables me to respond to two major objections to the wide-scope approach to the instrumental principle that have been developed by Joseph Raz and by Niko Kolodny.

Permaculture Ethics and the Chain of Benefits

by Bill Meacham

'Ought' Does Not Imply 'Can'

by Paul Saka

Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics)

by Antti Kauppinen

The final, approved version. (Special thanks to associate editor Sarah Stroud for many useful questions and suggestions, which significantly improved the paper.)

Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical... more Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical sentimentalism, and epistemic sentimentalism. This encyclopedia entry gives a brief overview of the positions and main arguments pro and con.

The Thought within Reality and Morality

by Tobias-René Wilczek

Written while studying Philosophy in grade 11

Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Ethics – the major issues that surround people’s minds for thousands of years – consist... more Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Ethics – the major issues that surround people’s minds for thousands of years – consist of various questions concerning the way people live, what they believe in, how they act, why they do what they do, etc. Many philosophers who have discussed these issues tend to focus mostly on questions such as, What is reality? What is the self? How does the mind work? What is morality? This essay will focus on my own philosophy and my views on Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Ethics.

What happened to philosophy? (The collective consciousness)

by Tawadeen Bankole

Limited Conventionalism About Morals

by Marinus Ferreira

In this paper I present limited conventionalism, which is the weakest manner in which conventions could feature in our... more In this paper I present limited conventionalism, which is the weakest manner in which conventions could feature in our moral reasoning: if there are any moral issues which are settled by convention, then they will include cases like those I describe here. My claim is that, unless every moral issue could be settled from general principles, what we might call the ‘underdetermination problem’ will arise, where your general moral principles can't decide among a set of equally good but mutually exclusive courses of action. Here I demonstrate that any underdetermination problem solution, giving those involved a way to work their way through the problem to the mutual satisfaction of everybody, is going to count as a convention in the sense analysed by David Lewis.This has the important and interesting result that part of the content of our evaluative terms is conventional. My argument for that point goes as follows: if general principles don't settle every moral question, then underdetermination cases arise; what is at issue with these cases is how to apply the general principles and the evaluative concepts they are framed in; underdetemination problem solutions specify particular ways to apply those principles and terms; any underdetermination problem solution is going to count as a Lewisian convention; thus, conventions are part of what makes up the content of our evaluative terms.

Kant Concept Art

by Mark Singer

Tandem works include: "Seminal Ethics," "More Seminal Ethics Implications," "Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications" - also on this site.

The artist is P. Patten (USA).