Per una genealogia della vita nel tempo che dura: Bergson se faisant
published in S&F_ #6 (www.scienzaefilosofia.it)
ASCA_McArdle_Photography at the Chiasm
Presented at EXTREMELY CLOSE AND INCREDIBLY SLOW
ASCA International Workshop 2012, 28-30 March 2012
“Immobile inside the train, seeing immobile things slip by”; thus is the theme of the immobile world of the traveller... more
“Immobile inside the train, seeing immobile things slip by”; thus is the theme of the immobile world of the traveller in the train introduced by Michel de Certeau in “Railway Navigation and Incarceration”. In contemplating this transfixion, he adapts Merleau-Ponty’s figure of the Chiasm, applying it to the carriage window and the steel rail to account for the way immobility crosses between near and far, between speed and stasis.
This paper identifies the photographic surface as a further manifestation of the binding chiasm to ask ‘What if the photographer were to relinquish habitual cyclopean and mercurial powers and to choose instead slow down the ‘capture’ and to peer around the ‘frame’? Recent experiments in contemporary photomedia deal with being (noun and verb), and moving, in space. Artist-researchers Marian Drew, Daniel Armstrong and the author, will be shown to be re-evaluating their inheritance; the ‘static’ image. Each has discovered new means by which to resolve the ‘figure and ground’ and the coincidence of environment and human subjects, at, within and through the ‘Chiasm’, by extending exposure and interpenetrating relations of near and far.
An observer who sees the world at a traveling point of observation is ‘everywhere at once’ (Gibson 1979). It is a sign of mind and attention that both visible and the tangible co-exist in and interpenetrate both the observer and the space in which they move. What is proposed by Marcel Merleau-Ponty via the Chiasm; a ‘double and crossed sublation of the visible in the tangible and of the tangible in the visible’, is verified in these artistic experiments.
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A 'way of being' in design practice: Zen and the art of being a human-centred practitioner
by Yoko Akama
Akama, Y. 2012. 'A 'way of being' in design practice: zen and the art of being a human-centred practitioner', Design Philosophy Papers, Vol. 1.
Design’s attempts to address social, ethical and environmental concerns of our time have often been marred by theory... more
Design’s attempts to address social, ethical and environmental concerns of our time have often been marred by theory generated by well-meaning scholars who have imposed hard-line definitions and models of what it means to be an ‘ethical designer’. These arguments abstract values and impose ideological and political positions that designers can find difficult to apply in their daily practices. It is not as simple as prescribing the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ values for designers to have and translate them through design. Whatever values there are, those values need to matter to people who care about them enough to translate them into action . Values are not impersonal. They cannot be detached and be subsumed under a more universal value or comparable importance. The paper opens with a critique of this prescriptive approach to highlight the reasons for why ethical design remains stuck in a rut. I then move to discuss more deeply, the close relationship between being ethical and being a human-centred practitioner in design. In doing so, I critique common notions of human-centred design that gives it an ergonomic, human-factors emphasis, or its ‘do-gooder’ side that is associated with humanitarian design. Instead, I offer an alternative framework for human-centred design based on the Japanese ethical concept woven into what it means to be human.
The Japanese term for ‘human being’ is ningen (人間), composed of two characters for ‘person’ (人), and ‘between’ (間). The Japanese understanding of human as in-betweenness, etymologised by ‘between person’, situates it as a relational being. This is the central framework for my notions of ‘self’ and being ‘human’ . This concept of human is strikingly different from major Western philosophies that emphasises ‘anthropos’ or ‘homo’, denoting the individual. Being human-centred is criticised for perpetuating an anthropocentric position , further contributing to humanity’s self-centredness and environmentally destructive behaviour. The profound ethical difference of conceiving humans as detached and in isolation, compared to the Japanese concept of human as relational in-betweennes, is argued by one of the most significant Japanese philosophers of the twentieth century, Tetsuro Watsuji . He was influenced by hermeneutics, phenomenology, Zen Buddhism and the Japanese indigenous spirituality of Shinto. In his book Rinrigaku, ethics in Japan, Watsuji is critical of Western philosophy (Heidegger and many others ) that emphasises the individual concept of self and the locus of the ethical problem pertaining to the consciousness of the individual. The paper dives deeply into Watsuji’s ethical framework in explaining the ningen ‘between person’ that is significant to my definition of being human-centred. I attempt to combine the Eastern philosophy with the West by bringing in a selection of other philosophers such as Goethe, Bortoft and Merleau-Ponty that have resonance with the argument constructed. There is nothing to be gained from East-West dualism or exoticism, as it locks down discourse. Although these Eastern and Western philosophies that I draw upon have not, until now, directly engaged with each other in the discourse of design , they have many valuable overlaps that I would like to share in this paper.
The relational association located in the betweenness, Watsuji argues, to be human is to shift and change continually – it is undergoing a process of constant transformation. The transformation of a designer to being a human-centred practitioner is achieved in relation to others. This connection between self and others (including people, animals, objects and environment) is essential in positioning and embedding oneself in the world. The transformative process is more than cognitive learning or professional development – it is in fact a process of self-awareness that comes from continually reflecting on our activity, our behaviour and how we are with others. This is reflective practice. Though in contrast to reflection and reflective practice that is grounded in critical theory , I explore this by incorporating aspects of wholeness from Goethe’s phenomenology and embodied perception by Merleau-Ponty . I argue the importance of being a reflective practitioner as the first step in being able to fully understand ourselves, our relationship and our connection to others. This pursuit of self-awareness, through reflective practice, is the central argument of this paper of being a human-centred practitioner. Through weaving together these various frameworks, I discuss the cyclical journey of transformation of the self where reflection is experienced in an immersive, affective, embodied way.
True, long-term sustainable change towards building and creating an ethical practice cannot come from being told what to design or choosing the ‘right’ values to adopt. Neither does it come from simply undertaking community-based projects, taking up a social cause or deploying participatory methods. To manifest and practise human-centredness is not a switch one can flick ‘on’ when you are in the design studio at 9am and ‘off’ when you’re leaving work. Instead, I stress the importance of human-centredness manifesting through all facets of our lives that involves engaging in the in-betweenness with others. It requires active creation and the practising of practice that is truly human-centred and aware – aware of oneself, of others and the world we live in. It is a day-to-day application and manifestation, but it is not merely a mechanical repetition. The significance of this being a practice is that it is a transformation and evolution of ourselves in bringing an awareness and embedded-ness to what we do everyday. It is a path (Tao) we each carve our ‘way of being’ in the world.
Phenomenological Naturalism
Draft only
In this paper, I propose a new phenomenology-based approach to naturalization of mind which I have name... more In this paper, I propose a new phenomenology-based approach to naturalization of mind which I have name phenomenological naturalism. More specifically, I introduce four points which characterise that approach: (1) the phenomenological criticism against the reductionist views on the naturalization of mind which do not consider the conscious experience and the original intentionality; (2) the notion of phenomenology as a criticism of reason whose aim is to found a genuine scientific psychology, therefore phenomenology is not an a priori anti-naturalist philosophy; (3) the first step of the phenomenological naturalism which consists in grounding the naturalization of mind in phenomenology through the definition of the metaphysical conditions of the mind and the elaboration of a phenomenology-oriented view of nature; (4) the second step of the phenomenological naturalism is the naturalizing the mind which consists in finding a natural content of the phenomenological-metaphysical category of mind. My conclusion is that only a phenomenology-based science of mind, whose objects of study have been conceptualized by the phenomenology itself, can begin a justified naturalization of mind.
Inter-Integralism ~~~ Critical Perspectives on Advanced and Adequate Phenomenology and “Pheno-Practice” for Integral Research
draft
This contribution investigates the status of phenomenology in integral theory. In particular it will problematise the... more
This contribution investigates the status of phenomenology in integral theory. In particular it will problematise the classification of life-worldly phenomenology as a discipline located only in the interior upper-left quadrant or as a Zone 1 perspective in Wilber’s integral model and methodology.
Based on main ideas of classical (Husserlian) phenomenology and its various critiques and further developments, the treatment in integral (AQAL) theory is discussed critically. Especially the ordering of phenomenology into a separate field or zone, the status of consciousness, including the debate related to its structure and states, and inter-subjective dimensions as well as the relation to contemplation and meditation are examined systematically.
Furthermore, then with regard to the more advanced form of phenomenology as developed by Merleau-Ponty its proto-integral potential will be outlined. It will be argued that activating this potential may contributes to correct some of the weaknesses and limitations of conventional integral theory.
Moreover, it will be proposed that advanced phenomenology provides the foundations for an “adequate phenomenology” in integral research. As part of this more adequate phenomenology and its ontological, epistemological, and methodological dimension some perspectives on what is called integral “pheno-practice” will be offered.
All in all, it is hoped that the critical exploration of phenomenology in its more proto-integral, adequate and pheno-practical forms might enrich integral research, improve its theory building and empirical testing by offering a more inclusive, coherent approach as part of an overarching holarchical ecology of integrative knowledge and practice
La Théorie du réflexe comme enjeu philosophique
MA Thesis, Philosophy and History of Science, Université Paris 1, 1998 (supervisor: J.-F. Braunstein)
Filosofie della scrittura: l’espressione letteraria e il problema della verità in Stendhal e in Merleau-Ponty
paper presentato nel corso delle giornate di studio dedicate a Merleau-Ponty, svoltesi nell’ottobre 2008 all’Università di Trento in collaborazione con l’Università Roma Tre (una versione rivista dello stesso articolo si trova in "Bollettino di studi sartriani", 2009)
“Embodied Perceptions of Others as a Condition of Selfhood? Empirical and Phenomenological Considerations.”
by Kym Maclaren
Published in: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 15, No. 8 (August 2008): 63-93.
Against recent claims that infants begin with a sense of themselves as distinct selves, I propose that the infant’s... more Against recent claims that infants begin with a sense of themselves as distinct selves, I propose that the infant’s initial sense of self is still indeterminate and ambiguous, and is only progressively consolidated, beginning with embodied perceptions of others. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and Hegel’s notion of mutual recognition, and with reference to empirical studies in developmental psychology, I argue that perceiving other persons is significantly different from perceiving inanimate things. Until sufficient motor capacities have developed for exploring and perceptually disambiguating inanimate things, it is only in perceiving others who recognize her that the infant is able to realize herself as a self. As the physiological and behavioural evidence suggests, whereas inanimate things initially captivate and dispossess the young infant, other people return her to herself. This paper lends support to the ideas that humans are ontologically social beings, and that selfhood is socially conditioned rather than given with consciousness.
A Phenomenology of Vision: the Self-Portraits of Jean-Étienne Liotard
RIHA Journal 0034 | 30 January 2012
This essay analyses the self-portraits of Jean-Étienne Liotard (1702-1789). Interpreting these objects through the... more This essay analyses the self-portraits of Jean-Étienne Liotard (1702-1789). Interpreting these objects through the lens of Maurice-Merleau-Ponty's writings on art and vision, I argue that Liotard's self-portraits can be understood as artistic experiments relating to the fundamental phenomenological problem of seeing and representing the lived-body. In making this argument this essay re-evaluates the art-historical tendency to read Liotard's self-portraits biographically as pictures of his unusual life or as tools of self-promotion.
The notion of embodied knowledge
by Shogo Tanaka
This paper discusses the notion of embodied knowledge, which is derived from the phenomenology of Maurice... more This paper discusses the notion of embodied knowledge, which is derived from the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Embodied knowledge is a type of knowledge where the body knows how to act (e.g., how to touch type, how toride a bicycle, etc.). One of the important features of this knowledge is that the body, not the mind, is the knowing subject. Procedures for performance are embodied such that the body knows how to act in a given situation. Embodied knowledge is not confined only to motor skills, but is concerned with the variety of human experiences, all of which share the property of 'doing without representing'. There is no need for representation because there exists a pre-reflective correspondence between body and world. Through examining Merleau-Ponty's notion of body schema, I try to clarify that embodied knowledge is beyond the Cartesian mind-body dualism and requires an embodied view of mind.
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Seen by:Camus' Theory of the Flesh
Full edited version appears in Sophia, 50(4), 2011, pp. 513-525. Full edited version appears in Sophia, 50(4), 2011, pp. 513-525.
Deleuze y Merleau-Ponty. La carne del Mundo
"Deleuze y Merleau-Ponty. La carne del Mundo", published in 'Polisemia' (ISSN 1900-4648), No. 9, volumen 1. Bogotá: Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios, pp. 45-55.
Resumen: A pesar de la distancia que parecen evidenciar la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty y de Deleuze, es posible... more
Resumen: A pesar de la distancia que parecen evidenciar la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty y de Deleuze, es posible descubrir complicidades no sólo analógicas respecto de la crítica que dirigen a Husserl. En el terreno estético, por ejemplo, podemos constatar que las últimas reflexiones de Merleau-Ponty, presentes fundamentalmente en Lo visible y lo invisible, representan un parangón constante para el desarrollo de obras como la que Deleuze consagra al pintor Francis Bacon. La investigación que sigue se aboca, pues, a definir los lugares y motivos principales en los que de la mano de la lectura que efectúan de Husserl, se reconocen entre Merleau-Ponty y Deleuze puntos de contacto que desafían la indiferencia aparente desde la que se comprenden sus respectivas filosofías.
Palabras clave: Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty, percepción, carne, intensidad, tiempo magma.
Abstract: Despite the distance between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and of Deleuze, it is possible to discover not only analogue complicity with regard to the criticism addressed to Husserl. In the aesthetic, for example, we note that the last thoughts of Merleau-Ponty, present mainly in The visible and the invisible, are a constant reference for the works that Deleuze dedicates to the painter Francis Bacon. In the present research we expect to define the passages on account of the reading of Husserl, and to show the point of contact between Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. So, we hope to change the image of apparent indifference with regard to understanding their philosophies.
Keywords: Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty, perception, flesh, intensity, time magma.
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