Mereology

An Analysis of Some Mirroring Principles

by Matt Leonard

Work in progress. Still very rough.

A lot of people think that the mereological structure of material objects is perfectly mirrored by and is a perfect... more A lot of people think that the mereological structure of material objects is perfectly mirrored by and is a perfect mirror of the spacetime regions which host the objects (i.e., their locations). A number of principles have been offered in attempt to capture this thought. In this paper, I offer an analysis of some of my own principles as well as some offered by Achille Varzi.

Essential Dependence, Truthmaking, and Mereology: Then and Now

by Ross Inman

One notable area in analytic metaphysics that has seen a revival of Aristotelian and scho- lastic inspired metaphysics... more One notable area in analytic metaphysics that has seen a revival of Aristotelian and scho- lastic inspired metaphysics is the return to a more robust construal of the notion of essence, what some have labelled “real” or “serious” essentialism. However, it is only recently that this more robust notion of essence has been implemented into the debate on truthmaking, mainly by the work of E. J. Lowe. The first part of the paper sets out to explore the scholastic roots of essential dependence as well as an account of truthmaking for accidental predications in terms of accidents. Along the way, the author examines the dialectical role the possibility of separated accidents in the Eucharist play with respect to developing a scholastic account of truthmaking as essential dependence. In conclusion the author utilises Aquinas’s hylomorphic ontology to suggest a new way forward for an essentialist account of truthmaking.

Extended Simple Objects

by Jonathan Erhardt

In this paper I explore the possibility of spatially extended mereological simples, i.e. of objects which have no... more In this paper I explore the possibility of spatially extended mereological simples, i.e. of objects which have no proper parts and occupy an area of space which consists of more than one point of space. Various metaphysicians have defended the possibility of such simples recently. Such accounts face an objection which goes back at least to Descartes. Two different strategies have been pursued to defend the possibility of extended mereological simples against this objection. One strategy is to give up the Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts (DAUP) which roughly states that any spatially extended object has parts that correspond to the parts of the region that it occupies. The other strategy is to give up the idea that space is continuous and instead adopt the idea of smallest discreet packages of space. This second strategy only saves a specific type of extended simples, namely simples of the size of those smallest packages of space. In this paper I propose a third way to respond to the objection. This way is based on a positive account of how a simple object can be extended and allows us to retain DAUP and leave the question open whether space is continuous or discreet. And it allows simples of any size. The cost is that it introduces modifications of the geometry of space.

“‘The Return of Crazy Mother’: The Cultural Politics of Carnival in 1930s Dijon,” Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, 16.4 (2010): 471-496.

by Philip Whalen

The political elite in inter-war France sought innovative ways to reconcile modernization agendas with existing... more The political elite in inter-war France sought innovative ways to reconcile modernization agendas with existing regional cultural traditions. Regional folkloric traditions and ludic festivals provided refuge from maligned national narratives. Burgundians, notably, drew upon carnival practices and motifs to solicit broad participation in a state-sanctioned project of regional modernization. Although organized by ostensibly opposed political, social, commercial, and cultural interests, Dijon’s Mère-Folle carnival and subsequent carnaval parades accomplished the same goals. These included creating a new spirit of civic pride and unity along, providing a time and space for overlapping and converging transformations to coexist and stabilize traditional cultural practices while limiting possibilities for women’s émancipation.

It Matters how you Slice it: Identity, Social Ontology, and Decomposition

by Robert Barnard

Paper version of talk for 2012 SSPP

Call the proposal that composition is identity the composition thesis.  This proposal is central to many... more Call the proposal that composition is identity the composition thesis.  This proposal is central to many contemporary discussions of the mereology of ordinary objects.  In this paper I consider three problem cases for the composition thesis, intensional entities, entities with essences, and social objects.  I suggest that while the first two cases can be addressed fairly easily by advocates of the composition thesis, the status of social entities is more problematic.  I argue that social entities are not mereologically composed, but are capable of being multiply decomposed.  I suggest that this is compatible with Searle’s suggestion that social entities realize socially constituted functional roles.

Wholes that Cause their Parts: Organic Self-Reproduction and the Reality of Biological Teleology

by Thomas Teufel

Published in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biology and Biomedical Sciences, vol. 42.2 (2011): 252-260.

A well-rehearsed move among teleological realists in the philosophy of biology is to base the idea of genuinely... more A well-rehearsed move among teleological realists in the philosophy of biology is to base the idea of genuinely teleological forms of organic self-reproduction on a type of causality derived from Kant. Teleological realists have long argued for the causal possibility of this form of causality—in which a whole is considered the cause of its parts—as well as formulated a set of teleological criteria of adequacy for it. What is missing, to date, is an account of the mereological principles that govern the envisioned whole-to-part causality. When the latter principles are taken into account, we find that there is no version of whole-to-part causality that is mereologically, causally and teleologically possible all at once, as teleological realism requires.

Mirror Realism

by Matt Leonard

Under review.

This paper concerns how the mereotopological structure of material objects is related to the mereotopological... more This paper concerns how the mereotopological structure of material objects is related to the mereotopological structure of those object’s locations in spacetime. If an object x is a part of an object y, does it follow that x’s location is a part of y’s location? If x’s location is connected to y’s location, does it follow that x is connected to y? Mirror realism is the view that, for any objects, they are mereotopologically related in a given way iff their locations are mereotopologically related in that way. In this paper, I do a few things. I provide some reasons to think that mirror realism is true. I then provide some natural principles which capture the view. I then show how the introduction of these principles leads to two undesirable results: the ‘expansions’ of objects and the exclusion of some views people often defend: namely, one version of endurantism, one view regard- ing time-travel, and the view defending coincident objects. Lastly, I discuss how mirror realism relates to the big picture. In particular, I discuss how the view and its conse- quences relate to the debate between (dualist) substantivalists and supersubstantivalists. I’ll argue that (dualist) substantivalists who have an affinity for at least some mirroring principles both (1) are committed to the expansions and exclusions I discuss, and (2) lose one of their powerful arguments against supersubstantivalism.

,,Les limites et ses modalités chez Leibniz“, in Natur und Subjekt: Akten des IX. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, Sept. 2011, S. 494-503.

by Shinji Ikeda

Leibniz approached the Continuum Problem from multiple aspects. It is his system of boundaries that connects his... more Leibniz approached the Continuum Problem from multiple aspects. It is his system of boundaries that connects his metaphysics to his geometry. By focusing on the metaphysical and geometrical foundations of boundaries, we consider how his ideas on boundaries contributed to his resolution of the problem. First, we examine his geometrical idea of boundaries, in which he tried to construct a “calculus of situation” by reducing Euclidian geometry into an intensional logic. Our claim is here that boundary is not only defined as “a section of continuum”, but also defined metaphysically as “a place inherent in continuum” and later defined by the relation of “homogonous” (homogona), i.e. the relation of having a same origin. Second, we analyse the metaphysical idea of boundaries. Here, we see his characterization of boundary as “mode of continuum”, which remained throughout in his philosophical and mathematical thought even after he began to develop his geometry.

Foundationalism and neuroscience; silence and language

by Stephen J. Cowley

Bennett and Hacker wrote a stinging response to this paper ("Isms are prisms: a reply to Keestra and Cowley", 2011. Language Sciences, 33/3: 459-463. In turn we responded to this with "Concepts-not just yardsticks, but also heuristics: rebutting Hacker and Bennett" 2011, Language Sciences, 33/3: 464-472.

Neuroscience offers more than new empirical evidence about the details of cognitive functions such as language,... more Neuroscience offers more than new empirical evidence about the details of cognitive functions such as language, perception and action. Since it also shows many functions to be highly distributed, interconnected and dependent on mechanisms at different levels of processing, it challenges concepts that are traditionally used to describe these functions. The question is how to accommodate these concepts to the recent evidence. A recent proposal, made in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003) by Bennett and Hacker, is that concepts play a foundational role in neuroscience, that empirical research needs to presuppose them and that changing concepts is a philosophical task. In defending this perspective, PFN shows much neuroscientific writing to be dualistic in nature due to our poor grasp of its foundations. In our review article we take a different approach. Instead of foundationalism we plead for a mild coherentism, which allows for a gradual and continuous alteration of concepts in light of new evidence. Following this approach it is also easier to deal with some neurological conditions (like blindsight, synaesthesia) that pose difficulties for our concepts. Finally, although words and concepts seem to seduce us to thinking that many skills and tasks function separately, it is language skill that – as neuroscientific evidence shows – co-emerges with action/perception cycles and thus seems to require revision of some of our central concepts.

Concepts – not just yardsticks, but also heuristics: rebutting Hacker and Bennett

by Stephen J. Cowley

This is our response to Bennett and Hacker's complaint that we have muisunderstood them ("Isms are prisms"). It appeared as:
Keestra, M & Cowley, S.J. (2011). Concepts – not just yardsticks, but also heuristics: rebutting Hacker and Bennett. Language Sciences 33/3: 464-472.

In their response to our article (Keestra and Cowley, 2009), Hacker and Bennett charge us with failing to understand... more In their response to our article (Keestra and Cowley, 2009), Hacker and Bennett charge us with failing to understand the project of their book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (PFN; Bennett and Hacker, 2003) and do this by discussing foundationalism, linguistic conservatism and the passivity of perception. In this rebuttal we explore disagreements that explain the alleged errors. First, we reiterate our substantial disagreement with Bennett and Hacker (B&H) regarding their assumption that, even regarding much debated concepts like ‘consciousness’, we can assume conceptual consensus within a community of competent speakers. Instead, we emphasize variability and divergence between individuals and groups in such contexts. Second, we plead for modesty in conceptual analysis, including the use of conceptual ambiguities as heuristics for the investigation of explanatory mechanisms. Third, we elucidate our proposal by discussing the interdependence of perception and action, which in some cases appear to be problematic for PFN. Fourth, we discuss why our view of conceptual innovation is different from B&H’s, as we plead for linking explanatory ingredients with conceptual analysis. We end by repeating our particular agreement with their mereological principle, even though we present different reasons: psychological concepts should not be applied to mere components or operations of explanatory mechanisms, for which another vocabulary should be developed.

Quelles Sont Les Parties Des Animaux ? Moriologie Ancienne Et Moriologie Contemporaine

by Andrea Libero Carbone

dans Cerami C. (éd.), Nature et Sagesse. Les rapports entre physique et métaphysique dans la tradition aristotélicienne (colloque international en l'honneur de Pierre Pellegrin, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris 9-12 juin 2010) [in press]

Quelles sont les parties des animaux ? Cette question apparemment simple et pourtant lourde d’enjeux a un rôle... more Quelles sont les parties des animaux ? Cette question apparemment simple et pourtant lourde d’enjeux a un rôle primordial tant dans la biologie d’Aristote que dans la biologie contemporaine. En ce qui concerne la moriologie aristotélicienne, je m’attacherai principalement à examiner les différences qui ont trait aux parties en tant que genos, et qui, de ce fait, se situent au niveau de généralité plus élevé. En ce qui concerne la moriologie contemporaine, je voudrais proposer une comparaison entre la démarche aristotélicienne et certaines approches récentes à la définition de la relation entiers/parties, qui est l’un des axes porteurs de la biologie évolutive du développement, notamment selon la perspective qui consiste à envisager l’organisation des êtres vivants en termes de “modularité”.

Any sum of parts which are water is water

by henry laycock

HUMANA.MENTE
International Journal of Philosophical Studies founded in Florence in 2007. Official journal of the Italian Philosophical Society

Issue 19 - December 2011
COMPOSITION, COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSATION
The idea behind this issue is to offer a representation of the most recent theories and position which are emerging in the debate and take David Lewis as their main theoretical source, critical target, or point of departure

ABSTRACT. Mereological entities often seem to violate ‘ordinary’ ideas of what a concrete object can be like, behaving... more ABSTRACT. Mereological entities often seem to violate ‘ordinary’ ideas of what a concrete object can be like, behaving more like sets than like Aristotelian substances. However, the mereological notions of ‘part’, ‘composition’, and ‘sum’ or ‘fusion’ appear to find concrete realisation in the actual semantics of mass nouns. Quine notes that ‘any sum of parts which are water is water’; and the wine from a single barrel can be bottled and distributed around the globe without affecting its identity. Is there here, as some have claimed, a ‘natural’ or ‘innocent’ form of mereology? The claim rests on the assumption that what a mass noun such as ‘wine’ denotes – the wine from a single barrel , for example – is indeed a unit of a special type, the sum or fusion of its many ‘parts’. The assumption is, however, open to question on semantic grounds.

Words Without Objects (BOOK)

by henry laycock

Clarendon Press, Oxford (this is not the complete book, unfortunately)

CLICK ON THE 'DOWNLOAD' - NOT THE 'QUICK VIEW' [ERROR!]

The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a... more The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.

Why Nihilism About Composition Is Simpler Than It Looks

by Jared Woodard

Fuzzy mereology

by Josh Parsons

draft only (2011)

Some philosophers have attempted to solve metaphysical problems about vagueness by understanding objects with vague... more Some philosophers have attempted to solve metaphysical problems about vagueness by understanding objects with vague boundaries as analogous to fuzzy sets. I formulate such a view and argue that it suffers from a serious lacuna, which I attempt to fill.

Conceptual conservatism and contingent composition

by Josh Parsons

draft only (2006)

"Under what circumstances do things add up to or compose something?" This is what Peter van Inwagen calls... more "Under what circumstances do things add up to or compose something?" This is what Peter van Inwagen calls the Special Composition Question. Everyone, it seems, has a different answer. Van Inwagen's, famously, is "when the activities of those things constitute a life". Other people --- nihilists about composition --- say "never!" Other people --- universalists about composition --- say "always!". Yet other people --- brutalists about composition --- say that there is no answer....

Dion, Theon, and DAUP

by Josh Parsons

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2004)

Here is a puzzle from the Stoic, Chrysippus: There was once a man called Dion, who was unfortunate enough to have his... more Here is a puzzle from the Stoic, Chrysippus: There was once a man called Dion, who was unfortunate enough to have his foot annihilated. Thereafter, he was known as Theon. Theon is identical to what was left over after Dion's foot was removed. That is, Theon is that part of Dion that does not include his foot. If all this is true, then Theon is a proper part of Dion. That is, he is a part of Dion, but not identical to Dion. But if that's right, then, surprisingly, Dion didn't survive the loss of his foot.{For a recent discussion of this puzzle as it appears (or is said to have appeared) in Chrysippus, see ...

Theories of Location

by Josh Parsons

Published in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3 (2007).

Metaphysicians of space and time are fond of talking about objects being present at, wholly present at, or existing at... more Metaphysicians of space and time are fond of talking about objects being present at, wholly present at, or existing at certain times, or occupying certain regions of space, or even regions of space-time... A great deal of debate has been conducted in this terminology: debates about whether anything does endure or perdure; about the ontology of temporal parts; about whether it makes sense to apply this kind of thinking to space, as well as to time (we can ask, for example, the analogous questions whether things are extended by being entended, or pertended); about whether it can be applied to space-time, and if so, to relativistic space-time. These debates have been fruitful, but cursed with a certain amount of imprecision.

I am not now, nor have I ever been, a turnip.

by Josh Parsons

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83:1 (2005)

Consider the following two-step programme for analysing tensed statements in natural language:... Consider the following two-step programme for analysing tensed statements in natural language:...

Hudson on location

by Josh Parsons

published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Chapter 4 of Hud Hudson's stimulating book The metaphysics of hyperspace contains an discussion of the notion of... more Chapter 4 of Hud Hudson's stimulating book The metaphysics of hyperspace contains an discussion of the notion of location in a container spacetime. Hudson uses this idea to define a number of what we might call modes of extension or ways of being extended. A pertended object is what most people think of as a typical extended object --- it is made up of spatial parts, one part for each region the object pervades. An entended object is an extended simple (or a complex object made up of extended simples). Elsewhere, I've argued that entended objects are conceptually possible; that nothing about the concept of "extended" rules out entention. (More about how this argument works below). Hudson thinks that I did not go far enough. Besides pertended and entended objects, he also sees conceptual room for what he calls spanners and multiply located objects. These last two ways of being extended are even more exotic than extended simples. ...