Mental Representation

El antirrepresentacionalismo de Hegel y su concepción del conocimiento como praxis intersubjetiva

by Hector Ferreiro

Este artículo aparecerá publicado próximamente en una antología de trabajos sobre la filosofía de Hegel editada por Daniel Brauer en la Editorial Prometeo, Buenos Aires, 2012.

The Relation between Language and Thought according to Hegel

by Hector Ferreiro

Slightly re-elaborated english version of the article “La relación entre lenguaje y pensamiento en el Sistema hegeliano”, published in Oliva Mendoza, Carlos (ed.), Hegel: Ciencia, Experiencia y Fenomenología, Ediciones de la Facultad deFilosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, 2010, 21-33. (I read this paper at the "Workshop Kant-Fichte-Hegel", Department of Philosophy and Moral Science, Ghent University, Belgium, June 24, 2011)

El concepto de representacion en la filosofia de Hegel

by Hector Ferreiro

En: Escritos de Filosofía, Buenos Aires, 35-36, 1999, págs. 99-130.

Verifying Visual Properties in Sentence Verification Facilitates Picture Recognition Memory

by Diane Pecher

Pecher, D., Zanolie, K., & Zeelenberg, R. (2007). Verifying visual properties in sentence verification facilitates picture recognition memory. Experimental Psychology, 54, 173-179.

According to the perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of... more According to the perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts. We investigated whether recognition memory for pictures of concepts was facilitated by earlier representation of visual properties of those concepts. During study, concept names (e.g., apple) were presented in a property verification task with a visual property (e.g., shiny) or with a nonvisual property (e.g., tart). Delayed picture recognition memory was better if the concept name had been presented with a visual property than if it had been presented with a nonvisual property. These results indicate that modality-specific simulations are used for concept representation.

Concepts are not represented by conscious imagery

by Diane Pecher

Pecher, D., Van Dantzig, S., & Schifferstein, H. N. J. (2009). Concepts are not represented by conscious imagery. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 914-919.

According to theories of grounded cognition, conceptual representation and perception share processing mechanisms. We... more According to theories of grounded cognition, conceptual representation and perception share processing mechanisms. We investigated whether this overlap is due to conscious perceptual imagery. Participants filled out questionnaires to assess the vividness of their imagery (Questionnaire on Mental Imagery) and the extent to which their imagery was object oriented and spatially oriented (Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire), and they performed a mental rotation task. One week later, they performed a verbal property verification task. In
this task, involvement of modality-specific systems is evidenced by the modality-switch effect, the finding that performance on a target trial (e.g., apple–green) is better after a same-modality trial (e.g., diamond–sparkle) than after a different-modality trial (e.g., airplane–noisy). Results showed a modality-switch effect, but there was no systematic relation between imagery scores and modality switch. We conclude that conscious mental imagery is not fundamental to conceptual representation.

Unconstraining theories of embodied cognition

by Diane Pecher

Van Dantzig, S., Zeelenberg, R., & Pecher, D. (2009). Unconstraining theories of embodied cognition. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 345-351.

The approach/avoidance effect refers to the finding that valenced stimuli trigger approach and avoidance actions.... more The approach/avoidance effect refers to the finding that valenced stimuli trigger approach and avoidance actions. Markman and Brendl [Markman, A. B., & Brendl, M. (2005). Constraining theories of embodied cognition. Psychological Science, 16, 6-16] argued that this effect is not a truly embodied phenomenon, but depends on participants' symbolic representation of the self. In their study, participants moved valenced words toward or away from their own name on the computer screen. This would induce participants to form a 'disembodied' self-representation at the location of their name, outside of the body. Approach/avoidance effects occurred with respect to the participant's name, rather than with respect to the body. In three experiments, we demonstrate that similar effects are found when the name is replaced by a positive word, a negative word or even when no word is presented at all. This suggests that the 'disembodied self' explanation of Markman and Brendl is incorrect, and that their findings do not necessarily constrain embodied theories of cognition.

Perceptual Processing Affects Conceptual Processing

by Diane Pecher

Van Dantzig, S., Pecher, D., Zeelenberg, R., & Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Perceptual processing affects conceptual processing. Cognitive Science, 32, 579-590.

According to the Perceptual Symbols Theory of cognition (Barsalou, 1999), modality-specific simulations underlie the... more According to the Perceptual Symbols Theory of cognition (Barsalou, 1999), modality-specific simulations underlie the representation of concepts. A strong prediction of this view is that perceptual processing affects conceptual processing. In this study, participants performed a perceptual detection task and a conceptual property-verification task in alternation. Responses on the property-verification task were slower for those trials that were preceded by a perceptual trial in a different modality than for those that were preceded by a perceptual trial in the same modality. This finding of a modality-switch effect across perceptual processing and conceptual processing supports the hypothesis that perceptual and conceptual representations are partially based on the same systems.

(Re)presenting

by Narve Strand

Normative Concepts: a connectedness model

by Laura Schroeter

co-authored with François Schroeter

An elaboration of jazz model of meaning: we seek to characterize not just linguistic communication, but normative thinking. We focus on the cognitive role of concepts in keeping track of a topic, through changes in associated descriptive beliefs and motivations. A relational account of meaning identity, we argue, better explains this tracking ability. It also affords new resources for vindicating realism about normative properties.

This paper proposes a relational account concepts and explains how the model fits normative terms like 'is right'. Our... more This paper proposes a relational account concepts and explains how the model fits normative terms like 'is right'. Our connectedness model builds social and historical facts into the foundations of concept identity. This aspect of the model, we argue, reshapes normative epistemology and provides new resources for a vindication of realism in ethics.

Cognitive dynamics: language as values realizing activity

by Stephen J. Cowley

These are proofs that appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2012). Cognitive dynamics: language as values realizing activity. In A. Kravchenko (ed). Cognitive Dynamics and Linguistic Interactions, pp. 15-46. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press.

To challenge cognitivism it is important emphasise how human bodies function. Like other organisms, we evolved to act... more To challenge cognitivism it is important emphasise how human bodies function. Like other organisms, we evolved to act and perceive in changing environments. In spite of the fact that this can be described as representing aspects of the world, there is no reason to think that people use what are representations for the brain (Steiner 2010). The central nervous system deals in the body-world relations that sustain flexible, adaptive behaviour. Bodies use measurable physical events or cognitive dynamics to control how they coordinate with the world. Humans extend this general capacity by cooperating in cultural settings.

Biology thus becomes enmeshed with history and, in looking at language too, this must be traced to minded behaviour. It follows that language -and teaching languages -must be explicated with respect to how encounters with the world are experienced as meaningful (Gibson 1979). Far from being subjective or abstract, cognitive dynamics function as public opportunities and threats. Social activity realizes values that motivate inhibition, thinking and communication (Gibson 1950; Hodges & Geyer 2006; Hodges 2007). In language, successes and failures arise as we mesh wordings with experience of items that serve in a (partly) shared social world. Using this perspective, I turn to pedagogical design and signs of writing to consider how applied linguistics can be enriched by viewing language as values realizing activity. The main concern of applied linguists becomes, not learning, but SLA or 'skilled linguistic action'.

Mental representations of music in cognitive science (draft)

by Edoardo Acotto

Incomplete draft

That of “mental representation” is a controversial and fundamental (foundational) concept for the philosophy of mind... more That of “mental representation” is a controversial and fundamental (foundational) concept for the philosophy of mind and the cognitive science but classical cognitive science encountered a lot of problems in treating it and connexionism did a great effort for getting rid of it. In philosophy of mind MR means mental entities with a content; in cognitive science MR means information structure coded in the mind with some role in cognitive tasks. In cognitive musicology the use of the concept is quite widespread but ambiguous and vague. We discuss its use and we compare the concept of mental representation of music with that of intentional sound object.

Role of spatial frequencies and exposure duration in face processing: Potential consequences on the memory format of facial representations.

by Guy Tiberghien

The early growth of symbolic understanding and use: A tribute to Ann Brown.

by Patricia Ganea

In Campione, J. C., Metz, K. E., & Palincsar, A. S.(Eds.), Children’s learning in the laboratory and in the classroom: Essays in honor of Ann Brown. New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum & Associates, 2007.

Thinking of things unseen: Infants’ use of language to update object representations.

by Patricia Ganea

Psychological Science (2007)

Not doing what you are told: Early perseverative errors in updating mental representations via language.

by Patricia Ganea

Child Development (2010)

Function and Content Reconsidered

by Marcin Miłkowski

draft for Content and Consciousness 2.0

In this chapter, I show that the theory of content as sketched in Daniel Dennett’s Content and Consciousness is,... more In this chapter, I show that the theory of content as sketched in Daniel Dennett’s Content and Consciousness is, contrary to appearances, quite different from the later developments in teleofunctional biosemantics. There are reasons to believe that his earlier theory fares in some respects much better than theories he later endorses. In contrast to Millikan's notion of function, Dennett's notion of functional structure is not historical (diachronic). Just because of that, his functional account of content is also not purely dependent on historical considerations. Note that according to Dennett, historically-dependent content is causally irrelevant, and its role in the explanation of behavior may be merely heuristic. The early account of Dennett stresses that the content is ascribed to the system by tracing the normal causes and effects of events, states and structures all the way to both the afferent and efferent peripheries. By relying on the notion of afferent/efferent peripheries, he requires, in fact, that the content be relevant for guiding the behavior. Just because of it, his early theory of content is closer to such proposals as the guidance theory of representation (GTR) of Anderson and Rosenberg and interactivism of Bickhard. Such a construal of content, notably, does vindicate the notion against current anti-representationalism in cognitive science. Yet the broad conception of function makes it really hard to justify claims about malfunction, and, consequently, misrepresentation.
I argue that the early theory should not be abandoned in favor of Millikan’s account of representation. Instead, I propose two relatively minor amendments: another construal of function along broadly Dennettian lines, and explication of his requirement of intensionality-sensitivity of representational explanations in terms of contrast-classes in causal explanations, as vindicated by Jim Woodward. The resulting conception is then tested by analyzing two cases.

Mentálne reprezentácie priestoru a ich súvislosť s priestorovým správaním človeka

by Katarína Böhmová

Bachelor thesis

One of the most frequent human activities is targeted moving, that has a condition of using mental capacity assigned... more One of the most frequent human activities is targeted moving, that has a condition of using mental capacity assigned to processing spatial perceptions – using of mental representations of space. In the work there are characteristics of cognitive maps and their connections to the frequency of using elaborated. Emanating from Gallistel, Lynch, Murakoshi & Kawai and Coshall there is hypothesis about more precise topological representation together with high using frequency testified. Second hypothesis of this work – the more frequent ways are represented as shorter – is testified on the part of respondents only. Hypotheses are testified / contradicted on the basis of interviews analyzing, observations, but sketch maps mostly – geometry (lengths, angles) and topology. In the discussion there are analyzed implications resulting from analysis: acquiring knowledge about geometry and topology of space and differences between acquiring them, mental representations relating to woman and mothers on maternity leave as a special category and at last reasoning of inaccurate right angle drawing by students.

Keywords: cognitive maps, mental representations of space, frequency of using ways, geometry, topology, lengths, angles, angles sizes, often, unusual, mothers, students, women, sketch maps, map analysis

Jednou z najčastejších činností človeka je cielený pohyb, ktorého podmienkou je používanie mentálnej kapacity určenej na spracovanie vnemov z priestoru – používanie mentálnych reprezentácií priestoru. Práca rozoberá vlastnosti kognitívnych máp a ich spojitosť s frekvenciou používania ciest. Vychádzajúc z Gallistela, Lyncha, Murakoshiho & Kawaia a Coshalla je v práci na základe analýzy dát terénneho výskumu potvrdená hypotéza o presnejšej topologickej reprezentácii pri vysokej frekvencii používania ciest. Druhá hypotéza tejto práce – častejšie používané cesty reprezentované ako kratšie – je potvrdená iba na časti respondentoch. Hypotézy sú potvrdené / vyvrátené na základe analýzy interview, pozorovaní, ale najmä analýzy náčrtových máp – geometrie (vzdialenosti, uhly) a topológie. V diskusii sú rozobraté implikácie plynúce z výsledkov analýzy: osvojovanie si geometrie a topológie priestoru a rozdiely medzi nimi, mentálne reprezentácie týkajúce sa žien a mamičiek na materskej dovolenke ako osobitnej kategórie a na poslednom mieste zdôvodnenie nepresného zakresľovania pravého uhla študentmi.

Kľúčové slová: kognitívne mapy, mentálne reprezentácie priestoru, frekvencia používania ciest, vzdialenosti, dĺžky, uhly, veľkosti uhlov, častejšie cesty, zriedkavejšie cesty, mamičky, študenti, ženy, náčrtové mapy, analýza máp

Emergence Colour and the Knowledge Argument: So what if Mary didn't know

by Elizabeth Schier

Does Intentional Ascent "Require" Semantic Ascent? A Reply to Bermudez

by Michael J. Braund

That some non-linguistic creatures are capable of some varieties of thought has become progressively hard to deny.... more That some non-linguistic creatures are capable of some varieties of thought has become progressively hard to deny. Evidence extends from the manufacture and use of tools in the case of many animals, to the ways infants respond when shown atypical perceptual events. (2003a, p. 81) In Thinking Without Words (TWW for short), Jose Luis Bermudez’s project is to explain how this thinking is possible. Therein, he presents a highly economical statement of the nature of non-linguistic thought, by developing a conceptual framework for treating infants and nonhuman animals as “genuine thinkers.” (2006, p. 320) While the idea of non-linguistic thought has garnered a great deal of attention in cognitive ethology and the neurosciences, this is not true of analytic philosophy. There, the discussions about non-linguistic behavior have focused on how such thoughts might be physically realized. In contrast, Bermudez approaches the problem by considering what is required to explain behavior in psychological terms. How can we know what non-linguistic creatures think? What fixes the contents of their thoughts? Are they thinkers like us, or do humans grow up to become fundamentally different types of thinkers with unique cognitive abilities? TWW offers answers to these questions, setting out criteria for identifying when psychological explanations are required for non-linguistic creatures, as well as determining the limits of such explanations. In what follows, I will briefly outline (what I take to be) Bermudez’s position in TWW, paying special attention to the claim that metarepresentational thought refers only to linguistically informed, inferential thinking. I will then argue that while the case he builds for a positive theory of non-linguistic thought is rich and cogent, holding up to the battery of criticisms I consider, it is doubtful whether his case for the negative aspects of the theory gets as far as it should. After posing a few general problems for the argument that intentional ascent requires semantic ascent, I will show that its basic strategy rests upon a dubious understanding of the role played by representational vehicles in thinking about thoughts.

Репрезентационализм и биологическая теория познания

by Alexander Kravchenko