The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-how
by Yuri Cath
2009. “The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-how”, Noûs Volume 43:1, pp. 137–56
What follows for the ability hypothesis reply to the knowledge argument if knowledge-how is just a form of... more What follows for the ability hypothesis reply to the knowledge argument if knowledge-how is just a form of knowledge-that? The obvious answer is that the ability hypothesis is false. For the ability hypothesis says that, when Mary sees red for the first time, Frank Jackson’s super-scientist gains only knowledge-how and not knowledge-that. In this paper I argue that this obvious answer is wrong: a version of the ability hypothesis might be true even if knowledge-how is a form of knowledge-that. To establish this conclusion I utilize Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s well-known account of knowledge-how as “simply a species of propositional knowledge” (Stanley & Williamson 2001: 1). I demonstrate that we can restate the core claims of the ability hypothesis – that Mary only gains new knowledge-how and not knowledge-that – within their account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that. I examine the implications of this result for both critics and proponents of the ability hypothesis.
Knowing How Without Knowing That
by Yuri Cath
Forthcoming. To appear in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, J. Bengson and M. Moffett eds., Oxford University Press
In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that.... more In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and Intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative shows how even if the arguments given here succeed it might still be reasonable to hold that knowing how to do something is a matter of standing in an intentional relation to a proposition other than the knowledge-that relation.
Regarding a Regress
by Yuri Cath
Forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (final version will differ a bit from this one)
Intellectualism is the view that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. The most famous objection to this view is... more Intellectualism is the view that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. The most famous objection to this view is Gilbert Ryle’s objection that it must be false on pain of avoiding an infinite and vicious regress. However, despite its fame, the status of this objection is highly contested. The aim of this paper is to clarify and advance the often rather confusing debates about whether there is a successful regress argument against intellectualism. Towards this end, I identify what I take to be the most basic and plausible form of a regress argument against intellectualism—the employment regress. I argue that the employment regress fails and then use this conclusion to help clarify and criticise other regress arguments in the literature.
Knowledge-how, Linguistic Intellectualism, and Ryle's Return
Final Draft. Published in: Tolksdorf, Stefan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 269-304.
How should we understand knowledge-how – knowledge how to do something? And how is it related to knowledge-that –... more How should we understand knowledge-how – knowledge how to do something? And how is it related to knowledge-that – knowledge that something is the case?1 In this paper, I will discuss a very important and influential aspect of this question, namely the claim – dubbed ‘Intellectualism’ by Gilbert Ryle (1945, 1949) – that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that. Recently, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) have tried to establish Intellectualism with the aid of linguistic considerations. This project – Linguistic Intellectualism – will be criticized on three levels. First, I will reconstruct and object to Stanley & Williamson’s positive argument in favour of Intellectualism (section 2). Second, I will assess their view of the relationship between knowledge-how and practical ability and argue that their stance is not well-motivated (section 3). Third, I will discuss their criticism of Ryle’s objection against Intellectualism. After distinguishing between different versions of Ryle’s argument, I will show that its strongest version is both immune to the objection by Stanley & Williamson and a decisive argument against their own theory (section 4). Given that Intellectualism fails for these three reasons, I finally draw on a broader reading of Ryle in order to develop the beginnings of a positive account of knowledge-how and its relationship to knowledge-that (section 5).

