La Justicia Distributiva en la Concepción Libertariana de Nozick y Hayek
Publicado en la Revista Agenda: Ética , Economía y Políticas Públicas No. 2. Cider, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, 1999
Economic Libertarians, Property, and Institutions: Linking Activism, Ideas and Identities among Property Rights Advocates
Published in The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make, edited by Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold
Twentieth century economic libertarians developed their ideas and identities through legal advocacy. This... more Twentieth century economic libertarians developed their ideas and identities through legal advocacy. This included making use of past arguments concerning the nature of individual property rights that, ironically, involved corporate interests in the late nineteenth century. These corporate interests, eventually, became part of the regulatory framework that property rights activists in the 20th century took aim at. Through the development of a "conservative public interest movement", these activists developed legal arguments within the institutions of the legal profession in part by creating new organizations in that profession, including the Federalist Society. This paper describes this progression, linking ideas and institutions to activism among conservative public interest lawyers who self-identify as economic libertarians.
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Seen by:“Recovering Popular Rule: Calhoun, Sectional Conflict, and Modern America.”
by Lee Cheek
“Recovering Popular Rule: Calhoun, Sectional Conflict, and Modern America.” In Journal of Libertarian Studies, Volume 16, Number 2 (Spring 2002).
From Marxian Objectivism toward Austrian Subjectivism: A Phenomenological Approach
Unabridged version of a paper to be delivered for the joint K.U.Leuven/UCLouvain seminar 'Ethics and Public Policy' (March 2012). Please do not quote.
70 views
Seen by:what can we do? A philosophical analysis on rights and self determination
The principle of self-determination, as commonly intended, is based on a formal and individualistic view of liberty... more The principle of self-determination, as commonly intended, is based on a formal and individualistic view of liberty rights. This perspective, however, is inconsistent with the needs of a community, and particularly with the necessity to promote a relatively stable social order, and an integration between subjects. I propose a different perspective that takes into account the relationships rather than the individual. In particular, I will try to demonstrate 1) that any community implement a specific social order, that is a complex of practices; 2) that any social practices express specific values, 3) that these values are the result of historical and cultural circumstances, 4) that they are subject to an ongoing public debate, and finally 5) that only if the individual praxis is consistent with these values can it lead to recognition of rights. In that perspective does not exist a general liberty to determine itself, outside of a specific relational situation. It could only be affirmed that one has a practical liberty (not a right) to do and to act as it wants, but its rights depends on relationships in which the person is engaged.
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Seen by:The famous violinist and the political morality of abortion
Submitted as an assessed essay for the final-year undergraduate module 'Issues in Political Theory' at Warwick University. It was graded at a high 1st.
This paper argues that J. J. Thomson's famous violinist example, and self-ownership principles generally, cannot... more This paper argues that J. J. Thomson's famous violinist example, and self-ownership principles generally, cannot defend the political morality of abortion except in cases where pregnancy results from rape.
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60 views
Seen by:Poziția libertariană și stâng-libertariană cu privire la imigrare
by Diana Todea
Published in "Volume Colective", nr. 7, ed. Gratian Cormos, Argonaut Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 2010.
Website: http://revistainternationala.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=art
A libertarian account of freedom of movement and open borders
by Diana Todea
Published in The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies, 2 (2), 2010, Argonaut Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, Romania.
Website: http://revistainternationala.com/
In this paper the discussion focuses on the freedom of movement, on the perspective of open borders and the right of... more
In this paper the discussion focuses on the freedom of movement, on the perspective of open borders and the right of exit from communities.
Firstly, I offer a discussion on normative claims about immigration. Taking into account that immigration should be sustained, I analyse the arguments that promote this position. Secondly, I respond to the converse claim that immigration should not be supported from a libertarian perspective. A consequentialist libertarian would prefer immigration due to
its positive effects it has on society and that it maximizes liberty. A deontological libertarian will oppose immigration, on the false premise that it inflicts abuses and creates disorder.
I conclude that a libertarian should support immigration because it pleads for the maximization of liberty for all individuals, whereas the decision to close the borders and restrict freedom of movement supports the constraints of the state upon the free will
of individuals.
The “Open” Contract of Immigration: A Reply to Block and Callahan
by Diana Todea
This article is a reply to an article written by Prof. Walter Block and Prof. Callaghan: "The libertarian case for free immigration" (1998).
Published in The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies, nr. 5 (3), 2011, Argonaut Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, Romania.
Website: http://revistainternationala.com/
In this paper I argue that the debate which focuses around the right of immigration can be redirected towards a new... more In this paper I argue that the debate which focuses around the right of immigration can be redirected towards a new perspective: we should focus on signing contracts for immigration which automatically will give the right to immigrate to the potential immigrant that signs this contract with an individual/group/community from the host state. This contract has a symbolic meaning: it guarantees to the citizens from within the host state that the immigrant has good will and he is willing to be responsible for his future acts and these will not negatively affect the host society. The rights of both immigrants and citizens of the host states are protected via the “open” contract of immigration which supports the idea that immigrants become a commodity in the international market.
Stakeholding and Safety Nets
Nozick’s version of libertarianism is incoherent, even if one accepts the doubtful assumption that all ethical issues... more
Nozick’s version of libertarianism is incoherent, even if one accepts the doubtful assumption that all ethical issues can be reduced to property rights. Nozickian libertarianism requires 1) Unconditional property rights, established by 2) a lineage of just transfers traceable to 3) a just original acquisition. The purpose of this paper is to discredit all three of those criteria for determining property rights. No government, not even a night watchman libertarian state, can function if it makes property rights unconditional. No one in the real world can justify their property rights by citing a lineage of just acquisitions. Finally, the
concept of a unilaterally declared original acquisition, which supposedly supplies the foundation for all other property rights, is incoherent and unjust. A more moderate form of libertarianism would require institutions that strive to create approximate equality of opportunity. Those who took advantage of those opportunities would have a right to keep most of the wealth they created, and an obligation to create similar opportunities for others
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Seen by:Can libertarianism be coherently and plausibly combined with egalitarianism?
by Jiri Krcek
2nd year undergraduate essay. Mark: 75
Damian White and Gideon Kossoff Anarchism and Environmental Thought
by Damian White
Summary/review of the relationship between anarchism and environmentalism over the last century,,,,
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Seen by: and 13 morePersuasion and Liberty
by J.K. Miles
Draft Do not Distribute without Permission. Comments Welcome
First I will examine the intuitive compatibility between persuasion and liberty suggesting that this compatibility... more First I will examine the intuitive compatibility between persuasion and liberty suggesting that this compatibility harbors some difficulties regarding the value of persuasion. I will then look at two attempts to resolve these difficulties both from the broad classical liberal tradition. One of these traditions, social contract libertarianism—Represented by Jan Narveson-- tolerates public persuasion but denies its value. The other resolution comes from Mill. While valuing liberty and especially the living of autonomous lives, Mill also values persuasion as an important part of society going so far as to encourage the confrontation that public advocacy often inevitably creates. My conclusion will be that Mill’s perfectionist liberalism is more justified than Jan Narveson’s social contract libertarianism.
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Seen by: and 4 moreToppling the Jenga Tower: A Critique Of Nozick’s Theory of Holdings
Published in Pharmakon (American University) Issue #2, Spring 2009.
Proponents of an unrestricted free market and of a minimal state frequently use the philosophy of Robert Nozick to... more Proponents of an unrestricted free market and of a minimal state frequently use the philosophy of Robert Nozick to criticize government action. While this has obviously harmful ramifications for any project of social welfare, it also rests on tenuous philosophic justifications. This paper seeks to analyze the theoretical shortcomings of Nozick’s theory of holdings, a fundamental premise in his political philosophy as described in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. It concludes that, because of theoretical as well as practical shortcomings, Nozick’s theory of acquisition and transfer is untenable as the basis for a rational theory of distributive justice.
Libertarian Self-Defeat
by Evan Riley
Published in the Journal of Moral Philosophy in 2010.
I show that the standard libertarian conception of justice is vulnerable to a kind of basic collective self-defeat not... more
I show that the standard libertarian conception of justice is vulnerable to a kind of basic collective self-defeat not characteristic of its rivals. All deontological liberals, including the libertarian, ought to be committed to two very general claims regarding the nature of justice. The RSC (Reasonable Stability Criterion) is the requirement that in the just society, human beings will typically exhibit genuine literacy with the relevant conception. The MEC (Moral Education Condition) consists in the thought that a necessary condition for any such literacy is a proper moral education. It is consistent with full respect for standard libertarian justice that a society living under its auspices will fail to satisfy the RSC by failing to provide moral education to those who need it. This issues in the collective self-defeat of the conception, for by respecting all and only the constraints of libertarian justice, the group will have undermined the achievement of a characteristic aim.
Hugh Breakey, "Property, Persons, Boundaries: The Argument from Other-Ownership" Social Theory and Practice, Vol 37, no. 2 (2011), pp. 189-210.
by Hugh Breakey
A question of interpersonal sovereignty dating back to the early modern era has resurfaced in contemporary political... more A question of interpersonal sovereignty dating back to the early modern era has resurfaced in contemporary political philosophy: viz. Should one individual have, prior to any consent, property rights in another person? Libertarians answer that they should not – and that this commitment requires us to reject all positive duties. Liberal-egalitarians largely agree with the libertarian’s answer to the question, but deny the corollary they draw from it, arguing instead that egalitarian regimes do not require other-ownership. Drawing on recent property theory I argue the libertarians are wrong that positive duties necessarily imply other-ownership, and the egalitarians are wrong that egalitarian entitlements largely avoid other-ownership. Instead, a prohibition on other-ownership guides us towards a middling political position, both allowing and constraining our positive duties and liabilities to others. I conclude by suggesting that a prohibition on other-ownership creates an attractive boundary condition for property in general.

