Kant, legal and political philosophy, feminist philosophy

A superação hegeliana do dualismo entre determinismo e liberdade

by Hector Ferreiro

Paper reat at the Symposium `Sujeito e liberdade na filosofia moderna alemã´, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, Brazil, August 26-28, 2011.

The Truth About Kant On Lies

by James Mahon

‘All Politics Must Bend Its Knee Before Right’: Kant on the Relation of Morals to Politics

by Paul Formosa

Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 2 (2008): 1-25

Kant argues that “all politics must bend its knee before right” (PP: 8:380), and this means that “right must never be... more Kant argues that “all politics must bend its knee before right” (PP: 8:380), and this means that “right must never be accommodated to politics, but politics must always be accommodated to right” (SRL: 8:429).  Kant’s uncompromising stance on the relation of morals to politics has often been branded unrealistic and impractical. Indeed, it has often been argued that putting Kantian morality into political practice would, according to Alasdair MacIntyre, amount to “a dereliction of political duty”.  While justice (and morality) can afford to be blind, politics must keep its eyes wide open. Does this accusation of naïve impracticality against Kant stand up to criticism? With these difficulties in mind, this paper will address the question of the relation of morals to politics in Kant’s work by first offering an interpretation of Kant’s moral and political theory. In section two I reject those readings of Kant, which are not uncommon, that claim that his moral theory absolutely forbids lying under any circumstances. In section three I also reject those readings of Kant, which again are not uncommon, that claim that his political theory absolutely forbids civil disobedience and rebellion under any circumstances. Drawing upon this reconstructive exegesis, I argue in section four that Kant’s position on the relation of morals to politics is both morally uncompromising and yet politically flexible, both principled and practical. Further, I also examine in depth the claim that political progress is impossible without accompanying moral progress. A fully politicised public realm requires not only a rights-respecting but also a virtuous citizenry.

Kant's Justification of the Death Penalty Reconsidered - Kantian Review - Uncorrected Proofs

by Benjamin Yost

Critics claim that Kant’s enthusiastic embrace of the death penalty is incompatible with, or at least not required by,... more Critics claim that Kant’s enthusiastic embrace of the death penalty is incompatible with, or at least not required by, the principles of his practical philosophy. I argue that Kant has a strong justification of capital punishment, although it is not one that he seems to have noticed, and it is certainly not one he defended. I begin with the argument that Kant does explicitly develop: Kant claims that punishments must match their crimes, and so murderers must die. I defend this view against critics who argue that Kant’s use of the ius talionis is inconsistent and arbitrary, and I conclude that the doctrine of the ius talionis generates a prima facie justification of the death penalty. I then turn to two objections that try to show that the ius talionis does not ultimately justify capital punishment. The first claims that execution is impermissible because it infringes on a person’s inviolable right to life; the second claims that execution is impermissible because it violates human dignity. These are serious objections insofar as they employ an alleged categorical requirement to show that Kant’s endorsement of capital punishment is incompatible with his fundamental moral commitments. But I argue that while Kant’s own discussion of the death penalty contains no answer to these objections, a successful Kantian response can be developed. Turning to Kant’s discussion of honor, I argue that motives of honor would drive a rational person to endorse her own execution, were she to commit murder. Since practical reason requires a murderer to submit to the executioner’s hand, the right to life and dignity objections fail. The dignity argument fails because honorable people always act in ways that preserve their dignity, and since an honorable person would will to be executed, execution cannot violate dignity. The right to life argument fails because safeguarding the murderer’s life purchases his life at the cost of his honor and dignity, and there is no such thing as a right to life if the enforcement of this right leads to a violation of human dignity. In this way, the Kantian argument for the legitimacy of capital punishment is vindicated.

Kant, la metafísica y lo político

by Miguel Cuéllar

Este trabajo intenta mostrar que en la Crítica de la razón pura, Kant pretende adecuar la metafísica a la entonces... more Este trabajo intenta mostrar que en la Crítica de la razón pura, Kant pretende adecuar la metafísica a la entonces nueva forma de conocimiento y verdad establecida por la física newtoniana. En este intento, afirma que todo conocimiento válido tiene como límite el mundo de los fenómenos sensibles y que toda verdad absoluta sobre las ideas metafísicas de dios, el alma, la libertad y el ser es imposible, pues estas son ideas que no tienen existencia como fenómenos del mundo sensible. La imposiblidad de conocerlas objetivamente hace necesaria una crítica para aclarar qué validez podemos aceptar con respecto a los juicios que se hacen sobre estas ideas, pues aunque éstas no existen como objetos sensibles, no obstante, tienen efectos en el ámbito ético y político.
Con esta nueva forma de concebirla, Kant logra proponer una metafísica que le sirve de fundamento y justificación al régimen político concebido por la filosofía de la ilustración, un régimen republicano basado en la idea de libertad y que en los años en que fue publicada la obra de Kant estaba en pugna con el régimen absolutista, al cual finalmente logró derrocar y sustituir. La metafísica kantiana, vista desde esta interpretación, tiene en última instancia un fin político.