Kantian ethics

Kantian Practical Love

by Melissa Fahmy

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91.3 (Sept. 2010): 313-331

Active Sympathetic Participation: Reconsidering Kant's Duty of Sympathy

by Melissa Fahmy

Kantian Review 14.1 (2009): 31-52.

Beneficence and Other Duties of Love in The Metaphysics of Morals

by Melissa Fahmy

Co-authored with Marcia Baron, in The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, ed. Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009): 211-228.

Love, Respect, and Interfering with Others

by Melissa Fahmy

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (May 2011): 174-192.

"Commentary on Henry E. Allison’s 'Autonomy and Spontaneity in Kant’s Conception of the Self'"

by William J. Urban

class paper written February 24, 2010

"The Subject of Freedom in Kant’s Practical Philosophy"

by William J. Urban

class paper written May 31, 2010

'Ought' Does Not Imply 'Can'

by Paul Saka

Willing the Law

by J. David Velleman

Published in Peter Bauman & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts (2004)

Presents a "concessive" Kantian ethics, in which agents sometimes have good reason for doing the wrong... more Presents a "concessive" Kantian ethics, in which agents sometimes have good reason for doing the wrong thing, though they also have reason not to have those reasons.

The Voice of Conscience

by J. David Velleman

Published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1999)

An interpretation of the Categorical Imperative, based on the metaphor of a "voice of conscience" An interpretation of the Categorical Imperative, based on the metaphor of a "voice of conscience"

Love as a Moral Emotion

by J. David Velleman

Published in Ethics (1999)

On the relation between love and Kantian respect for persons On the relation between love and Kantian respect for persons

Life of Virtue Being an End in Itself

by Carmela Cyril Lua

Final paper submitted for Philo 197

This paper explores what it means to live a life of virtue in line with Aristotle’s concept of Eudaimonism, connects... more This paper explores what it means to live a life of virtue in line with Aristotle’s concept of Eudaimonism, connects said concept to Virtue Ethics, delves into the common notion that Virtue Ethics (that which corresponds to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics) is a teleological kind of virtue and finally, attempts to prove otherwise, in the process establishing its connection with Kantian Ethics.

"Sidgwick and Kant: on the so-called 'discrepancies' between Utilitarian and Kantian Ethics"

by Mariko Nakano-Okuno

in Henry Sidgwick: Happiness and Religion, edited by Placido Bucolo, Roger Crisp, and Bart Schultz, and published by University of Catania Press, 2007.

"Acting for the Right Reasons"

by Julia Markovits

Philosophical Review, Vol. 119, No. 2 (April 2010), pp. 201-242.

This paper examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right... more This paper examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons.  I argue against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right, and argue that Kantians and others ought instead to accept the view that morally worthy actions are those performed for the reasons why they are right.  In other words, morally worthy actions are those for which the reasons why they were performed (the reasons motivating them) and the reasons why they morally ought to have been performed (the reasons morally justifying them) coincide.  I call this the Coincident Reasons Thesis, and argue that it provides plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for morally worthy action, defending the claim against proposed counterexamples.  I end by showing that the plausibility of the thesis, which I argue is largely independent of any particular ethical standpoint, gives us some reason to doubt a class of ethical theories that includes utilitarianism.

Defending a Kantian Conception of Duties to Self and Others

by Keith Bustos

Published in The Journal of Value Inquiry, 42 (2008).

Morality as Practical Cognition

by Carla Bagnoli

abridged version Pacific APA Symposium on Engstrom, 2011

Self-Deception and Agential Authority

by Carla Bagnoli

HumanaMente n. 20 2012 special vol. edited by Pedrini

This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated... more This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions of rationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining the selective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moral sanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining the stability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities of self-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are high: it protects the agent’s self by undermining the authority she has on her mental life. To this extent, self-deception is akin to alienation and estrangement. Its morally disturbing feature is its self-serving partiality. The self-deceptive agent settles on standards of justification that are lower than any rational agent would adopt, and thus loses grip on her agency. To capture the moral dimension of self-deception, I defend a Kantian account of the constraints that bear on self-constitution, and argue that it warrants more discriminating standards of agential autonomy than other contemporary minimalist views of self-government.

Constructivism in metaethics

by Carla Bagnoli

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (published, Dec 2011)

Entry on the definition of constructivism in metaethics. Section §1 defines the scope of constructivism in ethics, in... more Entry on the definition of constructivism in metaethics. Section §1 defines the scope of constructivism in ethics, in contrast to constructivism in political theory. Sections §§2-5 illustrate the main varieties of metaethical constructivism, which are designed to account for the nature of normative truths and practical reasons. Section §6 presents the main varieties of constructivist accounts of the justification of moral judgments of right and wrong. Section §7 discusses the metaethical status of constructivism, and its distinctive import.

Review of Stephen Engstrom The Form of Practical Knowledge (EJP forthcoming)

by Carla Bagnoli

forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy n.1 2012

Morality as Practical Cognition

by Carla Bagnoli

forthcoming in ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY (abridged version Pacific APA Symposium on Engstrom, San Diego, 2011)

Stephen Engstrom argues for placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism. My remarks are intended... more Stephen Engstrom argues for placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism. My remarks are intended to highlight the merits of his interpretation in contrast to intuitionism and constructivism, understood as ways of appropriating Kant’s legacy. In particular, I focus on two issues: first, the special character of practical knowledge – as opposed to theoretical knowledge, and craft expertise; and second, the apparent tension between the demands of morality and the requirements of instrumental reason, when this is understood as driven by concerns for happiness, prudence, and personal integrity.

The False Appeal of Kantian Intuitionism

by Carla Bagnoli