Kant's Ethics

'Ought' Does Not Imply 'Can'

by Paul Saka

The Contradictions of Moral Life: Hegel's Critique of Kant

by John Russon

Chapter 10 of John Russon, _Reading Hegel's Phenomenology_, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp 147-156, (and notes, pp 255-256).

This is an interpretation of the "Morality" section of Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_. I identify the... more This is an interpretation of the "Morality" section of Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_. I identify the central insight of Kant's moral philosophy, explain the core idea involved in Hegel's criticism of Kant's moral position, and then define what Hegel's positive position on morality is.

Why Ought I Be Rational?

by Joey Miller

- Term Paper for Professor Lydia Patton's "Kant's Ethical Thought" Seminar (Fall 2011)
- Southwest Graduate Student Conference in Philosophy, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, Mar 2-3, 2012

In this paper I argue that any attempt to ground ethical concepts in pure rationality (thereby necessarily excluding... more In this paper I argue that any attempt to ground ethical concepts in pure rationality (thereby necessarily excluding appeals to empirical facts) is inevitably inadequate because it cannot provide an appropriate answer to the “why be moral” question. While the ethical rationalists seem to have a simple and straightforward answer to this question, difficulties arise in any attempt to provide an answer while continuing to adhere to the rationalist approach. Essentially, for the rationalist, the question “why be moral?” reduces to the question “why be rational?”, and the rationalist has two ways of addressing this question. First, they can claim that the question is ridiculous and requires no explanation, or, secondly, they can see it as a legitimate question and attempt to provide an answer. I argue that both attempts fail for the rationalist, and any attempt to answer the “why be moral” question cannot be done within a rationalist framework. In section II I provide a brief explanation of the rationalist approach, using Immanuel Kant’s framework as the primary example, followed, in section III, by an explanation of the rationalist’s answer to the question “why be moral?”. Section IV draws out some of the difficulties in this seemingly straightforward answer by explaining the two approaches the rationalist can take and how both approaches are inadequate. Finally, in section V, I explain the significance of this conclusion as it suggests that any attempt to build an ethical theory is going to seem to require a grounding of ethical concepts in empirical facts.

Assessing Components of Morality

by Robert Shaw

Robert Keith Shaw (1997) Assessing Components of Morality. Thesis (Master of Philosophy). Auckland: The University of Auckland.

An investigation into the assessment of the moral components which were developed by John Wilson, is reported. Tests... more An investigation into the assessment of the moral components which were developed by John Wilson, is reported. Tests fox the classroom measurement of two components were developed. The components were; PHIL(CC), the claiming of concern for other persons as an overriding, universal, and prescriptive principle in moral decision making; and; GIG, knowledge of factual information which is relevant in making moral decisions which subjects face. The test development exercise was undertaken at a time when public interest in moral education was growing. The recent demand for moral education in Auckland is reviewed.

‘Three Perspectives on Abraham’s Defense Against Kant’s Charge of Immoral Conduct’

by Stephen Palmquist

The Journal of Religion 89:4 (October 2009), pp.467-497 (co-authored with Philip Rudisill)

Kant on Keeping a Secret

by James Mahon

The Truth About Kant On Lies

by James Mahon

The Alleged Paradox of Self-Legislation and the Normative Requirements of the Rational Will: Kant’s Derivation of the Categorical Imperative Reconsidered

by Bob Robinson

Draft. I am unsatisfied with a couple parts of the paper. I welcome any comments on how I might improve it. The paper: I take aim at Henry Allison and Allen Wood's criticisms of Kant's derivation of the categorical imperative. My chief claim is that both fail to recognize that in his derivation of the categorical imperative, Kant argues that rational agents self-legislate their _maxims_. This then allows Kant to appeal to the categorical imperative as the criterion of practical rationality, since not all maxims are fit for universality.

Kant on Friendship

by Stijn Van Impe

Published in International Journal of Arts & Sciences, 2011, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 127-139.

Kantiaanse Etiquette. De Onbekende Kant over Morele Vriendschap

by Stijn Van Impe

Published in Antenne, 2011 [Tijdschrift voor de Unie van Vrijzinnige Verenigingen] [On invitation]

I sincerely wish to thank Ward De Baene for his kind invitation to write a modest, popular essay on Kant's account of moral friendship for a broad audience.

Intentionality, Normativity and Communality in Kant’s Realm of Ends

by Stijn Van Impe

Co-authored with Bart Vandenabeele as second author. Published in Mario Šilar & Felipe Schwember Augier (eds.) (2009), Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity, special issue of Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico, N° 212, pp. 125–133.

Kant on Political and Ethical Communities with Regard to Perpetual Peace

by Stijn Van Impe

In Patricia Hanna (ed.) (2009), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies, volume 3, Athens: ATINER, pp. 105–118.

Kant's Realm of Ends: A Communal Moral Practice as Locus for the Unity of Moral Personhood

by Stijn Van Impe

Published in Stephen Palmquist (ed.) (2010), Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 424-437.

A Reply to Kant’s Moral Despair Argument against Atheism

by Stijn Van Impe

Published in Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference of Young Scientists: Humanities and Social Sciences 2010, Lviv: Publishing House of Lviv Polytechnic, 2010, pp. 306–307.

Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide. Edited by Andrews Reath & Jens Timmerman (2010). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

by Stijn Van Impe

Review published in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 2010, vol. 72(4), pp. 815–817.

‘Kant’s Moral Theism and Moral Despair Argument against Atheism’.

by Stijn Van Impe

Published in early view online in The Heythrop Journal.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00656.x

Kant’s Realm of Ends and Realm of Grace Reconsidered

by Stijn Van Impe

Forthcoming in Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca, Margit Ruffing (eds.) (2013), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010, Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Kant on Freedom and Radical Evil in Infancy

by Joseph Cannon

forthcoming in the Proceedings of the XIth International Kant Congress, De Gruyter

The Moral Value of Artistic Beauty in Kant

by Joseph Cannon

Published in Kantian Review (16.1 March 2011), with comment by Paul Guyer and reply by the author

In § 42 of the third Critique, ‘On the intellectual interest in the beautiful,’ Kant claims that it is ‘always the... more In § 42 of the third Critique, ‘On the intellectual interest in the beautiful,’ Kant claims that it is ‘always the mark of a good soul’ (5:298) to take an ‘immediate interest’ in natural beauty because it indicates a moral interest in harmony between nature and moral freedom. In the same pages, however, he denies the possibility of a similarly morally significant interest in artistic beauty. This paper argues that according to his own theory of fine art Kant ought not to deny this value to artistic beauty. In the pages that immediately follow his discussion of immediate interest Kant defines artistic beauty as the joint product of a ‘natural gift’ of genius and a freely exercised discipline of skill and taste. This commits him to the claim that artistic beauty embodies and expresses a harmony between nature and freedom in the productive act of a human being, and thus to the claim that one can take an immediate and morally significant interest in artistic beauty, just as much as in natural beauty.