La tercera antinomia de la razón pura su crítica y resolución en el Sistema de Hegel
En: López, Diana María (comp.), Experiencia y límite. Kant Kolloquium (1804-2004), Ediciones de la Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Santa Fe, 2009, pp. 195-207.
A superação hegeliana do dualismo entre determinismo e liberdade
Paper reat at the Symposium `Sujeito e liberdade na filosofia moderna alemã´, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, Brazil, August 26-28, 2011.
3 views
Seen by:Becoming Spirit: Morality in Hegel's Phenomenology and Bergman's Through a Glass Darkly
Published in Evental Aesthetics
The following essay brings together philosophy and film. On the one hand, it is a short study of Hegel’s chapter on... more The following essay brings together philosophy and film. On the one hand, it is a short study of Hegel’s chapter on morality in the Phenomenology of Spirit. On the other hand, it deals with some of the moral conflicts presented in Ingmar Bergman’s 1961 film, Through a Glass Darkly. Central to my discussion is the concept of God. I aim to show how God, manifest in absolute Spirit, should not be understood as a transcendental figure located in a beyond, but as a concrete entity found within the acts of forgiveness and reconciliation.
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Seen by:Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World (Book Review)
Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World
Alex Karolis
Contemporary Political Theory 7, 111-114 (25 February 2008) doi:10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300317
"Commentary on Henry E. Allison’s 'Autonomy and Spontaneity in Kant’s Conception of the Self'"
class paper written February 24, 2010
Weltbürgerrecht und Kolonialismuskritik bei Kant
In: Gerhardt, Volker u. a. (Hg.): Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Band 4. De Gruyter: Berlin 2001.
Willing the Law
Published in Peter Bauman & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts (2004)
Presents a "concessive" Kantian ethics, in which agents sometimes have good reason for doing the wrong... more Presents a "concessive" Kantian ethics, in which agents sometimes have good reason for doing the wrong thing, though they also have reason not to have those reasons.
The Contradictions of Moral Life: Hegel's Critique of Kant
by John Russon
Chapter 10 of John Russon, _Reading Hegel's Phenomenology_, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp 147-156, (and notes, pp 255-256).
This is an interpretation of the "Morality" section of Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_. I identify the... more This is an interpretation of the "Morality" section of Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_. I identify the central insight of Kant's moral philosophy, explain the core idea involved in Hegel's criticism of Kant's moral position, and then define what Hegel's positive position on morality is.
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Seen by: and 4 moreBeyond Price
Published in Ethics (2008)
Kant's argument against the morality of suicide. Kant's argument against the morality of suicide.
52 views
Seen by:Why Ought I Be Rational?
by Joey Miller
- Term Paper for Professor Lydia Patton's "Kant's Ethical Thought" Seminar (Fall 2011)
- Southwest Graduate Student Conference in Philosophy, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, Mar 2-3, 2012
In this paper I argue that any attempt to ground ethical concepts in pure rationality (thereby necessarily excluding... more In this paper I argue that any attempt to ground ethical concepts in pure rationality (thereby necessarily excluding appeals to empirical facts) is inevitably inadequate because it cannot provide an appropriate answer to the “why be moral” question. While the ethical rationalists seem to have a simple and straightforward answer to this question, difficulties arise in any attempt to provide an answer while continuing to adhere to the rationalist approach. Essentially, for the rationalist, the question “why be moral?” reduces to the question “why be rational?”, and the rationalist has two ways of addressing this question. First, they can claim that the question is ridiculous and requires no explanation, or, secondly, they can see it as a legitimate question and attempt to provide an answer. I argue that both attempts fail for the rationalist, and any attempt to answer the “why be moral” question cannot be done within a rationalist framework. In section II I provide a brief explanation of the rationalist approach, using Immanuel Kant’s framework as the primary example, followed, in section III, by an explanation of the rationalist’s answer to the question “why be moral?”. Section IV draws out some of the difficulties in this seemingly straightforward answer by explaining the two approaches the rationalist can take and how both approaches are inadequate. Finally, in section V, I explain the significance of this conclusion as it suggests that any attempt to build an ethical theory is going to seem to require a grounding of ethical concepts in empirical facts.
Kant's Solution to the Sidgwick Problem
This is the peer-reviewed version of an article forthcoming in the European Journal of Philosophy.
In this paper I examine Kant’s discussion of freedom in the Metaphysics of Morals, while devoting special attention to... more In this paper I examine Kant’s discussion of freedom in the Metaphysics of Morals, while devoting special attention to the question as to whether indeed, as many commentators have claimed, it contains a solution to an objection raised by Carl Leonhard Reinhold in the collected edition of his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy and again by Henry Sidgwick in a famous paper published in 1888. In the first section, I provide a concise formulation of what I believe to be the core of Reinhold’s and Sidgwick’s objection under the title “Objection R/S” and then describe the general structure of the predominant strategy by which commentators have tried to avoid it through recourse to a famous passage in the Metaphysics of Morals. In the second, I recount just enough of the history behind this passage to provide a proper context for its interpretation and, in particular, to show its historical link to Objection R/S. In the remaining sections, I argue that the passage pointed to by commentators does not and indeed cannot contain any solution along the lines so far suggested. By way of conclusion, I consider whether the results I have reached cohere with other passages from Kant’s works and briefly suggest but leave undeveloped an alternative strategy for meeting Objection R/S.
Assessing Components of Morality
by Robert Shaw
Robert Keith Shaw (1997) Assessing Components of Morality. Thesis (Master of Philosophy). Auckland: The University of Auckland.
An investigation into the assessment of the moral components which were developed by John Wilson, is reported. Tests... more An investigation into the assessment of the moral components which were developed by John Wilson, is reported. Tests fox the classroom measurement of two components were developed. The components were; PHIL(CC), the claiming of concern for other persons as an overriding, universal, and prescriptive principle in moral decision making; and; GIG, knowledge of factual information which is relevant in making moral decisions which subjects face. The test development exercise was undertaken at a time when public interest in moral education was growing. The recent demand for moral education in Auckland is reviewed.

