Just war theory (Philosophy)

The Nature of Necessity in the Just War Theories of The West and Islam

by Eric Gallager

The second paper I wrote for my Peace Studies class with Professor Irene Oh in the fall semester of my junior year at GWU.

In this paper I argue that the argument of necessity serves similar purposes in the just war theories of both the West... more In this paper I argue that the argument of necessity serves similar purposes in the just war theories of both the West and Islam, and that what differs between how it is used in each is what exactly constitutes "necessity."

A Death to Celebrate?: The Just-War Tradition and the Killing of Bin Laden

by Ronald Osborn

Commonweal, Vol.138, No.11, June 3, 2011 (cover story)

Was the killing of bin Laden a legitimate action? Most Americans have already concluded that it was. For those... more Was the killing of bin Laden a legitimate action? Most Americans have already concluded that it was. For those Christians who subscribe to just-war precepts, however, perhaps the most difficult requirement of the tradition is the demand that we mourn rather than celebrate the deaths of our foes, and that the occasion of killing be one of moral introspection rather than of unbridled enthusiasm or unexamined joy among those who claim justice for their side.

12. "Moral Considerations in Rabbinic Literature Regarding the Warsaw Uprising".

by Isaac Hershkowitz

in: Amnon Shapira & Yigal Levin (eds.), War and Peace in Jewish Tradition: From the Biblical World to the Present (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, forthcoming).

Fairness and Liability in the Just War: Combatants, Non-Combatants, and Lawful Irregulars

by Christopher Finlay

Forthcoming in Political Studies. For a slightly earlier version of the essay, please follow the link.

Critics of non-uniformed ‘irregular’ warfare argue that it is unfair both to non-combatants and to enemy ‘regulars’. I... more Critics of non-uniformed ‘irregular’ warfare argue that it is unfair both to non-combatants and to enemy ‘regulars’. I contest that view by asking how the leaders of a people forced to fight a just war should distribute risks within their own population. Insofar as all are the victims of aggression or unjust occupation, I argue, no citizens on the just side are morally liable to attack. But to benefit from the restraining effects of the principle of discrimination, some members must be rendered legally liable. Political leaders must therefore find the most appropriate distribution of the risk of harm, first, by deciding which and how many citizens to select as ‘combatants’; and second, by specifying how far to distance combatants from civilians. I identify four normative considerations that must be taken into account: each possible arrangement must (1) fulfil basic requirements of fairness domestically; then, between equally fair arrangements, leaders ought to determine which offers the most auspicious balance between (2) the goal of survival during the war (of the society and as many of its members as possible) and (3) the goal of winning it and, hence, eliminating the injustices that caused the war; finally (4) the arrangement should not be unfair to enemy combatants. On this basis, I argue that in spite of the increased risks it poses to civilians, limited ‘irregular’ warfare might be deployed legitimately against occupiers where the use of uniforms would have rendered insurgents vulnerable to targeted assassination or arrest prior to actual combat.

Cyber-Security and the Law of War: The Legal and Ethical Aspects of Cyber-conflict

by Andrew Liaropoulos

Over the last years there is a growing body of literature over exploiting cyberspace for offensive and defensive... more Over the last years there is a growing body of literature over exploiting cyberspace for offensive and defensive purposes. Cyber-conflict is after all the newest mode of warfare and cyber-weapons have been described as weapons of mass disruption. Although the attention on the technical and military dimensions of cyberspace is justifiable, one needs also to look into the legal and ethical aspects of cyber-conflict, in order to comprehend the complex nature of cyberspace. The lack of an international legal framework that defines the use of force in cyberspace, operational difficulties in deterring and identifying cyber-attacks as well as the asymmetric dimension of cyber-conflicts pose without a doubt, great pressure on both theorists and practitioners of warfare. This paper will highlight the legal and ethical dilemmas regarding the use of force in cyberspace and question how the Law of War can be applied to cyber-threats.

The Burden of Autonomy: Non-combatant Immunity and Humanitarian Intervention

by William Cornwell

Ethical Perspectives 12.3 (September 2005): 341-355

Michael Walzer argues that except in cases involving genocide or mass slaughter, humanitarian intervention is... more Michael Walzer argues that except in cases involving genocide or mass slaughter, humanitarian intervention is unjustified because "citizens get the government they deserve, or, at least, the government for which they are 'fit.'" Yet, if people are autonomous and deserve the government that rules over them, then it would seem that they are responsible for the government's actions, including their nations' wars of aggression. That line of thought undermines the doctrine of non-combatant immunity, which is perhaps the most important of Walzer's jus in bello principles. In this way, the concept of self-determination frustrates Walzer's attempts to keep jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations separate.

Just Wars, Angry Wars, Democratic Wars: the Athenian Model.

by Giulia Sissa

This paper is an expanded version of my my contribution to an International Conference, held in Paris, 15 - 16 - 17 November 2007,
at the Institut National d'Histoire de l'Art:

Les femmes, le feminin et le politique apres Nicole Loraux

The event was co-sponsored by: Equipe Pheacie, Centre Louis Gernet, UMR Genre, Travail, Mobilites; Reseau Interdisciplinaire et Interuniversitaire National sur le Genre.
The proceedings are now published in the "Discussion Series" of the Center for Hellenic Studies, Harvard University.

Founded on the principle of freedom of all, a democratic city cannot, purely and simply,sport imperial expansion,... more Founded on the principle of freedom of all, a democratic city cannot, purely and simply,sport imperial expansion, aimed at the domination of others. In words (at least) a democratic
war has to be waged to protect freedom, or to make liberty equally shared. Athens therefore invented that self-applauding, and now trite, argument that, when fought on behalf of democracy, a war is always just. Or, in the language of the Greeks, it is beautiful, noble, worthy of praise. Firstly, it will always be intended for self-protection (and, later, security) even when it consists of the most aggressive intervention in, or against, other cities. Secondly, it will always be conducted for the sake of somebody else: allies, and preferably weaker or offended parties. Democratic wars preserve, by definition, the principles of democracy. Thirdly, in the oratory of a prominent speech-writer, who composes his arguments after 403, every democratic war reenacts – in the virtually infinite extension of liberty of all – a foundational struggle, the one which is praiseworthy above all, the democratic revolution. Lysias’ montage of Athenian history from the stand point, and on behalf, of democracy restored, will be our focus. But not simply as a narrative.
Because democracy operates through speech-acts, and because felicitous speech-acts are made up of moving arguments, the life of democracy requires an orchestration of the
passions. In Lysias’ language on war, we can see a particularly powerful emotional component. If a righteous war is defensive, it has to be vindictive. The narrative and explanation of conflicts fit the pattern of the most political of human emotions: anger, as the honorable wish to punish an undeserved offense. To present a war – and, what is less obvious, a civil war – as just means to claim that it is, indeed, an act of retaliation, justified by an assault, that was unjustified in the first place; the emotional effect of this claim is to feel anger, and to arouse it in the audience. The rhetoric of the just war is a rhetoric of anger. Democratic wars are angry wars.
Now, anger is the quintessentially aristocratic, Homeric and tragic passion, felt by gods,heroes and kings. Anger, Aristotle claims, is the response to an unmerited slight, by all those who merit recognition, even deference, thus cannot endure disrespect. The anger of the People, which Lysias’ oratory stokes with great verve, is part of a peculiar feature of Atheniandemocracy: the appropriation of the values and the discourse of the archaic, pan-Hellenic, nobility. Beyond the obvious paradigm of the resistance to the Persian invasion, another foundational war can be seen at the horizon of fourth century political culture: the Trojan War, that long story of a mênis, the “numinous” wrath of a slighted warrior, but also the tale of a vindictive and righteous expedition.