Justification and evidence

La justification et la présentation des démarches de responsabilité sociétale dans la communication corporate : notes d’analyse textuelle d’une nouvelle rhétorique épidictique

by Andrea Catellani

Études de communication, 37 | 2011, [En ligne], mis en ligne le 01 décembre 2013. URL : http://edc.revues.org/index3204.html.

L’article s’interroge sur une forme récente de rhétorique, le discours « corporate » dédié à l’engagement des grandes... more L’article s’interroge sur une forme récente de rhétorique, le discours « corporate » dédié à l’engagement des grandes entreprises dans le domaine de la protection de l’environnement. L’analyse, d’orientation sémiotique, veut observer en premier lieu les modalités de justification explicite des démarches environnementales, l’énonciation argumentée des raisons de cet engagement. En second lieu, nous prenons en considération la simple présentation des actions de l’acteur-entreprise dans le domaine de la RSE, et de l’environnement en particulier. Dans ce second cas, nous nous intéressons surtout à la dynamique constante entre deux formes textuelles, le récit et la liste. Il s’agit de voir comment le discours corporate propose certains actes et pratiques comme étant des éléments valorisés, et réciproquement comment l’entreprise est représentée comme « sujet de valeur ».

Justification and presentation of corporate social responsibility activities in corporate communication : notes of textual analysis on a new epideictic rhetoric

The paper is focused on a recent form or rhetoric, corporate discourse dedicated to the engagement of big firms in the field of environmental protection. The analysis is semiotic-oriented. The paper observes firstly the modalities of justification of environmental activities, the argued enunciation of the reasons of this engagement. Secondly, it takes into consideration the representation of the actions of the firm in the field of CSR, in particular in its environmental aspect. In this second case, we will focus on the constant dynamic between two text forms, story and list. The paper tries to see how corporate discourse proposes specific acts and practices as valuable elements, and how the firm is represented as a « valuable subject ».

Justification as 'Would-Be' Knowledge

by Aidan McGlynn

Draft only. Final version forthcoming in Episteme.

In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists... more In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. A further aim is to defend a more traditional conception, according to which justification is a matter of sufficiently high evidential likelihood. In particular, I suggest that this conception of justification offers a plausible account of lottery cases: cases in which one believes a true proposition—for example that one’s lottery ticket will lose—on the basis of probabilistic evidence.

Evidence for false evidence

by Neil Mehta

Draft only.

Assuming that evidence is propositional, I defend the view that some false propositions can constitute evidence. I... more Assuming that evidence is propositional, I defend the view that some false propositions can constitute evidence. I begin by providing a theoretically neutral characterization of evidence: evidence is the proper basis for evidential beliefs, i.e., those beliefs which are justified at least partly in virtue of being properly based on something. I then motivate several constraints for a theory of evidence, including (i) intuitively grounded constraints concerning the presence or absence of justification in particular cases, and (ii) theoretical constraints concerning our access to evidential propositions. I argue that, if evidence is propositional, these constraints may be jointly satisfied only if some false propositions constitute evidence. Finally, I rebut recent objections by Littlejohn and Williamson against the existence of false propositional evidence.

Esperienze, linguaggio, giustificazione. Su "A Manual of Experimental Philosophy" di David Berman

by Daniele Bertini

Giornale di Metafisica, 33(3), 2011.

David Berman's work on experimental philosophy is a defence of a traditional approach to empiricism against both... more David Berman's work on experimental philosophy is a defence of a traditional approach to empiricism against both contemporary rationalism and logico-analytic philosophy. While his approach focuses on empirical evidence in support of theoretical claims, Berman distinguishes his position from the kind of experimentalism recently risen from the analytic world. After having highlighted the merit of Berman's approach to philosophy, I comment on his main views, addressing particularly the relationship between language, intuitions and experience from the standpoint of the epistemological topic of belief justification.

Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency

by Declan Smithies

Forthcoming in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of... more Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson’s argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, but it fails to show that no conditions are epistemically transparent. Moreover, this reinstates the argument from the transparency of evidence against factive mentalism.

Discovery and Communication of Important Marketing Findings: Evidence and Proposals

by J Armstrong

Reprinted with permission from Journal of Business Research, 56 (2002) 69-84, with commentaries by Rossiter and Lehmann, pp. 85-90. A response to the commentary was published as “The Value of Surprising Findings for Research on Marketing,” pp. 91-92.

My review of empirical research on scientific publication led to the following conclusions. Three criteria are useful... more My review of empirical research on scientific publication led to the following conclusions. Three criteria are useful for identifying whether findings are important: replication, validity, and usefulness. A fourth criterion, surprise, applies in some situations. Based on these criteria, important findings resulting from academic research in marketing seem to be rare. To a large
extent, this rarity is due to a reward system that is built around subjective peer review. Rather than using peer review as a secret screening process, using an open process likely will improve papers and inform readers. Researchers, journals, business schools, funding agencies, and professional organizations can all contribute to improving the process. For example, researchers should do directed research on papers that contribute to principles. Journals should invite papers that contribute to principles. Business school administrators should reward researchers who make important findings. Funding agencies should base decisions on researchers' prior success in making important findings, and professional organizations should maintain web sites that describe what is known about principles and what research is needed on principles.

Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth?

by Daniel Whiting

Forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2012).

It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory... more It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief’s aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief’s aim using the notion of truth. In this paper, by considering whether they can account for belief’s standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief’s aim given in terms of truth and advance a neglected alternative.

The myth of the false, justified belief

by Clayton Littlejohn

I defend the view that there are no false, justified beliefs. Most of this paper has been incorporated into... more I defend the view that there are no false, justified beliefs. Most of this paper has been incorporated into Justification and the Truth-Connection (Cambridge University Press).

John Dewey's Logic of Science

by Matthew J. Brown

forthcoming (tentatively in October 2012) in HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science

In recent years, pragmatism in general and John Dewey in particular have been of increasing interest to philosophers... more In recent years, pragmatism in general and John Dewey in particular have been of increasing interest to philosophers of science. Dewey's work provides an interesting alternative package of views to those which derive from the logical empiricists and their critics, on problems of both traditional and more recent vintage. Dewey's work ought to be of special interest to recent philosophers of science committed to the program of analyzing ``science in practice.'' The core of Dewey's philosophy of science is his theory of inquiry---what he called ``logic.'' There is a major lacuna in the literature on this point, however: no contemporary philosophers of science have engaged with Dewey's logical theory, and scholars of Dewey's logic have rarely made connections with philosophy of science. This paper aims to fill this gap, to correct some significant errors in the interpretation of key ideas in Dewey's logical theory, and to show how Dewey's logic provides resources for a philosophy of science.

Beyond Risk: Emplacement and the Production of Environmental Evidence

by Joshua Reno

published in the August 2011 issue of American Ethnologist

I offer a counterpoint to the prevailing risk literature that focuses not on (mis)perceptions of danger but on the... more I offer a counterpoint to the prevailing risk literature that focuses not on (mis)perceptions of danger but on the production and circulation of different forms of evidence and the environmental claims they promote. Rather than reproduce the epistemic dichotomies associated with risk discourse, I discuss attempts by waste-industry technicians, government inspectors, lawyers, area residents, and activists to generate persuasive accounts of a large, U.S. landfill and its porous boundaries. I argue that the differential influence of their various claims is best understood by examining what it means to know and care for a place.