Korean Politics

La confrontación latente: El futuro incierto de la península coreana

by Asier Blas Mendoza

Blas Mendoza, Asier e Iker (2007): "La confrontación latente: el futuro incierto de la península coreana", Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, núm. 78, p. 197-216.

En el presente artículo se abordan los cambios acontecidos en las relaciones intercoreanas tras el derrumbe de los... more En el presente artículo se abordan los cambios acontecidos en las relaciones intercoreanas tras el derrumbe de los regímenes soviéticos. En los primeros años que siguieron a la caída del Telón de Acero, se mantuvo en todo el perímetro coreano un escenario de confrontación que parecía perpetuar el problema sine die. Pero en la segunda mitad de los años noventa, el Nordeste Asiático comienza a vivir un auténtico cambio que repercutirá en la aparición de contactos públicos entre las dos Coreas. El nuevo juego destapado oficialmente por la Sunshine Policy propició un replanteamiento muy profundo en las políticas exteriores de ambos estados, y abrió un nuevo capítulo en las relaciones intercoreanas que ha demostrado claramente la importante dimensión y repercusión del conflicto en el marco
geoestratégico de todo el Este Asiático, así como en la política internacional.

The New Korean Asianism

by Arnaud Leveau

July editorial, Asia Network (CNRS)

In 2007 South Korea and ASEAN signed a free trade agreement (FTA) completed by an investment agreement in 2009. Also... more In 2007 South Korea and ASEAN signed a free trade agreement (FTA) completed by an investment agreement in 2009. Also in 2009 the Asean-Korea Center had been created in Seoul. It aims is to promote economic relations and socio-cultural cooperation between South Korea and Asean countries. In 2010 on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Hanoi a joint statement Asean / South Korea for a strategic partnership has been adopted. The latter is accompanied by a concrete action plan covering the period 2011-2015 whose objective is to enhance economic and cultural ties and to strength dialogue and partnership on security issues. Furthermore the South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has proposed to create a structure allowing the Minister of Economy of the five Mekong countries (Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam) and their Korean counterpart to meet regularly to work on development programs. These actions are a part of the Korean strategy launched in March 2009 and called the New Asian Initiative that aims to develop relations with countries beyond South Korea usual scope (U.S, Northeast Asia and European Unio

A Comparative Study on the End of Authoritarian Regime and the Real Situation of Democratic Consolidation in South Korea and Indonesia

by suray agung nugroho

Journal of International Studies, 2001/No.4 (Vol.2, No.2),Graduate School of International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (GSIAS, HUFS)

From Developmental State to Developmental Society? The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Recent Korean Development and Possible Lessons for Developing Countries

by Thomas Kalinowski

2009. International Studies Review (Ewha) 10 (1):53-71.

In the 1980s and 1990s, rapid market oriented reforms, liberalization and privatization (“shock therapy”) in... more In the 1980s and 1990s, rapid market oriented reforms, liberalization and privatization (“shock therapy”) in developing and transformational countries caused economic and social problems that began to undermine the legitimacy of political democratization and market reforms itself. Scholars in the field of transformation and development theory found that market coordination alone was not able to fill the void left by a weak or weakening state. In this essay, we look at the case of Korea to find out if an active civil society can substitute functions of the withdrawing developmental state since the 1980s. We show that civil society organizations (CSOs) in Korea have been relatively effective in influencing political processes, shaping public opinion, compensating the weakness of political institutions, and contributing to general development. Korean CSOs achieved this remarkable impact despite substantial organizational problems and a relatively unfavorable socioeconomic and political environment. This effectiveness and the synergy between state and civil society make Korean CSOs very interesting to study for development scholars. Korea might offer some valuable lessons on how to improve advocacy CSOs in an unfavorable environment similar to that of many developing countries.

Korea's Recovery since the 1997/98 Financial Crisis: The Last Stage of the Developmental State

by Thomas Kalinowski

2008. New Political Economy 13 (4):447-462.

In this article, I challenge the view that Korea‟s successful macroeconomic recovery from the 1997/98 financial crisis... more In this article, I challenge the view that Korea‟s successful macroeconomic recovery from the 1997/98 financial crisis was the result of market-oriented reforms and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-prescribed structural adjustments. I show that the recovery was mainly achieved by the „traditional strengths‟ of the pre-crisis development model, resting on export orientation and strong state capacity, rather than a transformation into a new „neoliberal‟ state. However, I also show that economic liberalisation and market reforms undermine state capacity and restrict a proactive and developmental role of the state. In short, the successful recovery was the last stage of the developmental state in Korea. The article is organised as follows. In section one, I provide a critical review of the relevant literature on Korean post-crisis restructuring and present my argument in more detail. In section two, I show that the main contributor in stabilising the economy and replenishing foreign currency reserves was Korea‟s exports, and not the process of regaining foreign investors‟ confidence through market opening and financial liberalisation. In section three, I illustrate the importance of state intervention for the economic recovery of Korea and, in section four, I argue that this state capacity is a product of the Korean developmental state, which has slowly been undermined by market-oriented reforms. I conclude in section five that Korea‟s successful recovery has been based on the two pillars of export orientation and state expansion, which face internal and external limitations, making a similar strategy unviable for other countries and even for potential future crises in Korea.

L'essor du tigre : Les ambitions sud-coréennes en Asie du Sud-Est / The Surge of the Tiger : The South Korean Ambitions in Southeast Asia

by Arnaud Leveau

Published in "Asie du Sud-Est 2011"
Eds by Arnaud Leveau & Benoît de Tréglodé
Irasec, les Indes Savantes
pp.55-71

A Key element of the new Korean strategy, Southeast Asia remains a laboratory of power for the Korean government... more
A Key element of the new Korean strategy, Southeast Asia remains a laboratory of power for the Korean government and companies in their efforts to gain influences in the world affairs. The mechanisms elaborated in the region are already partly duplicated in some other parts of the world such as Latin American or Africa. Worried by the rise of China, South Korea seeks to create a network of friends with countries sharing similar concerns and with whom strengthen its relations not only economically but also politically and strategically.

‘Strategic Culture and the Korean Peninsula Crisis: Conceptual Challenges and Policy Opportunities.’

by James Stratford

Published in Security Challenges, 1:1, (2005) 123-35. Can be viewed freely by going to http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol1no1Stratford.pdf

The prospect of a nuclear capable North Korea has seen the strategic crisis on the Korean peninsula take on an... more The prospect of a nuclear capable North Korea has seen the strategic crisis on the Korean peninsula take on an additional layer of complexity and potentially catastrophic lethality. Recent analysis tends to focus only on the period since the Korean War and consequently pays little attention to historical and cultural factors, which inform the context in which the North Korean (and the South as well for that matter) elites operate. This paper is an attempt to demonstrate how an appreciation of traditional strategic culture and the broader history in which the crisis is situated can enhance our understanding of the motivations for, and functions of, this nuclear capability.

The Bombardment of Yeonpyeong: A Stepping Stone to a Second Korean War?

by Thomas French

Defence Viewpoints, UK Defence Forum, 29 November 2010.

The recent shelling by the North Korean People's Army of Yeonpyeong Island and the resultant civilian and military... more The recent shelling by the North Korean People's Army of Yeonpyeong Island and the resultant civilian and military casualties have raised many questions about the possible causes behind, and responses to, this clear act of aggression.

Causes

Much like the original outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 the exact cause or 'who fired first' in this incident may never be known. However, it seems that the North Korean shelling began ostensibly in response to an artillery exercise by the South Korean military. Nevertheless, the bombardment is believed by most observers, and crucially, the South Korean leadership, to have been a premeditated act of aggression.

Much like the sinking of the Cheonan on 26 March the incident has provoked a flurry of speculation about the North's motivation behind these highly risky acts of aggression. Some have speculated that the attack could be a response to the recent hosting of the G20 by the South, with the North unwilling to be upstaged by its southern neighbour. Others have argued that the attack could be a result of the recent statements by a US diplomat that Americans would not reward Northern provocations by returning to the six party talks. The often advanced theory of blaming of the incident on 'rogue elements' within the Northern military is also a common theme. No doubt these and the clichés of the North as a 'mad', 'bad' or even 'sad' regime will fill much of the commentary on the incident.

These rather flimsy arguments seem to unravel when confronted by the question: why would the North risk so much over such minor incidents as it would almost certainly be defeated if it came to war? A more credible explanation lies in attempting to assume the perspective of the Kim regime and the choices available to it.

Caught in the midst of a succession crisis, the ailing Kim Jong-il seems to want to ensure the smooth transition of power to his heir apparent Kim Jong-un. A useful tool in this seems to be winning the support of both the military and people through 'victories' over the United States and its South Korean 'puppet'. As noted in B.R. Myers's recent book The Cleanest Race this form of anti American / South Korean propaganda is very common in the North and a the sinking of a southern warship and the bombardment of a military base offer the chance to renew and strengthen this narrative and with it the interconnected Kim dynasty personality cult and central, highly respected position of the military.

Responses

The cessation of the bombardment and the apparent absence of any further acts of aggression seem to prove that the North doesn't seek a wider conflict, however the full response of the South is yet to be revealed. As noted in a previous Defence Viewpoints article, three possibilities lay open to the Southern government, sanctions, a blockade of some kind and finally, military action. It seems that the South too does not yet seek an escalation of the incident however the remarks by Southern President Lee Myung-bak that the attack would be met "through action", not just words may hint at a tougher line over the coming days. It seem Southern patience is wearing thin and this coupled with the inevitable public outcry and the clear opportunity the attack provides for a strike against the North's nuclear facilities, (including the recently discovered centrifuges at the Yongbyon nuclear complex) might yet result in a hardening of the South's attitude towards its northern neighbour.