Ludwig Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein, Quine and a naturalistic approach to propositional attitudes

by Sofia Stein

Published In: Primer Congreso Logica, Argumentacion y Pensamiento Critico, 2008, Santiago. Actas del Primer Congreso Logica, Argumentacion y Pensamiento Critico. Santiago : Centro de Estudios de la Argumentacion y el Razonamiento, Facultad de Psicologia, Universidad Diego, 2008.

In recent writings of a naturalistic nature, philosophers such as Eric Lormand have tried to explain from a... more In recent writings of a naturalistic nature, philosophers such as Eric Lormand have tried to explain from a philosophical point of view —but based on scientific evidence— what the nature of propositional attitudes is, to what extent they depend on empirical content (e.g. impressions), and to what extent they depend on a mental domain which is not necessarily linked to impressions. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the need to presuppose some kind of correlation between propositional attitudes and internal states —both physical and mental, with the intention of demonstrating certain limits of the explanatory capacity of Wittgenstein’s later anti-mentalism. I will reflect on the relationship between the notion of use and the notion of reference —or ‘self-reference’ in this specific case— in the arguments put forward by John V. Canfield (1996) concerning the differing positions of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Willard Quine regarding propositional attitudes. On the one hand, the analysis will reflect on Wittgenstein’s affirmation that it is unnecessary to establish any kind of internal correlation —to a subject of speech— between the expression of a propositional attitude and an internal state to the subject, in order for ‘correct usage’ of propositional attitudes to occur. On the other hand, this analysis may help to clarify to what extent the behaviourism present in Quine’s semantic perspective (1960; 1990) depends on the supposition of correlations between phrases and stimuli, which is considered by Canfield to be a clearly positivist trait of Quine’s position. The conclusions will not be purely interpretative.  I intend to contribute to the discussion concerning the need to talk about mind experiences —in a naturalistic way— for the explanation of language-games, which are necessarily inter-subjective and intentional.

DISPENSING WITH REFERENCE TO ELEMENTARY EXPERIENCES

by Sofia Stein

Reference of this paper: STEIN, S. I. A. Dispensing with reference to elementary experiences. In: III Meeting on Pragmatism, 2006, Granada. Contributions to the III Meeting on Pragmatism: Inference, Agency and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Granada : Faculty of Philosophy, University of Granada, 2006. p. 105-116.

The aim of this paper is to show that, on the basis of the phenomenalist view in Carnap’s Aufbau, it is possible to... more The aim of this paper is to show that, on the basis of the phenomenalist view in Carnap’s Aufbau, it is possible to observe part of the evolution, from the beginning to the middle of the 20th century, of the philosophical analysis concerning sense and reference in the direction of a more pragmatic view. Some differences between the thought of Carnap in 1928 and the philosophy of Quine, which is close to certain statements of the second phase of Wittgenstein, are established. It is not intended, given the limited number of authors analysed and given the temporal limit of the works discussed, to assert that the evolution noted is the main one. However, on observing this small fragment of the 20th century thought, it is possible to understand better other advances which have occurred in semantics and ontology.

The Multiple Complete Systems Conception as Fil Conducteur of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Pre-Proceedings of the 32nd Wittgenstein International Symposium, 2009. To appear also in the Agora Project.

by Mauro Engelmann

O que é o “Big Typescript”? (What is the “Big Typescript”?) Dois Pontos (2009).

by Mauro Engelmann

The Limits of Silence: Descartes, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Ordinary Language

by Narve Strand

In "Descartes and Cartesianism", Smith, N. D. & Taylor, J. (eds.) (Cambridge Scholars Press, 2005), pp. 133-59

Human Nature in Chinese Thought: A Wittgensteinian Treatment

by Mark N. Basafa

Co-authored with Paul C. L. Tang

Nauseating Flux: Iris Murdoch on Sartre and Heraclitus

by David Robjant

forthcoming, The European Journal of Philosophy
Article first published online: 17 APR 2012

I observe Iris Murdoch’s distinctive use of the word ‘flux’ in discussion of Sartre’s Nausea and show that her usage... more I observe Iris Murdoch’s distinctive use of the word ‘flux’ in discussion of Sartre’s Nausea and show that her usage is persuasive and revolutionary, first as Sartre exegesis, second as Heraclitus exegesis, and throughout as a contribution to the philosophy of language. Murdoch’s usage of ‘flux’ frames a comparison of Sartre’s Roquentin with other figures who have had similarly flowing experience but without nausea. Roquentin's plight is shown to be ‘a philosopher's plight’ precipitated by a defective theory of descriptive success. I then show how the Heraclitean fragments would support Murdoch’s treatment of flux and on close analysis contradict the established view exemplified in the work of Wittgenstein and Jonathan Barnes. Flux is not a variety of change, and the river image ‘cannot be analysed into non-metaphorical components without a loss of substance’.

Understanding the Lion For Real

by Constantine Sandis

Final version forthcoming in (eds.) A. Marques & N. Venturinha, Knowledge, Language and Mind: Wittgenstein's Thought in Progress (Berlin: de Gruyter), 2012.

A longer book-length treatment will subsequently be published as Wittgenstein's Lion.


Comments welcome

Introduction to doctoral dissertation

by Eric T. Kerr

This is the introduction to my doctoral dissertation. It is a work in progress so please do not quote. Please feel welcome to contact me if you are interested in my research and would like to know more.

This dissertation is a contribution to applied social epistemology. That is, it is a philosophical study, based on... more This dissertation is a contribution to applied social epistemology. That is, it is a philosophical study, based on empirical fieldwork research, of social knowledge. I draw on fieldwork research based on drilling and logging techniques in petroleum engineering to analyse the nature of a particular species of knowledge hereto left largely untouched by analytic epistemology – technical knowledge. Technical knowledge is, broadly speaking, knowledge of how to design, produce, and operate a technical artefact. This species of knowledge has not been given proper attention in analytic epistemology despite its prominent place in most cultures. I demonstrate that this knowledge can only be properly accounted for through the lenses of social or ‘anti-individualist’ epistemology and develop an account of technical knowledge strongly influenced by Barry Barnes, Fred Dretske, Martin Kusch, and research in the philosophy of engineering. This account of knowledge is social, rather than individualist, informational, rather than doxastic, and admits what I call extended epistemic systems, rather than constraining the proper attribution of knowledge only to particular human bodies. My thesis delivers a number of central novel theses: I argue that technical knowledge is distinctive and that there is a heuristic value to analysing it as distinct from scientific or ordinary knowledge-how which is often ignored by accounts which point to the convergence of scientific and technological disciplines and think that technical knowledge and the knowledge of engineers is epistemologically uninteresting. I argue that semantic epistemologies such as semantic contextualism and communitarianism ought to follow the implications of their thesis to wit that ‘knows’ (and its cognate terms) should be analysed as semantic ex-pressions. I argue in favour of a meaning finitist approach to this. In order to develop an account of technical knowledge as described above, we will need to know what kinds of things technical artefacts are. Is this knowledge of natural kinds – as scientific knowledge generally is, -- knowledge of social kinds – as sociology generally is – or knowledge of artificial kinds. I argue that technical artefacts are artificial kinds and that knowledge thereof is consequently knowledge of an artificial kind. As argued by Kusch and the Dual Nature Thesis, artificial kinds are kinds which combine the type of reference-talk relevant to natural and social kinds. I analyse reference-talk about another artificial kind – tools – in order to develop an ontology of tools. In the following chapters I consider what kinds of entity can be attributed with possessing technical knowledge. I consider, as a starting point, what tool use is, concluding that, in certain cases, animals as well as some technical artefacts (e.g. computers) can use tools. They can also design and produce tools. Consequently, these are not barriers to including them as bearers of technical knowledge. However, I note that the aforementioned do not, under some accounts, possess beliefs and mental states comparable to those of human knowers. This may prohibit them from truly possessing technical knowledge. Through an argument that focuses on perceptual knowledge, I argue that the bearer of knowledge can extend beyond the boundaries of human bodies. I also argue in favour of an informational approach to knowledge that would include animals and sociotechnical systems (systems comprising of humans and technical artefacts) as bearers of technical knowledge. Finally, the issue of basic sociotechnical systems (e.g. a human using a microscope) knowing raises the possibility of more complex systems knowing (e.g. a team of engineers using tools and computer software). I consider this possibility in the final chapter.

A Nervous Splendor

by Anthony Gottlieb

Essay on the Wittgenstein family, especially Ludwig Wittgenstein and Paul Wittgenstein, a propos Alexander Waugh's "The House of Wittgenstein". Published in the New Yorker on 6th April, 2009

  The Philosophers that Sophie Skipped

by Anthony Gottlieb

Essay on the origins and rise of analytic philosophy. Published in The Economist on 7th December, 1996

Kafka's Verwandlung, Wittgenstein's Tractatus and the Limits of Metaphor

by Rebecca Schuman

The Fideism of the Wittgensteinians

by Angelo Bottone

Published in Metalogicon vol. XIV (2001), 9-24.

Newman and Wittgenstein after Foundationalism

by Angelo Bottone

Published in New Blackfriars, n. 1001 (2005)

Newman and Rahner on the Way to Faith

by Ian Logan

'Newman and Rahner on the Way to Faith - and Wittgenstein came too!', published in 'New Blackfriars', Vol. 82 No. 970 (December 2001) 579-590

excerpt of »Pictorial Ambiguity«

by Nicolas Romanacci

exycerpt of my Master Thesis, based on a presentation at the conference: »Bilder–Sehen–Denken«, Chemnitz 2009.

Abstract: Ambiguity commonly counts as a specific feature of art, implying quite general importance. Though authors... more Abstract: Ambiguity commonly counts as a specific feature of art, implying quite general importance. Though authors like Gombrich did stress its importance for an aesthetic analysis, there’s no comprehensive study at hand regarding ambiguity in art that offers an investigation of the symbol theoretical, the media-specific and the epistemological aspects of ambiguity. My investigation aims to contribute to a view on ambiguity that explores these aspects (or ›levels‹) and particularly also tries to relate these levels to each other – presuming that a differentiated theoretical discourse serves as an important point of departure for a differentiated description of different types of ambiguity, to be precisely elaborated through analysing specific and concrete works of art. Subsequently, it is intended that only differentiated results of investigating the ›theoretical level‹ and the ›media level‹ can serve as a sound reference for statements on a ›general level‹. One basic point of departure for my investigation is the view on interpreting aesthetic experience in terms of treating an artwork as a symbolic object (understood in a conceivable broad sense). Therefore we have to look closely at the ways of reference an artwork has to offer, for this is one important way to analyse how an artwork can be understood. I want to forge an application of this general ›cognitive‹ approach to an analysis of concrete artworks and propose to interprete my investigation as exemplifying an approach to an ›applied cognitive aesthetics‹. This article is an excerpt from my study providing some examples from the applied ›media level‹ and closing with some epistemological considerations.

Den tidige Adolf Loos i Wien - Café Museum, Kärntner bar och Looshaus

by Fred Andersson

Published in the online journal for art history in Finland: "TaHiTi - Taidehistoria Tieteenä" (ISSN 2242-0665), no 2 (2011). Language: Swedish.

Reading Wittgenstein Reading Tolstoy - Saying and Showing in ''The Three Hermits''

by Douglas Duhaime

Paper presented at the 2011 MLA Convention in Los Angeles

Did I do It? Yeah, You Did! Wittgenstein & Libet on free will

by Carlos M. Muñoz-Suárez

Co-authored with: Rene J Campis

This is a standard draft, comments are welcome!!

Classic approaches to the problem of the relation between... more This is a standard draft, comments are welcome!!

Classic approaches to the problem of the relation between subjective choices & intentional motor acts assume that the latter are a direct effect of the former. According to Libet, intentional actions are direct effects of a brain event preceding them (called Readiness Potential). We propose a dual-domain analysis: (I) We claim from a naturalized standpoint that subjective choice is another neurocognitive event that intervenes in the making of intentional actions rather than being just an epiphenomenal event, since subjective choice is intrinsically related to the fixation of the focus of attention; (ii) We claim that the relevant concept of agent must be grasped starting from the relevant domain in which our conception of will make sense (in which we commonly use the concept). Wittgenstein's remarks in his early work seem to coincide with most of our general conclusions.

Die Welt als Grund: Wittgenstein, Gadamer und James

by Núria Sara Miras Boronat

Vortrag, Sektion Philosophie des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts.
XXII Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, LMU München, September 2011