Mental Causation

Consciousness and the causal paradox

by Max Velmans

This is a clean PDF of my reply to the final BBS commentary by Sam Rakover (1996) on my BBS target article Velmans, M. (1991) Is human information processing conscious? BBS 14:651-726. In his commentary Rakover makes the valid point that information moves between unconscious processing and consciousness in a continuous stream. Consequently, he argues, consciousness has an effect on subsequent unconscious processing. In my reply, I agree—but point out that in order to understand this one needs to resolve the causal paradox that, viewed from a first-person perspective, the contents of consciousness appear to have many causal effects on subsequent mental events and overt behaviour, while viewed from a purely third-person perspective conscious contents appear to be entirely epiphenomenal. I then suggest some first principles for resolving this paradox (which I developed in more detail in later writings, for example in my book Understanding Consciousness, 2000, 2009).

Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity—but... more Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity—but viewed from a third-person perspective consciousness appears to play no role in the activity of brains, producing a "causal paradox". To resolve this paradox one needs to distinguish consciousness of processing from consciousness accompanying processing or causing processing. Accounts of consciousness/brain causal interactions switch between first- and third-person perspectives. However, epistemically, the differences between first- and third-person access are fundamental. First- and third-person accounts are complementary and mutually irreducible.

Consciousness, causality and complementarity

by Max Velmans

This is a clean PDF of my reply to 5 continuing commentaries in the Behavioral and Brain Sciences on my 1991 target article that in various ways expand on the original 36 commentaries and my original reply.

This reply to five continuing commentaries on my 1991 target article on “Is human information processing conscious”... more This reply to five continuing commentaries on my 1991 target article on “Is human information processing conscious” focuses on six related issues: 1) whether focal attentive processing replaces consciousness as a causal agent in third-person viewable human information processing, 2) whether consciousness can be dissociated from human information processing, 3) continuing disputes about definitions of "consciousness" and about what constitutes a “conscious process”, 4) how observer-relativity in psychology relates (and does not relate) to relativity in physics, 5) whether the first-person viewable causal efficacy of consciousness counts as ‘real’ causal efficacy and 6) a clarification of the sense in which first- and third-person causal accounts of mental processing are complementary and mutually irreducible.

The Supervenience Argument: Kim's Challenge to Nonreductive Physicalism

by Juhani Yli-Vakkuri

Co-authored with Ausonio Marras. Published in F. Orilia and S. Gozzano, eds., Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2008, pp. 101-132.

Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument purports to show that epiphenomenalism about the mental follows from premises... more Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument purports to show that epiphenomenalism about the mental follows from premises that any nonreductive physicalist should find acceptable. Kim regards his argument as a reductio ad absurdum of nonreductive physicalism. We reconstruct and evaluate the latest version of Kim’s argument. We argue that the premises of Kim’s argument are much less innocent than they may appear. In particular, we single out for criticism an unstated assumption about the identity conditions of events, and we argue that this assumption could be seen as all by itself implying that nonreductive physicalism is false, thus begging the question against that position. It is also dubious, we argue, whether Kim’s unstated assumption is even consistent with one of the stated assumptions of his argument, “the principle of causal exclusion”, given a standard understanding of causal overdetermination.

Do I have more free will than you do?

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.

The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.

Questioning the causal inheritance principle

by Ivar Hannikainen

Counterfactuals, Overdetermination and Mental Causation

by Simona Aimar

The Exclusion Problem (EP) for mental causation suggests that there is a tension between the claim that the mental... more The Exclusion Problem (EP) for mental causation suggests that there is a tension between the claim that the mental causes physical effects, and the claim that the mental does not overdetermine its physical effects. In response, Karen Bennett (2008, 2003) puts forward an extra necessary condition for overdetermination: if one candidate cause were to occur but the other were not to occur, the effect would still occur. She thus denies one of the assumptions of EP, the assumption that if an effect has two sufficient causes, it is overdetermined. If sound, her argument does two things: it solves EP, and it shows how to use counterfactuals in order to make the notion of overdetermination precise. However, the argument is not sound.

The Metaphysics of Causation

by Teed Rockwell

Exclusion Excluded

by Brad Weslake

Under review.

I argue that an independently attractive account of causation and causal explanation provides a principled resolution... more I argue that an independently attractive account of causation and causal explanation provides a principled resolution of the exclusion problem.

Reduction in Philosophy of Mind: A Pluralistic Account

by Markus Eronen

PhD Thesis, University of Osnabrück, Institute of Cognitive Science.

Published by Ontos Verlag in 2011.

The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science.... more The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while antireductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist theory of causation, to reassess the traditional approaches to reduction in philosophy of mind. I then elaborate and defend a pluralistic framework for philosophy of mind, and show how reductionist ideas can be incorporated into it. This leads to a novel synthesis of pluralism and reductionism that I call pluralistic physicalism.

Inhalt und kausale Rolle von phänomenalen Erfahrungen und Überzeugungen bei Fred Dretske

by Fabian Hundertmark

Not Published

Im ersten Teil der Hausarbeit stelle ich Überzeugungen und phänomenale Erfahrungen vor. Ich werde zeigen, dass diese... more Im ersten Teil der Hausarbeit stelle ich Überzeugungen und phänomenale Erfahrungen vor. Ich werde zeigen, dass diese einen Gehalt bzw. Intentionalität haben und welchen Einfluss diese Eigenschaft auf die kausale Rolle hat, wenn es darum geht, welche Überzeugungen von welchen phänomenalen Erfahrungen verursacht werden. Im zweiten Teil stelle ich Dretskes Position im Bezug auf phänomenale Zustände und Überzeugungen dar, wie er sie in Dretske (1988, 1998) vertreten hat.

Im letzten, kritischen Abschnitt, will ich Dretskes Position dahingehend kritisieren, dass er es nicht schafft, Introspektion und die Kausalbeziehung zwischen phänomenalen Zuständen und Überzeugungen im Allgemeinen mit deren Inhalt zu verknüpfen, da der Gehalt phänomenaler Zustände in der Evolutionsgeschichte (Phylogenese), der Gehalt von Überzeugungen hingegen aus der Ontogenese stammt und da der Gehalt phänomenaler Erfahrungen, in seiner Theorie, keinen Einfluss auf ihre kausale Rolle hat.

The Microstructure View of the Brain-Consciousness Relation

by Michael Schmitz

Mental Causation and Explanatory Practice

by Fauve Lybaert

Appraisal, Vol. 7, No. 4, October 2009, pp. 11-16.

Most philosophers endorse the viewpoint that a
mental event can cause a physical movement, as
well as... more Most philosophers endorse the viewpoint that a
mental event can cause a physical movement, as
well as another mental event. Yet, the ontology to
which they adhere prevents them from conceiving
this mental causation. Jaegwon Kim solves this
problem by defining mental causation so that it does
not conflict with the current ontology. Tyler Burge
reverses this strategy: he thinks an investigation of
the problem of mental causation should start with an
analysis of explanatory practice, rather than with an
elaboration upon the current ontology. The aim of
this paper is to contrast and evaluate these
strategies.

Causation is Macroscopic but not Irreducible

by David Papineau

To appear in S. Gibb and E. Lowe (eds) The Ontology of Mental Causation

In this paper I argue that causation is an essentially macroscopic phenomenon, and that mental causes are therefore... more In this paper I argue that causation is an essentially macroscopic phenomenon, and that mental causes are therefore capable of outcompeting their more specific physical realizers as causes of physical effects. But I also argue that any causes must be type-identical with physical properties, on pain of positing inexplicable physical conspiracies. I therefore allow
macroscopic mental causation, but only when it is physically reducible.

Causalité Psychique: la machine sémantique de Freud

by claudia passos ferreira

Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion and Nonreductive Physicalism

by Paul Raymont

Published in Physicalism and Mental Causation, ed. Walter and Heckmann (Exeter, UK: Imprint

On Causal Relevance: a Reply to Sullivan

by Paul Raymont

Reply to a note by Arthur Sullivan about my paper, "Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant?"

Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant?

by Paul Raymont

Non-reductive physicalists are increasingly regarded as unwitting epiphenomenalists, since their refusal to reduce... more Non-reductive physicalists are increasingly regarded as unwitting epiphenomenalists, since their refusal to reduce mental features to physical properties allegedly implies that while there are mental causes, none of these causes produces its effects in virtue of being the type of mental state that it is. I examine, and reject, the “trope” response to this charge. I take the failure of the trope model of causal relevance to be instructive, since it illustrates a confusion that lies at the heart of the concept of causal relevance, a concept that is central to the criticism of non-reductive physicalism. By identifying this confusion, I hope to dispel the notion that non-reductive physicalism carries any commitment to epiphenomenalism.

Causal Exclusion and Dependent Overdetermination

by Dwayne Moore

Emerging From the Causal Drain

by Richard Corry

Published in Philosophical Studies (2012) DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9918-3

The copy here on academia.edu is a pre-print version of the article and should not be cited.

For nearly twenty years, Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument has stood as the major hurdle for non-reductive... more For nearly twenty years, Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument has stood as the major hurdle for non-reductive physicalism. If successful, Kim’s argument would show that the high-level properties posited by non-reductive physicalists must either be identical with lower-level physical properties, or else must be causally inert. The most prominent objection to the Causal Exclusion Argument—the so called Overdetermination objection—points out that there are some notions of causation that are left untouched by the argument. If causation is simply counterfactual dependence, for example, then the Causal Exclusion Argument Fails. Thus, much of the existing debate turns on the issue of which account of causation is appropriate. In this paper, however, I take a bolder approach and argue that Kim’s preferred version of the Causal Exclusion Argument fails no matter what account one gives of causation. Any notion of causation that is strong enough to support the premises of the argument is too strong to play the role required in the logic of the argument. I also consider a second version of the Causal Exclusion Argument, and suggest that although it may avoid the problems of the first version, it begs the question against a particular form of non-reductive physicalism, namely emergentism.

Second Order Properties: Why Kim's Reduction Does Not Work

by Simone Gozzano

Logic & Phylosophy of Science, Electronic Journal , 1 (1), 2003, pp. 1-18.

In this paper I argue that recent reductionist’s arguments marshaled by Jaegwon Kim on the causal status of mental... more In this paper I argue that recent reductionist’s arguments marshaled by Jaegwon Kim on the causal status of mental properties do not get the point they are aimed at. In particular, in the first part, tackling epistemological issues, I show that Kim’s arguments concerning the heterogeneity of disjunctive properties if accepted would undermine most scientific practice; in the second part, devoted to metaphysical issues, I argue that Kim’s reductive functionalism, if taken as a metaphysical thesis, cannot be applied neither to qualitative states nor to intentional ones. In particular, qualitative states cannot be reduced by Kim’s admissions, while intentional states cannot be reduced given Kripke’s argument concerning the nature of theoretical identifications. Being mental states either qualitative or intentional, Kim’s strategy fails to make his point. Finally, I argue that the mental properties can be interpreted as micro-based properties, so showing that the so-called ‘generalization argument’ either holds or licenses us in crediting mental properties with causal powers.