What can we learn from fiction?
Dissertation completed to fulfil requirements of MA Critical Theory at Manchester Metropolitan University
Herein I argue that we can learn from literary texts, but not in the same manner by which we learn from philosophical... more
Herein I argue that we can learn from literary texts, but not in the same manner by which we learn from philosophical texts. I consider whether literary texts are successful in imparting empirical knowledge, knowledge of what it is like to undergo particular experiences, knowledge of how to reconceptualize situations or knowledge of how to empathize; I conclude that literary texts teach us how we may reconceptualize situations and how to better empathize with others.
I begin by considering what we may learn from fictional philosophical thought experiments and reasons why these may succeed and fail to convince the reader, concluding that they successfully challenge intuitions but often fail to establish that the conclusions drawn hold true as generalizations. Next I compare philosophical thought experiments with literary texts, concluding that literary texts can act as thought experiments but, contrary to philosophical thought experiments, will often abstain from prescribing a particular conclusion to the reader. I evaluate New and Stolnitz’s arguments that we cannot learn from literary texts and conclude that they only succeed in establishing that literary texts cannot impart empirical knowledge. Finally I consider the extent to which Nussbaum is successful in arguing that experience of literary reading teaches us how to empathize and to be more compassionate.
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Seen by:Morality and Art: Wayne Booth and the Case of Huck Finn
2007, Philosophy and Literature 31, no. 1: 125-32
In this essay, I argue that it is sometimes inappropriate to appeal to moral criteria in artistic judgments, even when... more In this essay, I argue that it is sometimes inappropriate to appeal to moral criteria in artistic judgments, even when the moral content of an artwork contributes to its artistic value. I suggest that this is the case with artworks that (1) are “interrogative” in form, posing a question or problem that remains unresolved in the work, and (2) have moral dilemmas as a principal theme. Using Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn as an example of morally interrogative artwork, I critique Wayne Booth’s moral defense of the novel. I argue that because Booth incorrectly attributes a moral stance to the book, he overlooks its value as a provocation to critical reflection about morality.

