Maritime Routes

Year of the Arab Uprising: Impact on Southeast Asia

by James M. Dorsey

Thursday, December 1, 2011
Year of the Arab Uprising: Impact on Southeast Asia
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Year of the Arab Uprising: Impact on Southeast Asia
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RSIS presents the following commentary Year of the Arab Uprising: Impact on Southeast Asia by James M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg
By James M. Dorsey

Synopsis

The popular revolts sweeping the Middle East and North Africa are part of a global demand for political openness and transparency. Southeast Asia has so far proven adept in its response but has yet to address fundamental issues.

Commentary

TUNISIAN STREET vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation was not simply a cry for justice, freedom and economic opportunity. It was an act of desperation in the face of humiliation, a cry for dignity that resonated with the masses across North Africa and the Middle East.

Bouazizi's death sparked a move to end not just the yoke of tyranny but of neo-patriarchic rule in which the autocratic father figure replicates himself throughout society from head of state to village chief to the head of the nuclear family. The system franchised authoritarian rule. As a result Bouazizi’s cry for dignity was and is a quest for citizenship rather than guardianship, for legitimate authority, transparency and ultimately true sovereignty.

Arguably, more than anything else, Bouazizi’s cry integrated the relatively inward-looking region from Morocco to the Gulf into a globalised world. The region became part of a global trend and in some ways its most resilient, poised to rewrite political geography. The demand for openness and transparency, fuelled by a perceived failure of existing institutions, manifests itself in different ways in different parts of the world. In the West it's
Occupy Wall Street. In the Middle East and North Africa, pushing for greater transparency often meant violence to change ossified dictatorships incapable of accommodation of people's aspirations and reform.

Southeast Asia not immune

Southeast Asia has not been immune to the global trend. Nonetheless, to suggest that the Arab Spring would spark a counterpart uprising in Southeast Asia would be far-fetched. Southeast Asia was already confronting calls for change before the Arab revolt erupted and the impact of the trend in Southeast Asia is evident.

Myanmar has cautiously relaxed strict government control, Malaysia responded to sharp criticism of the police by repealing two sweeping security laws and lifting restrictions on the media and Thai voters returned to power the party of deposed premier Thaksin Shinawatra, a victory for his red-shirted supporters involved in bloody clashes with the military last year. In doing so, Southeast Asian governments have proven to be far more attuned than their Middle Eastern and North African counterparts to what was happening around them and have displayed a greater deal of vision and flexibility. Nonetheless, they will also require forward planning.

Ensuring energy security

When, rather than if, the Arab uprising inevitably spreads to the Gulf, Southeast Asian nations will have to define the risk to their energy security and develop alternatives in case of a disruption in oil and gas supplies as well as increase their focus on alternative energy options. Some, like the Philippines, will also have to deal with the impact of large numbers of migrant workers returning home to escape erupting turmoil.

Non-oil producing Southeast Asian nations like Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines depend on the Middle East for 70 percent of their oil and gas imports.

In addition, Southeast Asia and the Middle East are crucial links in a seaborne commerce conveyor belt that runs from the Gulf to the Pacific. If the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were seen until now as potentially risky maritime choke points, today it is the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf and Bab el Mandeb between Somalia and Yemen that are more vulnerable.

Asia would be most affected if shipping particularly through the Straits of Hormuz were to be interrupted. The United States gets 22 percent of its oil from the Gulf, Europe about 30 percent but Asia all of 75 percent, which makes Asia having the most at stake in terms of energy security.

Southeast Asia’s strategic advantage

Almost a year into the Arab revolt, the Middle East and North Africa region is looking at up to a decade of volatility, uncertainty and bloodshed. The region may be the part of the world where resistance to change will prove to be most adamant with consequences far beyond its borders.

Southeast Asian nations, unlike those in the Middle East and North Africa, with few exceptions have demonstrated an ability to respond to demands for openness and transparency and sought to restore confidence in institutions in ways that do not escalate tensions. Nonetheless, steps taken by Southeast Asian government are likely to prove insufficient. Those steps are by and large designed to remove immediate lightning rods and release pent-up frustration but often do not really address basic grievances, among which corruption figures prominently.

A majority of Southeast Asian governments, unlike their Middle Eastern and North African counterparts, enjoy varying degrees of popularity and legitimacy. To the extent that there is a desire for change, it is a desire to effect change with the government, not in spite of it. That is an asset few Middle Eastern rulers can claim. However to maintain that strategic advantage, Southeast Asian nations will have to develop enlightened, proactive policies that go beyond removing immediate irritants and address real concerns.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

How fast is fast? Technology, trade and speed under sail on the Roman Red Sea.

by Julian Whitewright

Published as
Whitewright, J. 2007. How fast is fast? Technology, trade and speed under sail on the Roman Red Sea. In Natural Resources and Cultural Connections of the Red Sea. Proceedings of Red Sea Project III, J. Starkey, P. Starkey & T. Wilkinson (eds), pp. 77-87. Oxford: BAR International Series 1661.

Amenemhet II and the Sea: maritime aspects of the Mit Rahina (Memphis) inscription

by Ezra Marcus

Russia and the Arctic: the "Last Dash North"

by Keir Giles

Keir Giles and Dr Mark A Smith
September 2007

* The belief that the North Pole region could contain large quantities of oil and gas is one of the major forces... more * The belief that the North Pole region could contain large quantities of oil and gas is one of the major forces driving Russian policy. The North Pole expedition of July-August 2007 laid the ground for submitting a claim to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf that the Lomonosov Ridge belongs to Russia.

* Russia’s claims will be challenged by Canada, the USA and Denmark. The Arctic region is likely to become a region of geopolitical competition later in the 21st century as the ice cap melts.

* There is a widespread view in Russia that its claim to Arctic territory is not speculative, but rightful compensation for territorial losses in Europe.

* Any foreign interest in the area, government, commercial or environmental, is seen as hostile intent.

* Armed action by NATO to contest Russia’s Arctic claims is discussed as a serious possibility.

* Reports of the death of the Russian North are greatly exaggerated, as they take no account of commercial rebirth based on the oil industry.

* Russia has a well-developed commercial and transport infrastructure to take advantage of opportunities offered by the retreating icecap, in contrast to other littoral states.

* Naval re-armament and increased military activity mean the same applies to capacity for military action.

Conference Announcement: “In the Wake of the Basque Whalers: Cultural and Genetic Heritage of the Basques and the Native Americans of the North Atlantic”

by Roslyn Frank

Here is the program for the upcoming International Conference called “In the Wake of the Basque Whalers: Cultural and Genetic Heritage of the Basques and the Native Americans of the North Atlantic”, featuring speakers from across several disciplines and cultures. It will take place 21-22 September 2011 in Bilbao, Spain, on the campus of the University of the Basque Country. It has been coordinated by the BIOMICs unit of UPV/EHU, University of the Basque Country Research Group and the well known film maker, photographer and investigator Xabi Otero of JAUZARREA. The unique blend of presentations in the humanities and hard sciences that characterizes this conference is a reflection of the unique broad-based interdisciplinary approach promoted by the team of geneticists at the University of the Basque Country, most particularly by Dr. Marian M. de Pancorbo, Director of the UPV/EHU BIOMICS unit, and Dr. Sergio Cardoso.

The conference summary is as follows:

“The Basques established relations with Native Americans in the St.... more The conference summary is as follows:

“The Basques established relations with Native Americans in the St. Lawrence River area over many centuries, and evidence of this appears in historical records. A wealth of historical, archaeological and even language records have been preserved as a result of these relations. One can therefore assume that the DNA lineages may also bear witness to these relations, owing to the contribution resulting from the constant trade established with the Native Americans by our whale hunters, cod fishermen and fur traders from the Lower Middle Ages and up until the 20th century.”

The list of participants includes: Dr. Marian M. de Pancorbo (UPV/EHU), Xabi Otero (JAUZARREA), Juan Antonio Urbeltz (IKERFOLK Institute), Dr. Stephen Augustine (Museum of Civilisation, Hull-Ottawa, Traditional Mi’kmaq Chief, Restigouche), Dr. Paul Charest (Laval University, Québec), Ghislain Picard (Head of the Assembly of the First Nations of Québec and Labrador), Dr. Charles A. Martin (University of Montreal), Dr. Stephen Oppenheimer (University of Oxford), Dr. Daniel G. Bradley (Trinity College, Dublin), Dr. Sergio Cardoso (UPV/EHU), Jon Maia and Amets Arzallus, Dr. Roldán Jimeno Aranguren (Public University of Navarre), Dr. Jacques Lacoursière (Laval University, Québec), Dr. Miren Egaña Goya (Aranzadi Scientific Society, Donostia), Dr. Brad Loewen (University of Montreal), Dr. Peter Bakker (University of Aarhus, Denmark), Dr. Robert Grenier (Parks Canada, UNESCO), Xabier Agote (ALBAOLA Association, Pasaia), Dr. Aurélie Arcocha-Scarcia (Université Michel de Montaigen-Bordeaux3, Centre de Recherche sur la Langue et les Textes).

Forthcoming: Roman ports and Mediterranean connectivity

by Andrew Wilson

Wilson, A. I., Schörle, K. and Rice, C. (forthcoming), “Roman ports and Mediterranean connectivity”. In S. Keay (ed.), Rome, Portus and the Mediterranean, Archaeological Monographs of the British School at Rome. British School at Rome London.

This paper examines several interrelated aspects of maritime connectivity within the Roman Mediterranean. First, it... more This paper examines several interrelated aspects of maritime connectivity within the Roman Mediterranean. First, it considers Fulford’s suggestion of a divide between eastern and western trading zones along the North African coast in the light of new discoveries since the publication of his article in Libyan Studies in 1989. Some evidence supports his analysis; the distribution of Italian bricks imported as return cargoes to North Africa does not extend east of the Gulf of Sirt; by contrast the identifiable exports from Cyrenaica go north up the Adriatic but not west to Tripolitania. However, the imported finewares at Berenice (Benghazi) in the third century AD are almost exclusively African Red Slip ware from Tunisia, though it is unclear if they have been imported directly (as clearly occurred much earlier with the import of Punic cooking wares to Cyrenaica), or as return cargoes from an intermediate entrepôt such as Portus. The idea of a certain amount of traffic along the North African littoral is supported by the epigraphic evidence suggesting Alexandrian worshippers at sanctuaries of Isis and Sarapis at major North African ports west of the Gulf of Sirt, who may be part of trading diaspora communities, of the kind attested at Puteoli and elsewhere.

Such trading communities at major ports suggest regular mercantile connections on established routes, with knowledge about general market demand (if not actual price levels) at distant ports, and sometimes contacts between known trading partners. The glass industry is considered as a case study illustrating the geographical integration of the Roman economy through maritime networks between ports. Roman glass production relied heavily on large-scale primary production of raw glass in the Levant, using natron imported from Egypt. The raw glass was then shipped around the Roman world to secondary production centres where it was transformed into a final product; the different stages of production were linked by long-distance maritime trade routes.

Finally, the paper examines how port structures, capacities and facilities might relate to and reflect the patterns of maritime trade in antiquity. The type and size of port infrastructure and harbour capacity can help to construct hierarchies of ports, ranging from villa harbours to major entrepôts like Portus, and to suggest connections between them within regional hierarchies. It is noteworthy that some of the villa harbours of the Roman period could accommodate sizeable sea-going ships capable of undertaking open-water voyages to distant emporia.

Review: G. Aldrete, Floods of the Tiber in Ancient Rome (Baltimore, 2007)

by Eric Kondratieff